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1.1 Subject – Amnesty International and apartheid 
 
The subject of this study is a civil society human rights organization Amnesty International 
(Amnesty) and its approach towards human rights crisis in apartheid South Africa. 
Institutional basis for Amnesty’s activities is Universal Human Rights Declaration (UDHR) 
that was introduced by United Nations (UN) in 1948.1 Amnesty was established in 1961 on 
the initiative of British lawyer who decided to publish a set of articles in the Observer 
newspaper on the conditions of political prisoners. These articles caused an immediate 
reaction and eventually an entire movement and phenomenon of grass root level human rights 
activism was created. Amnesty is an organization that is based on the enthusiasms of the 
members who contribute to the action of organization financially (membership fees, 
collections, etc.) and by promoting human rights issues. Amnesty seeks financial and political 
autonomy by managing its resources and the foremost interest of this study is to comprehend 
that how this type of mass movement can contribute to improvement and promotion of human 
rights.2 This introduction deals mainly with paradigms of human rights studies and the 
strategy and principles of Amnesty will dealt more carefully in the next chapter (page 24). 
 
Amnesty is a global actor and it seeks to cover human rights issues evenly around the world 
regardless of political, social or cultural context. Apartheid and South Africa was a target 
among the other targets in Amnesty’s broad quest for human rights. Apartheid was an 
institutional system of racial segregation that was established in 1948 and it managed to carry 
on until 1994 through varying political and social phases. In the nexus of this phenomenon 
was apartheid state that organized and managed the project, which was based on premise that 
humans are inherently racially different. This desire was embodied in principle that a shared 
society between different cultural settings is a mere impossibility. In popular context 
apartheid has been comprehended overtly through conception of race whereas the strategy of 
apartheid fostered apartness also within ‘racial groups’. Besides claimed practical 
implications without doubt apartheid had its mythological implications, which makes 
analyzing apartheid society and state challenging and complicated. The social features and 
implications are inevitably intertwined with human rights violations and violence/violations 
can be seen as a dimension of apartheid. This study will examine how the mental and 
practical boundaries and desire to protect them affected human rights violations. The political 
                                                 
1 Baehr 1992, 116. 
2 Clark 2001, 5-8; Baehr 1994, 5-6. 
 2
history has focused on practical implications of apartheid but the mental and mythological 
side of apartheid has been a slippery target for researchers. Therefore to conceive human 
rights violations and violence presumes to approach apartheid from perspective that seeks to 
transgress the boundaries that leash and restrict the perspective of political history.     
 
 
 
1.2 Perspectives and methods 
 
The approach of this study arises from preceding studies and research tradition and 
particularly how research community has conceived how human communities set, change and 
hold boundaries. The basic assumption of this study is that there are boundaries that frame, 
restrict and define human communities and these boundaries have far reaching impact on 
human behavior. What kind of relevance these boundaries have from perspective of human 
rights? The foremost question is that how humans as a community conceive violence and on 
what kind of explanations, vindications, approval or rejection are these conceptions based on? 
In this quest two opposing views can be recognized. The first one is a moral approach that 
condemns violence as a deviation from humanity and it draws an unconditional boundary of 
humanity and inhumanity. The problem of setting moral boundary is that apartheid set also its 
unconditional moral boundaries and it defined also standards of inclusion and deviation. The 
current human rights theories are based on who has the most valid moral code and how it can 
be practically promoted. However, it is questionable that how well human rights norms could 
reach apartheid community that was controlled by another kind of morality and mentality. 
Following the normative logic in historical perspective can only lead to dead ends of thinking 
and appalling anachronism. People who were influenced by the sphere of apartheid were 
moral in that particular context and they realized their tenets by following what apartheid 
community suggested as moral and honorable.   
 
Now we have a paradox between traditional moral theory and human rights. How can it be 
solved? First we have to recognize that the manner in which apartheid state constructed other 
groups as threat and consequently portrayed them as opponents and enemies. The morality of 
apartheid drew a boundary between civilized society for White people, and customary and 
‘uncivilized’ society for non-white people. The mission of apartheid was not coherent and it 
attached and utilized mythological symbols and taboos on people who were set outside of the 
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proper society. Apartheid claimed an authentic identity for all the people and claimed that 
these as unchanged originalities. South African society was under immense socio-economical 
change in this particular time of modernization, which inevitable changed ways of living and 
consequently the social positions and identities.3 This change threatened the moral boundary 
of apartheid that had marginalized non-white people out of ‘civilized’ context whereas the 
social and economical movement was inevitable penetrating the boundary of identity and 
morality. We will see through this study how political opponents were stigmatized and 
dehumanized and they became legitimate objects in project of maintaining moral boundaries 
by violence.    
 
Now we have recognized that maintaining and promoting moral attitudes has two sides. The 
first one is the aspiration to reach the center of morality and respect of community - moral and 
social acceptance, which constructs the coherence of the community. The other side of this 
phenomenon is keeping and defending the moral boundaries that influence the attitude 
towards out groups. This social development is defining from the perspective of human rights 
if it leads to dehumanization of certain groups and stripping them of their rights as humans. In 
the case of apartheid this was not solely a question of logic and from the perspective of 
outsider the desire to segregate appears partially as superstitious. It is difficult to draw a line 
when these emotions were ‘genuinely’ present and when they were particularly fostered and 
on the other hand encouraged and promoted for political purposes. However, it is clear that 
people who were assaulted by apartheid regime were dehumanized and pushed beyond the 
boundaries of humanity.   
 
When we see that apartheid was a system with strong moral conviction and strong self-
confidence that was based on high morality we can ask that how it possible to communicate 
with people who deny others’ human rights in its moral quest? Is a moral approach viable at 
all in comprehending human rights? The question here is not about whether torture and other 
human rights violations were right or wrong because they are inherently wrong. The question 
is that how a particular moral scenario or worldview can be accessed and influenced. Making 
moral statements on torture and perform actions that actually improve human rights can be 
two utterly dissimilar matters. Apartheiders who had been targets and actors of social process 
of constructing moral boundaries believed that their entire lifestyle and civilization is at stake 
                                                 
3 Mamdani 1996, 6. 
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and apartheid an answer for their question of persistence. This determination could not be 
converted simply by stating that defending those borders by violent means is not acceptable. 
What human rights theories and political science has not been able to admit that the reasons 
for such scenarios have to be looked from un-reason and unreasonable, from within the tenets 
of apartheid. Whereas the modern science seeks to maintain a rational worldview it cannot 
accept that technocratic and scientific state can be a source and implement of executing 
superstitious desires. To admit this is a minimum presumption to proceed in the question of 
human rights in apartheid South Africa.  
  
What does moral or normative approach state about the activities of Amnesty regarding what 
has been pronounced above? The starting point has to be that perpetrators, torturers and 
killers should not be dehumanized, stigmatized and demonized. How it this is possible 
because affirmatively violence appear for its opponent as utter deviation for humanity and 
painstakingly inconceivable? Often violence has been conceived through such superstitious 
conceptions as evil and for example Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has 
recognized this problem and it has referred in this question holocaust research that has sought 
to transgress the moral boundaries that restrict the examination of human rights violations.4 
The reason for this approach is the violence and agonizing past could be easily pushed beyond 
the moral boundary, to a grey area of humanity that does not explain anything.  Now we have 
recognized that there is a paradox between morality, boundaries and a mission to ethically and 
responsibly conceive human rights violations. This problem regards Amnesty as an 
organization and also its members and how they process the phenomenon of violence. There 
is an affirmative temptation to stigmatize the torturers. Without doubt human rights activism 
originates from disgust against downright violence. The problem is that observers cannot see 
the motives and the moral boundaries that inspire the torture. Negative emotions are allowed 
and even desired, but the violence as a phenomenon is something that has to be carefully 
processed and in this mission the contemporary human rights studies have failed. 
 
The most complicated problem is that violence causes violence and often State repression is 
followed by liberation movements who apply violence for liberating aims. Amnesty has 
applied a policy that it will not adopt prisoners who have resorted or endorsed violence. 
Adoption is a procedure where a political prisoner is being recognized and consequently 
                                                 
4 TRC Vol. 5 Chapter 7. 258.* 
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Amnesty starts a promotion and publicity campaign to protect the prisoner from inhuman 
treatment. Amnesty also appeals for freeing of person who has been imprisoned solely on 
political basis. However, it is difficult to restrict the problem to individual prisoners because 
they are often members of organizations that resort violence. Therefore the question is larger 
and often we tend to stigmatize one side of the conflict and another liberating side is being on 
the contrary confirmed. This is a subject that is a taboo in human rights studies and even 
though the existence of this phenomenon can be seen on the background, researchers have 
been timid to process this apparent problem. One of the foremost questions of this study is 
that how Amnesty managed to mentally and morally process human rights violations that 
originated from the ‘both sides’ of the conflict. 
  
 
 
1.3 Sources and preceding studies 
 
What do the previous studies suggest regarding the problem of approaching violence and 
human rights violations? In this respect mainly two opposing arguments can be recognized. 
The first is Peter Baehr’s article Amnesty International and its self-imposed limited mandate, 
which largely leans on practical implications of human rights activities. The second argument 
or school is the group of researcher who base their presentations on human rights norms and 
they lean largely of moral implications of human rights. Moral in this context should not be 
seen as morality in traditional sense and it could be characterized as practical morality. 
However, the limitations of moral boundaries are the main problem of this school and the 
critique in this study is focused on these confining boundaries.  
 
What does Baehr suggest about problem of approaching violence that invokes strong 
emotional reactions? Baehr has diminished the problem of violence as mere practical question 
and by doing that the mental dimension is being neglected. He claims that Amnesty has 
adopted the principle of non-violence for merely practical reasons and he argues that pacifists 
and non-pacifists have to be able to act within the same organization. According to this non-
violence is a compromise amidst varying comprehensions regarding violence. This is the 
practical side of human rights activism, but it surely has a mental dimension as well and this 
affects strongly how activism is being managed and implemented. This is a question that 
human rights studies have not been able to grasp. Does the concept of pacifism offer any 
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sensible approach towards human rights whatsoever? Is the question of pacifism decisive 
from the perspective of human rights activism? Pacifism is a misleading strong one-
dimensional and analogical symbol that can only simplify our understanding on human 
rights.5  
 
However, it can reveal something that studies have not been able unveil by this far. The 
question is that is a non-pacifist capable to foster equal human rights even-handedly? To deny 
violence from one and to allow it for others presumes hierarchical mental constructions and 
justifications what is acceptable violence. On the other hand the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights states that all the human beings should be protected from violence. Factually 
this is not the case, so how should we approach the question? The problem is that when the 
enemy is constructed, habitually dehumanization and myths are involved in this process. A 
group or human being is dehumanized as legitimate target of violence. Another extreme is 
cold-blooded violence where theoretically group or individual bypass the emotions and apply 
violence for inherently universally moral and right reasons. For example military 
organizations are influenced by this popular illusion. Meaning of these analogies is not to 
congeal theoretical standpoints but to cause confusion and point out that what is seen as self-
evident in research tradition is actually a collection of complicit questions. The current 
theories seem to have fallen into false certainty on feasibility of violence and one intention of 
this study is to show possible downsides of moral agency. 
 
The argument of Baehr leans on positive philosophy that individuals are capable of making 
rational decisions, however, violence is a question that is surrounded by myths and un-reason 
that cannot be easily reached by rationality. Pacifism does not necessarily imply lapsing into 
misery of surrendering voluntarily to violent abuse.  Pacifism could be interpreted denying 
participating the collective process of dehumanization where community stigmatizes groups 
or persons as evil or undesirable. We have to admit that as humans we have apparent problem 
of processing phenomenon of violence and this has led to situation where liberating violence 
is being of often condoned and even glorified. We can either loose the grip when criticizing 
the ‘oppressor’ or approving the ‘liberator’. This is a question that cannot be approached 
exclusively from moral principles or the boundaries of morality have to be explored, 
recognized and possibly transgressed in each case. As a result Baehr’s argument 
                                                 
5 Baehr 1994, 14. 
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underestimates the problem of equal human rights and also he overestimates the capability of 
humanity naturally to judge righteously what acceptable violence is.  
 
Therefore Baehr’s presentation cannot prepare us for a difficult question regarding humans 
committing horrifying acts in the name of liberty. It is a definitive problem from perspective 
of human rights if a human rights activist or organization believes in deserved harm or 
confined human rights. This question might appear now as irrelevant but the coming chapters 
will reveal the complicity of this seemingly simple question. This study cannot offer profound 
and versatile argument of relation of human rights and political philosophy of violence, but 
hopefully I manage to point out that this is a crucial question that has not been uncovered and 
invented in human rights studies. There is no violence without fear and terror and this has 
strong political consequences and implications that have not been recognized by human rights 
studies. The false sense of controllability and malleability have possibly caused that that 
human rights issues are not being managed with seriousness that they should be.   
 
What about the approach of normative school? Can it offer any guidance for this paradox? 
Ann Marie Clark has written a book from normative perspective called Diplomacy of 
Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms. The foremost thesis 
of Clark is that Amnesty has essentially fostered human rights through norms and by doing 
that it has demanded and installed international dedication to human rights. In that sense the 
results of Amnesty and Clark are unquestionable and the boundary of the norms has been 
successfully pushed further and governments have been included in the sphere of human 
rights norms successfully. However, the problem of this study concerns trancendenting and 
transgressing the boundaries and the case of apartheid is exceptional because the pushing the 
moral boundary further failed due to many reasons. Therefore the interest of this study is 
focused on what happens when the norms and power behind them is not sufficient and the 
worldview of ‘dissenter’ cannot be directly influenced. 
 
The most extensive normative human rights theory by this far is spiral model which is the 
basis of The Power of Human Rights. This book consists of theoretical setting and 5 cases 
studies. The South African among these cases presented by David Black. Spiral model is 
based on such conceptions as norms, identity and socialization. What kind on entrance this 
platform provides to conceive the theory and practice of human rights? The current theories 
have intense interest on how the international community can be mobilized for human rights 
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work, but when the problem is approached from perspective norms the normative theory often 
forgets to examine what kind of impact actually this mobilization has on the human rights 
violating State. In this respect the values of apartheid and human rights norms set into 
confrontation and principally apartheid state was not willing to bargain on its moral 
conviction. This does not mean surrendering before the problem but such closeness sets an 
overwhelming challenge for human rights activism to exceed and enlarge the normative 
standpoints.  
 
Yet another problem that regards human rights norms is that spiral model does not define 
what qualifies as a human rights norm. Norms are being discussed on a level of strategy and 
method and therefore it is impossible to define what is normative and what should be 
contributed to situational creativity. The danger with norms is that they can become 
analogical political implements and they do not actually improve human rights but create a 
sense of connectedness and progress. I will criticize Black for contributing the power of 
norms analogically in the end of the next chapter. The claim of spiral model is that reluctant 
human rights violating states get thrown into human rights spiral when they give dishonest 
and fine sounding promises without implementing them. The next step after the analogical 
beginning is the actual change that will be accelerated and supported by human rights 
activism. My intention is to put this proposition on trial and ask whether spiral model 
contributes too much success on human rights norms in the case of apartheid.6     
 
Socialization is a norm that plays a central role in the construction of spiral model. 
Socialization refers to information and knowledge that is being transferred through social 
interaction and communication. What kinds of experiences are possible to transfer through 
socialization? The foremost intuition is that things such gender roles, nationality, ethnicity, 
mother tongue can qualify as things transferred in socialization. Besides that there can be 
engineered socializations that take place through various social institutions such as schools. 
But how can human rights be transferred through socialization and norms? The first 
shortcoming of this idea is that it positions humans to higher and lower positions regarding 
their normative and cognitive status. Apartheid had already created a strong moral basis and 
apartheiders got socialized mainly to their immediate surroundings, which was primary in 
comparison to other moral settings. Learning of human rights is possible but the burden in this 
                                                 
6 Risse & Sikkink 1999, 22-24. 
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process and search cannot be placed solely on the human rights violating state because it has 
to exceed its morality whereas the external observer, according to contemporary theory, is the 
source of morality and right inherently.7  
 
Yet another conception that spiral model applies is shaming, which is based on the idea of 
imposing social sanctions in form of condemnation.8 This is also a key concept in 
understanding of Amnesty’s procedure. The motivation for human rights activism is rising 
from this factor and also the desired impact is been attained through publicity and promotion 
and shame is an essential aspect of Amnesty’s power. In other words Amnesty is activating 
potentiality of other actors by producing information and the essential impetus of this data is 
that it has emotional implications and it intentionally portrays human rights violating 
actor/State as shameful. Expectation is that this creates a state of dissonance, which 
consequently drives human rights violating actor to search for relieve by waiving human 
rights violating actions. But is this method actually improving human rights or is this the logic 
that we want to cherish for reason or another?  
 
Shaming improves human rights is a dubious logic because there are no unambiguous 
evidence that it would function in this way and it also anachronistically justifies Amnesty’s 
strategy. In the case of apartheid most of the human rights violations took place in the end of 
1980s and the beginning of 1990s when the consciousness of human rights and shaming were 
greatest and this is the fact that questions the logic of shaming. It would be just as feasible to 
claim that shaming can function as a provocation that led to apartheid state’s abstention from 
dialogue and continuation of violent policies. This does not mean that pressurizing and 
shaming should be abandoned as strategies of human rights improvement, but the aspect of 
shaming should not take over the other possible aspects. This is the most urgent problem 
considering Amnesty’s activities and the promotion of human rights constructs fairly lasting 
mental structure and this structure can be in contradiction with the actual human rights 
scenario. Since Amnesty is a mass movement based on voluntarism supposedly the thoughts 
of activist affect how human rights are being presented. It is clear that the reality of activists 
and the reality of apartheid were not the same. This constitutes a problem only if the actual 
human rights and human rights activism demarcates and it can be argued that Amnesty’s 
interest divorces human rights interest. The main target of Amnesty’s shaming was apartheid 
                                                 
7 Risse & Sikkink 1999, 11-17. 
8 Risse & Sikkink 1999, 15. 
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state even though non-State actors committed most of the violations. This problem will be 
dealt with in the IV chapter. It is the major problem of this study to understand the complicity 
and ambiguous character of human rights and this is also a major challenge for Amnesty to 
operate in stressful and complicit scenarios and maintain ability to comprehend issues 
comprehensively whereas there is a great danger of ‘narrow vision’. 
  
Besides human rights studies this presentation is based on historical studies on the modern 
South African history. The attention towards human rights is increasing in these types of 
presentations. One of the latest books published is James Barber’s South Africa in the 
twentieth century a political history - in search of a nation state. Historical studies are 
especially useful when the topic of this study is being contextualized and for example how 
human rights affected international politics is a matter of interest here. Anti-apartheid spirit 
that inspired human rights activities is strongly present in modern historical presentations on 
apartheid. This is a positive thing and this puts on trial problematic history that led to killing 
and torture of thousands of people. However, the remarks presented above on transgression 
regard historical presentations as well and there is a potential danger to portray history one-
dimensionally. For example Roger B. Beck has written on South African history on overtly 
critical manner in presentation called The History of South Africa. This will not make these 
studies useless, but in order to make them helpful they have be approached and interpreted 
with certain suspicion. One more presentation that has inspired this study is Lindsay Michie 
Eades’ The end of apartheid in South Africa. Among other things this study unravels how 
sanctions and generally anti-apartheid activists affected or did not affect how material and 
political resources were managed. The general intention in this study is to compare the picture 
that political history has given on human rights and compare with the manner in which 
Amnesty has portrayed the same era from different perspective. 
 
Besides theoretisized information the primary source of this study are the reports that 
Amnesty has published on human rights violations in South Africa. I have qualified three 
major reports which all represent a certain era, approach and attitude. The first report that 
Amnesty published was released in 1965. Prison Conditions in South Africa was a beginning 
of series reports that regarded particularly some certain country. This was first three-badge set 
of reports that inaugurated this country specific project. The other two reports of this badge 
were on Portugal and Romania. Amnesty’s intention was to pick up targets from all the 
political and cultural spheres to address the equality of human rights and also make clear there 
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are no political intentions behind human rights activities.9 The second larger report was 
released in 1978 under name Political Imprisonment in South Africa. There are major 
differences between this and the earlier report and the attention between these eras is focused 
on portraying how Amnesty’s reports changed and developed. The contents of these reports 
consist of providing political background and on this platform the actual human rights cases 
are being portrayed. Information consists of trials, newspaper articles, and interviews of the 
victims. The first chapter deals with how Amnesty processes this information. The last report 
that is being presented in this study is State of Fear: Security force complicity in torture and 
political killings 1990-1992 and differs largely from the preceding reports. South Africa 
entered into period of chaos in the mid 1980s and this continued until the beginning of 1990s 
and as a during this period human rights violations escalated from State institutions and they 
virtually crossed all the political associations and institutions in South Africa.  
 
The contents of these reports depended on the context of Amnesty and on political and social 
context within South Africa. All these factors have influenced how Amnesty acted and what 
kind of interests Amnesty had. The three main reports that are qualified for this study all 
represent largely unique discoursive contexts that can be only conceived as separate entities 
and therefore there are no general analytical tools that could be applied unambiguously on 
these unique contexts. Consequently the procession of Amnesty sources takes places 
continuously through this study and the interplay of ‘Amnesty context’ and ‘apartheid 
context’ will explain Amnesty’s position on human right in a particular era. 
 
Experiences and information gained from Amnesty reports is supplied with experiences of 
various people who were involved human rights violations issues by way or another. For 
example biographical material, interviews and statements by people who actually experienced 
the reality of apartheid are useful and they are not covered in the cloak of theory where 
experiences are disconnected from their original context. This does not mean either favoring 
or disfavoring either of these approaches but theory and political level has taken over in 
portraying South Africa’s history and therefore it is reasonable to underline how humans on 
the grass root level experienced human rights violations. Besides the lack of actual 
experiences in academic works these experiences are wildly presented by media and for 
example Eugene de Kock who was a central character regarding human rights violations has 
                                                 
9 Clark 2001, 14. 
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been labeled as ‘prime evil’.10 There are more useful ways of processing human rights 
violations than to attribute them to the myth of evil. This is a problem that historical studies 
should grab more decisively. 
 
Memoirs of Helen Suzman is a very useful source for comprehending and experiencing the 
atmosphere and attitude that dominated the management and understanding of human rights 
issue in apartheid South Africa. Memoirs of Suzman provide a vivid inside view to a 
community and regime that had very little social sensitivity. Suzman was the only anti-
apartheid activist in the apartheid Parliament and through that platform she could publicize 
and promote human rights even though the general atmosphere was rejecting human rights 
discourse entirely. Another autobiographical presentation that is used in this study is 
Raymong Suttner’s Inside apartheid's prison : notes and letters of struggle. In this 
presentation Suttner describes how he was persecuted by the security institutions of apartheid 
and how eventually he was torture and imprisoned for political reasons. Also some extracts of 
experiences of Albie Sachs and Nelson Mandela will be utilized to support and confirm what 
Amnesty has presented. 
 
The most extensive work regarding human rights in South Africa by this far is Truth and 
Reconciliation examinations and publications. TRC was State orchestrated organization found 
in 1995 to investigate human rights violations of apartheid era. TRC released its report and 
findings in 1998 in which it condemned the human rights violations of all the political sides. 
Publications consist of investigations, reports, statements, and hearings and generally on the 
information that the commission managed to obtain. TRC’s mission was two fold; it sought to 
investigate human rights violations in neutral manner and it also thrived to foster 
reconciliation and peace in deeply traumatized communities. TRC work is useful from the 
perspective of this study because Amnesty’s capability to acknowledge and analyze human 
rights violations was limited in contemporary context and TRC has managed in retrospect to 
uncover immense quantities of information regarding the very same issues as Amnesty 
investigated. Some of the cases that Amnesty has presented will be compared to the 
retrospective examinations of TRC. Besides gathering data TRC has structured and analyzed 
varying cases and it has developed a social scientific approach towards human rights. This 
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can give a good starting point for forthcoming human rights studies and TRC material 
provides good leads but the material needs profound examination and re-analysis.  
 
Some of the TRC information will be applied here as a primary source and some of it as a 
secondary source which means that I will lean on conclusion that have been made by TRC. 
The value of this information is largely advisory and it should not be considered as absolute 
truth. This study utilizes mainly Chapter 7, Causes, Motives and Perspectives of Perpetrators, 
which has been published in volume 5. TRC reports are widely available and they have been 
released on paper by McMillan, on CD by Jutastat11 and online by South African 
government.12 Whereas Amnesty strongly presented the view of ‘victims’ TRC seeks to 
uncover also what inspired and motivated the perpetrators. The basic principle of TRC was 
that it traded statements for amnesty and applicants/former perpetrators were granted amnesty 
for their activities if they gave honest information on past’s activities. This somewhat fostered 
the appearance of ‘truth’ when the perpetrators did not have to hide information in fear of 
incriminating themselves. However, there are several problems in contextualizing and 
interpreting TRC material and some of them will be issued in the corresponding chapters. 
Including this side in the analysis can widen our perspective and understanding on human 
rights violations. 
 
 
 
1.4 Formulation of the research task 
 
The foremost purpose of human rights activities is to influence and to make an impact and 
consequently contribute to improvement of human rights. Or this is the desirable outcome and 
the aim of this study is to find out to what extent this intention was successful. From the 
perspective of historical study interests of information are clashing in this task. The intention 
of Amnesty was to mobilize maximum amount of people to discredit and question the 
integrity of apartheid regime. Consequently this entail that Amnesty described reality on 
certain conditions that have to be acknowledged properly to facilitate Amnesty material as a 
relevant source. My hypothesis is that Amnesty sympathized with the “victims” and frowned 
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upon the “perpetrator”. The conflict began as apartheid state as the main “perpetrator” but the 
escalation of the conflict disintegrated this unambiguous category. One of the central 
questions is that how Amnesty managed to get a grip on the continuously rotating and 
changing scenario? Amnesty’s strategy to mobilize voluntary masses inevitably involved 
sympathizing with the victims, which can turn a project of human rights into a project 
sympathizing. This can be particularly misleading especially when the objects of sympathy 
become perpetrators. My task is to sort out by analyzing three discursive scenarios that how 
Amnesty reported on human rights violations in South Africa and how well this corresponds 
to the historical and human rights reality. This task can be seen other way round as well and 
Amnesty material can be used also for supplying the image that historical studies have 
produced.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I 
Unpractised activities of Amnesty and the domination of apartheid state 
in the 1960s 
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1.1 The rise of National Party and creation of apartheid in 1948  
 
South Africa’s apartheid system was established in 1948 after Afrikaner dominated National 
Party took the lead in South African politics. Racial segregation had been long before 1948 
part of South African politics and in 1948 it was institutionalized as a system of apartheid that 
created legal framework for the segregation. This system divided people in groups that were 
defined by race and cultural background and it was based on ideology of racial differences 
and White supremacy. The purpose of this system was to keep racial groups separated and 
create a privileged society for the White South African minority. The strength of apartheid lay 
on two pillars and the first one was the bureaucratic machinery that created and organized the 
solutions for segregation13 and the second one is the violent intervention and its objective was 
to suppress the subversive powers that tried to bring apartheid down by violence. In this study 
the particular interest is in the violent intervention and its consequences – human rights 
violations.  
 
 System was created in the end of 1950s and 1960s and supplied in the coming years of 
apartheid. The more repression heightened and the further the system progressed the more 
hated and resisted it became which brought about the rise of tension between the State and its 
opponents. Apartheid laws consisted of for example Mixed Marriages 1949 and Immorality 
Act which were designed to prevent sexual activity and marriages between the racial groups 
and especially between Whites and non-whites. Du Toit has interpreted that the function of 
this legislation was not to prevent people marry “over racial lines” because the amount such 
marriages was very low, “only fewer than 100 such marriages were concluded annually”. 
The actual function was “…to stigmatise those South Africans who were not classified white 
as being socially inferior”.14 The same year population registration act was created, which 
divided people into 4 categories Whites, Coloureds, Asians and Africans. To support and push 
the segregation further apartheid administration brought up Group Areas Act 1950 and 
Natives Resettlement Act 1954. These laws granted officials a possibility to forced removals 
and abolishing the settlement on areas that were to be reserved for the White population 
group. The most infamous forced removals were in Johannesburg’s Sophiatown in and 
District Six in Cape Town where the areas were demolished and in the case of Sophiatown a 
                                                 
13 Look for example Ivan Evans, Bureaucracy and Race, Native Administration in South Africa, University of 
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new area called Triomf15 for White people was built, whereas District Six remained deserted. 
The spatial segregation and the Pass Laws granted the State a wide authority to rule where the 
non-white population lived and worked. Du Toit notes that: “It has been calculated that more 
than 26 million Africans were prosecuted under the various laws restraining their free 
movement in the country between 1916 and 1982.”16 Also the basic right of education was 
only fully granted for the White part of the society. Work was divided in White people work 
and Black people work and generally speaking all the least attractive works were reserved for 
the non-whites. In 1970 when the proportion of the White population of the total population 
was 20 per cent they received 70 per cent of the country’s total income.17 The lowered 
education standards for non-whites were defined by Bantu education act in 1953 and 
according to words of South Africa’s prime minister Dr. Verwoerd that many previous 
educators of Africans: ”misled them (Africans)  by showing them the green pastures of 
European society in which they are not allowed to graze” .18 In the name of self-
determination all the prosperity was monopolised for the use of White society. 
 
 
 
1.2 Sharpeville massacre and subsequent eradication of Rule of Law 
 
The main instrument against the apartheid state before the violent liberation struggle was 
defiance, and the demonstrations that preceded Sharpeville massacre were part of this activity. 
The objective of defiance was to communally and intentionally break the law and 
subsequently State prisons would be crowded with defiant citizens which would force the 
system to make concessions. In demonstrations against pass laws people gathered and burned 
their passbooks that the State used to control citizens location. One of these demonstrations 
where people intentionally broke pass laws to offer themselves to be arrested took place in 
Sharpeville, south of Johannesburg. Peaceful demonstration turned into bloodbath when 
frightened policemen opened fire towards the demonstrators and the outcome was death of 69 
and wounding of 180. Most of the demonstrators were shot in the back when they were 
already fleeing from the place. This caused international condemnation towards South Africa 
which eventually caused that South Africa was forced to resign from the British 
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Commonwealth in 1961 and subsequently became a republic. Internal consequences in South 
Africa were that the time of peaceful protest was over and African National Congress (ANC) 
and Pan-African Congress (PAC) established armed wings, ANC Umkhonto We Sizwe and 
PAC Poqo and they started armed struggle against the apartheid state. 
 
 Liberation struggle that was based on violent means set a new challenge for Amnesty that 
abstained from support of violence for any purposes. This meant that Amnesty gave up 
appeals on the prisoners and detainees who took part in the actions of liberation struggle and 
for example Nelson Mandela was out of Amnesty’s appeals because he supported violence as 
the last resort against apartheid state. This principled decision had important connotations and 
by approving the norm of non-violence Amnesty according to Clark preserved “a level of 
neutrality on ideological issues”.19 However, this did not wholly eliminate the problem of 
partiality because according to Risse and Sikkink one function of the human rights NGOs is 
to reinforce the domestic opposition by legitimizing their struggle against human rights 
violating State and sustain moral support for this cause and unite the domestic resistance. This 
was a counterforce to the apartheid state’s propaganda that sought to de-legitimise the 
demands of South African majority.20 Therefore Amnesty moved on an area where it was 
extremely difficult to separate what is support for the peaceful resistance and what is support 
for the violence resistance. Spiral model suggest that to support the domestic opposition is 
essential but the argument is inaccurate because they do not specify who actually represents 
the opposition and how it should be supported.21 Is it rallying the opposition if one gives 
support for violent liberation struggle? Yes it is, but is it proper behaviour from the 
perspective of human rights? In the 1960s this did not constitute any major problem for 
Amnesty but in the last chapter of this study this question will be examined because then the 
most violations were committed by Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), not directly by apartheid 
state. However, it was the only conceivable decision from Amnesty to announce that it does 
not support violent liberation struggle because a human rights organisation can never win a 
discussion on “what is justified violence or terrorism”.  
 
Sharpeville massacre was an important turning point in South African human rights, because 
it started mutual hostilities that overshadowed human rights all the way to the end of 
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apartheid. Apartheid state created an active policy of violent intervention that was aimed to 
suppress primarily the rise of civil society and secondarily violent resistance against the State. 
The foundation for the violent intervention was shaped in 1960s by the laws that granted 
authorities with broad, if not unlimited rights to assault apartheid state’s opponents. These 
laws were the prime catalyst of human rights violations and they endowed police, especially 
the secret police, with broad authority and power that legalized the violent intervention and 
gave State tools to interfere with individual rights without consequences. From 1962 on police 
could detain persons 12 days without court decision and this repressive tool was extended to 
90 days by General law amendment 1963, also known as Ninety-day Detention Law, and it 
was even further exceeded in 1965 and the first 90 days could be extended by 90 days more. 
Basically it made possible to detain anybody in solitary confinement without presenting a 
legal offence as a basis for the detention.22 Albie Sachs was one of the people detained under 
this law and he describes 168 days spent in detention:  
 
“I was detained under what was called the 90-Day Law. You didn't have to be given a 
reason. It was enough for the security police to have a suspicion that you had 
information which could help them in their security inquiries. Then they could lock you 
up for 90 days, in solitary confinement, without access to lawyers, family, anybody else. 
At the end of the 90 days I was about to be released. I packed everything. I was going 
out. I was extremely suspicious, it was the hardest period of my life by far. And before I 
could reach the front door of the discharge office, a cop was there. He put out his hand, 
shook my hand, and said, "I'm placing you under arrest again." And I went back inside. 
I had to unpack the few things that I had, sign the property receipt again for my watch, 
and back into my cell. So I spent another 78 days. It was 168 days in solitary.”23 
 
Another case was in 1963 Ruth First who was held 117 days in detention and released after 90 
days and detained immediately again. After that she attempted a suicide, which was not 
extraordinary in the conditions that were imposed on the detainees in South Africa.24 The 
legal arsenal of repressive measures was increased by Sabotage act 1962 and Terrorism act 
1967. Amnesty International reports reveal how this security system functioned and how 
people were treated and these laws gave almost unlimited authority to the officials that used 
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24 Suzman 1994, 76. 
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inhuman treatment to extract information from detainees or suppress them mentally. Another 
central repressive tool was the State of Emergency that from the perspective of human rights 
meant even more arbitrary actions. Under the special regulations the State had broad rights to 
break individual freedom and detain people arbitrarily and impose censorship restrictions on 
media. The States of Emergencies played more significant role in the 1976 Soweto uprising 
and especially the latter part of 1980s when the “People’s war” (this will be examined in the 
last chapter) posed a real threat to apartheid state.25 The State of Emergency that was released 
after the Sharpeville massacre over 18 000 people were arrested. When State of Emergency 
was on, State could virtually detain anybody without prosecution for undefined period and 
even 180 days detention could be further exceeded. 
 
 The result of the legislative modifications was that South Africa entered in mode of “state of 
exception” that could be characterized as a permanent State of Emergency. State of exception 
is a term that Agemben has developed to describe a situation where the legal system is namely 
ruling, but the power of exceptions is so high that other than parliamentary powers rule the 
development. The paradox is that: “the state of exception appears as the legal form of what 
cannot have legal form.”26 South Africa came to a situation during 1960s where the law 
actually suspended the power of law, and this process abandoned what Agemben calls “the 
living being of law”.27 This mode is a grey area between the political definitions and the 
public law and the classification of a legal subject is blurred and consequently military and 
police rule arbitrarily. Agemben gives as example of the state of exception Nazi Germany that 
was 12 year exception where the Rule of Law was suspended. 
 
“…by means of the state of exception, of a legal civil war that allows for the physical 
elimination not only of political adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who for some 
reason cannot be integrated into the political system.”28 
 
Agemben underlines the great paradox that exceptions and emergencies are successfully 
socialized in the common State activities and States can perform such operations “legally” 
and run the monopoly of violence against its own citizens. Agemben gives an example that 
makes a more accurate comparison to the situation of apartheid South Africa, which is the 
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Patriot Act that was formed in United States after the terrorist attacks of 9/11(November 13, 
2001). Patriot Act defines that authorities can: "take into custody any alien suspected of 
activities that endangered the national security of the United States,"29 and detain people 
suspected as terrorists for 7 days without providing evidence as a basis of detention. This 
according to Agemben: “… radically erases any legal status of the individual, thus producing 
a legally unnameable and unclassifiable being.”30 As we are going to see the same 
development took place in South Africa and other than legal standards labelled who was a 
“political criminal” and a blurred being of political terrorist was created by apartheid state. 
Apartheid state produced inconsistent chaos of laws and arbitrary rulings and tried to control 
the country through “the state of exception”. The atmosphere where the Patriot act and 
apartheid’s security legislation were formed was similar and the emotions of terror and fear 
inspired these processes. These two accounts are not fully comparable but they both have the 
component of insurgence which justifies the exception from the law and subsequently a legal 
subject is vanished and in exchange a blurred unclassifiable legal subject is being produced. 
In South Africa the difference between the State of Emergency and the “normal” state was 
minimal and State of Emergency could be characterised as the mass mobilisation of the 
security forces. When the State felt that it is under threat it mobilised the security machinery 
and ruthlessly detained massive amounts of people and all this was performed legally under 
the “state of exception”. 
 
The situation of legal absence of law posed also a very complicated situation for Amnesty 
because when the legal standards are being abolished it is difficult to draw a line between 
legal and illegal and then fit this paradox in the context of international human rights norms 
and build a discourse of rational argumentation. Agemben refers De Martino in this matter as 
follows: 
 
“The question of borders becomes all the more urgent: if exceptional measures are the result 
of periods of political crisis and, as such, must be understood on political and not juridico-
constitutional grounds (De Martino 1973,320)”31 
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What was the basis of comprehension when Amnesty interpreted the actions of apartheid 
state? Amnesty was searching for its position in the international human rights field in 1960s 
and therefore its actions and methods were still unpractised. This was reflected also how 
Amnesty processed this problem and 1964 Prison Conditions in South Africa demonstrates 
that Amnesty saw apartheid as jurisdico-constitutional problem rather than political 
confrontation where legality does not exist.  
 
Spiral model sees that the reason for lack of human rights is the lack of institutionalised 
human right norms, but this is an anachronism if we cannot see that there were no conditions 
for establishing institutional norms. Spiral model sees that the solution is argumentative 
rationality that turns the irrational conflict into process of rational argumentation. I can agree 
that this is finally the solution but, how this takes place because, institutions can’t force 
people to behave in some certain way if people do not approve the content of rules and 
norms?  The problem is that spiral model examines this issue as externalized political problem 
and intention here is to view how and why human rights violations appeared inside South 
Africa. This examination demonstrates that there has to be a platform on which the 
development can be constructed or otherwise the human rights activities have difficulties to 
reach the actual problem. Whereas spiral model sees one universal reality, this study sees 
shared norms as a possibility but the worldview of human rights violating State is not 
inevitably accessible from the general and normative comprehension.32   
 
What is remarkable from the perspective of human rights and has not been emphasized 
enough in historical and human rights studies that South African parliament voluntarily gave 
away a gigantic share of its power to the security institutions that drifted away from the 
parliamentary control. The Ninety-day detention law gave basically unlimited authority and 
the police was not accountable to the parliament, justice system or anybody else for its 
actions. It was a law that gave infinite rights without burden of responsibility or restrictions. 
When Terrorism act further extended the rights of police a senior police officer commented 
that: ”This is a mighty weapon in the hands of police”.33 From police perspective it gave 
massive tool for suppressing violently apartheid state’s opponents, but from the human rights 
perspective it meant the beginning of arbitrary madness. The Montesquieu model where the 
legislative, the executive, and the judiciary powers are divided between separate institutions 
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was destroyed. Instead of this model security institution held powers of all these institutions. 
Police could decide who it desires to arrest, for what reason and how long is that person under 
detention. Police decided for the detention and it did not have to present any evidences or 
reasons for the detention, whereas normally court of law should examine if the suspect is 
guilty or not.  Police arbitrarily decided on treatment of the detainees and torture was often 
used as an interrogation method.  Helen Suzman sums up the laws that the parliament 
produced in 1960s: “With these three Acts – the Sabotage act, the Ninety-day Detention Law 
and the Terrorism Act - ´due process´ and the Rule of Law were utterly destroyed in South 
Africa”34.  
 
What are the reasons for this unusual development where the parliament was voluntarily 
stripping itself from power? Parliament almost unanimously voted for the Ninety-day 
Detention law and Helen Suzman was the only MP to resist the law and even the 
government’s opposition, United Party supported National Party in this issues.35 This started a 
process that monopolized the power and eradicated white political opposition. This is a 
reflection of the immense fear that the parliament and generally the South African dominating 
minority felt after confrontation between the apartheid state and the Black majority had turned 
into violent at Sharpeville. Many people genuinely believed that Sharpeville and the 
subsequent inauguration of violent resistance meant the end of White supremacy in South 
Africa and that would have had deep influence on their lives.36 Stock market indicated of an 
expectation that South Africa will be fallen into chaos after Sharpeville and there was a major 
outflow of capita from the country.37  
 
This was the beginning of fear –  the siege mentality. It was a time when the Rule of Law and 
human rights disappeared from South Africa while the apartheid state was seeking for 
security. The feeling of insecurity started to develop in 1960s and it increased as the 
confrontation turned bloodier and in the 1980s and the beginning of 1990s when South Africa 
was in total chaos, it was on its peak. When the confrontation heightened apartheid state’s 
response was to boost the violent intervention, but the enduring resistance was too powerful 
for the apartheid state to suppress by violence. The result was an ever-increasing spin of 
violence. Apartheid state was trying to look for security, however, the result of increasing the 
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power of military and police was quite the opposite and it fed the violence and destruction 
that the State tried to avoid.38 The atmosphere of horror abolished White political opposition 
and guaranteed NP’s popularity among the White voters and the success of repressive 
legislation in the parliament. 
 
When South Africa chose to further develop apartheid rather than seek consensus through 
concessions the outcome was that South Africa turned into a police State, which guaranteed 
the human rights violations for the years to come. The booming economy made possible 
investments on police and security forces and creation of the domestic weapon production 
changed South Africa’s internal and external power to a level that was never seen before.39 
The State repressive powers were ever increased after death of Prime Minister Dr. Verwoerd 
and the election of the new Prime Minister B.J. Vorster. Dr. Verwoerd was a passionate social 
engineer who tried to create racial society by scientific means, whereas Vorster put more 
emphasis on violent intervention and enforcement. Beck observes that: “…his colleagues 
selected him primarily because of his toughness and his ruthless suppression of the anti-
apartheid organizations”. 40 In 1968 B.J. Vorster created Bureau of State security BOSS 
which reorganized and centralized the activities of the secret police.41 This organization was 
in the centre of the human right violations and police activities it ran secret operations, which 
will be examined in the coming chapters. Amnesty coverage in 1960s will not give a good 
picture on BOSS’ participation on the violent intervention, but on the 1970s when reports 
include statements from people who were tortured by secret police the arbitrary powers of this 
institution become clearer. Numerous government opponents were detained, tortured and 
assassinated by the security police.42 This is a fact that becomes vividly uncovered through 
Amnesty reports and especially the torture that is carried out in security institutions such as 
police stations is described far and wide.   
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1.3 Function of Amnesty International in the human rights field 
 
The analysis above describes how apartheid started to shape an ideal and desired society by 
increasing violent measures when the social means could not anymore bring out the desired 
effect. The new content and perspective that this argument seeks to bring to human rights 
studies and to historical understanding general, that a powerless human rights NGO 
challenges a powerful State that has legitimacy and long-term relations on the international 
level. How is it possible that a State with political, economical, and violent powers and 
capabilities can be criticized and challenged by an organization without ‘actual’ power and 
legitimacy? This study seeks to combine the historical perspective and human rights studies 
and address what kind of possibilities and power such an organization can have and how and 
why organizations such as Amnesty can make a change.  
 
The year 1961 is when Amnesty International was created and back then it was not the same 
type of powerful global actor as it is today. In the beginning there was only organization 
creator lawyer Peter Benenson’s vision of a new type of human rights organization, where 
ordinary people who have an interest on human rights appeal for prisoners of conscience 
globally. The first material of Amnesty was published in a newspaper and it caused an initial 
reaction and consequently this created an immediate connection between activists and human 
rights.43 In the beginning the participation of civil society on human rights was few and far 
between and Amnesty was one of the few new human rights NGOs and it had to create its 
own profile and it had to earn recognition before its new kind of attitude was accepted as 
proper and acceptable. For example apartheid state considered Amnesty as an illicit intruder 
on its private territory, which indicates the situation of 1960s where Amnesty’s presence was 
regarded as an intervention on intimate zone. Targets of Amnesty’s activities might still feel 
similarly today, but in the 1960s Amnesty’s effort and generally intervention to human rights 
issues was hardly considered acceptable or normal considering the tradition of international 
affairs.44  
 
The foundation of Amnesty’s international existence is the 1948 UDHR that laid down the 
ideal principles of human rights. The essential question that why there was a demand and 
possibility for such an organization as Amnesty in this particular historical time? The key 
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problem and the cause why Amnesty was desperately needed to reshape human rights, was 
when the UN member States ratified UDHR, in public member States splendidly declared the 
noble principles but in private and in actual moral choices the human rights where far from 
the principles of UDHR. South Africa was one of the States that took part actively in 
founding UN, but when the General Assembly voted for UDHR South Africa abstained from 
voting, which indicates the content of declaration did not meet South Africa’s desires.45  
 
The problem was not that the validity of human rights principles would be denied, but they 
were clearly seen as declaration of others’ responsibilities towards me, not as universal pro-
human declaration that banned use of violence as a tool of power, especially under exceptive 
situations. Human rights only applied in egocentric sense, people who are by my side should 
be protected and in public principles applied as a tool to gain recognition and in private they 
applied genuinely only for the people who were included in the sphere of private. In South 
Africa this was the group of White people who did not resist apartheid, but I argue that 
eventually that nobody can be protected in such a closed society as South Africa was because 
there is no consistent authority that shapes the lines of private and public and basically all the 
motion and change (civil society) turns undesired. Eventually one cannot choose or change 
one’s political or social orientation. There is no will in such a society and it is based on laws 
that are being allegedly shaped by history and predefined forms and deviating from this 
absolute reality will cause a disciplinary action. The private territory is therefore out of any 
redefinition whatsoever from perspective of systems such as apartheid.  
 
“A small collection of individuals founded Amnesty International (AI) in 1961 to translate 
human rights principles into practical action”46, is the way in which Clark summarises the 
mission of Amnesty. In this study Amnesty’s function will be seen in the similar way and 
instead of claiming universalism Amnesty created encounters between people and this started 
multiple processes around the world that started to expose different ways of comprehending 
human rights and how the practical reality turned out to be much more complicated than self-
evident theoretical and universal reality. I see Amnesty as an organization that reshapes the 
boundaries of private and public and therefore the subject of this study can be seen as 
confrontation between two opposing forces. Apartheid state sought to maintain absolute 
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privacy and Amnesty sought to dismantle privacy and seek change by doing that. Obviously 
this was a remarkable process because apartheid state saw it as definite threat to its existence 
and Amnesty saw the process of dismantling privacy and making States accountable as an 
issue of prime importance, or that is the remark that is given for that activity in this study.   
 
In the 1961 Amnesty started from a scratch and it was already internationally notified reporter 
in the mid 1970s which is quite a considerable achievement in a short period of 10 years. This 
suggest that there was a true demand for the establishing Amnesty and people agreed with 
Amnesty’s cause, even though whenever organization entered a private territory it caused an 
outraging protest from the one (apartheid state) who claimed sovereignty and privacy. 
Nowadays Amnesty’s organization is vast and it operates in nearly all the countries. The 
resources of Amnesty, as well mental as economical were limited in the beginning and this 
also affected the limit of covered human rights cases. When Amnesty released the first three 
country focused reports, South African case was regarded as one that should be included in 
this project. The other two reports were on Portugal that was a dictatorship at that time and on 
communist Romania.47 And obviously South African case was considered as essential for 
Amnesty’s cause because in the time of limited resources it was chosen from many possible 
cases. Amnesty states that it does not prioritize any human rights cases, but in this case it 
appears that the organization faced a situation where it simply could not report on all the 
countries due to lack of resources.  
 
Generally speaking Amnesty resources limited greatly the abilities to conduct research in 
1960s and investigations were based on reading newspapers and other sources. Consequently 
Amnesty put forward information that was a compilation different sources but the actual fact-
finding had not developed yet. Nancy Dick, who was responsible for South African 
investigations, was working voluntarily and part time in year 1971, and Amnesty was still 
running strongly on voluntary resources and there were no funds to run the professional 
machinery that is in place today. This means that the mission of Amnesty were only half 
realised when it could not produce and disseminate information that it had gathered, however, 
the prime function came true, which is to create motion through publicity. Therefore, when 
evaluating Amnesty’s activities in 1960s it should be kept in mind that it is difficult to 
estimate what kind of attitude Amnesty had because reports and investigations were 
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inevitably ‘incomplete’ due to lack of resources. The spiral comparison could be also used for 
the founding of Amnesty and organization that started from zero collect mental and 
economical resources and new activities and publications attract and inspire people who join 
Amnesty or get inspired by human rights work. This expands the power of the organization 
and also reinforces a belief that there is true desire that people want to express their thought 
and feelings though this channel and also affect the construction of the reality through this 
way.   
 
The function of Amnesty is two fold in the international system – to criticize and alter and to 
construct and conform. The centre of human rights activities is UN that creates laws and 
convention such as UDHR that provides legitimacy and leverage for civil society 
organizations. There is one remarkable reason why civil society involvement is essential to 
human rights activities. Regardless of UN’s prestige and power, member States expect proper 
behaviour from UN, which prevents entering the private sector where the human rights 
violations take place. Also confrontation on this forum is not desired because consensus 
guarantees ability to commit to gradual long-term change and therefore to compare the ‘time’ 
of UN and Amnesty are not possible. They have both their sphere of time and motion. 
Consequently Amnesty’s status outside the international relations guarantees a neutral 
standpoint from where it is possible to enter the private sector, regardless of possible 
confrontation that it brings about. This is the actual human rights activity where human rights 
are being defined and in an interplay between the advocates of principles and dissenters of the 
norms and in this play it possible to uncover the actual standpoints and what they are 
compared to the sworn normative and theoretical standpoints.48  
 
Amnesty as organization has a peculiar structure that consists of the professional section and 
amateur members who operate locally in the national sections and some in the central 
administration. Amnesty has high status in the international community and it is UN’s 
permanent advisor in human rights issues and some of its activities are almost integrated part 
of UN organization even though it maintains certain autonomy.49 The title for Clark’s study 
Diplomacy of Conscience brilliantly expresses the character of Amnesty, which has the 
emotional side and the institutional and international side. Consciousness refers to moral 
consciousness that activates Amnesty members and is this motion is basis and foundation of 
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organization. Then diplomacy refers status and role Amnesty has in the international system 
and to the professional secretariat and semi-official status that Amnesty has taken in human 
rights issues.  The construction of human rights cases depends in many senses on the 
information that Amnesty is producing, because UN does not have capabilities to collect such 
information by itself and yet it needs accurate information on human rights that reality that 
equals human rights reality (for example in South Africa) can be constructed on UN forum 
and matching actions can take place (arms embargo for example).50   
 
The heart of Amnesty’s organization is the secretariat that is located in London. It manages 
the research and publication activities and the information that is collected from field is 
carefully revised before it is further disseminated.51 Most of the secretariat consists of 
professionals who are being paid regular salary, which means that Amnesty’s expertise is not 
leaning solely on voluntary and situational effort.52  When the information is routinely 
subjected to various data-processing practices it improves the quality and credibility of 
information essentially. Let us think for example a situation where the same person would 
have travelled to South Africa and collected information and consequently the same person 
would compile a report on South Africa’s human right. Possibly this person would have 
included biased and subjective information in the report due to intense involvement in the 
emotionally infuriating human rights violations. This is the reason why Amnesty has certain 
proceedings for the gathering and disseminating the information. When the data is revised by 
the secretariat through objective eyes that probably have emotional distance to the 
information, it is possible to make corrections and remove and add information. This is an 
overwhelming strength that many governmental organizations do not have because they are 
regularly locked in one-dimensional mode and I see that this is the reason why Amnesty could 
and should increase and expand human rights activities and create actual change by putting 
forward versatile information on human rights. 
 
Another issue is that Amnesty management has concrete power, which means that it has 
responsibility as well and duties regarding gathering and disseminating information. 
Responsibility towards human rights violating State that information is correct and proper and 
at the same responsibility towards the receivers’ of information because they act and feel on 
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the basis what is given to them. This does not eliminate receiver’s responsibility to be critical 
and the desired outcome is created through mutual responsibilities. Unfortunately the 
individual members do not have necessarily the same responsibilities and the accountability is 
often limited to the rights of assumed victim. A representation of this problem is for example 
Amnesty’s approach to Nelson Mandela’s position who had accepted violence as last resort 
against apartheid state. Organizational level refused to classify Mandela as a prisoner of 
conscience, whereas big group of members demanded that he should be accepted. The 
management decide that: “Although most members would probably consider as individuals 
that there are some situations where violent action is the only solution, the membership would 
not agree on what those situations are.”53  
 
In this situation the management used its power in correct way, though I hope that this would 
be more than a question of principle as Clark presents it. That it would not be only a principle 
that is experienced as a sacrifice to abandon a liberation icon that is a subject of “worldwide 
popular sympathy”54. Clark sees this as a sacrificial and altruistic deed but I see this as the 
only possible way forward. Otherwise Amnesty would fall into apathy and into a negative 
spiral of discourse of violence and its justified applications. Besides that, Amnesty’s mission 
would be impossible without principle of non-violence and it would be utterly irrelevant to 
apply for people such as Mandela because it does not have any meaning for the overall 
mission and it can tear down the entire undertaking. Amnesty should rather oppose trend 
where violent liberation and reform is glorified and stress that change comes through gradual 
develoment and people’s commitment to it, not by through sudden violent wonders. Ideally 
Amnesty and its members would not be in confrontation and disagreement, but in mutual and 
constructive relation where cognitive development would take place. This would make 
possible to understand complicity and dimensions of human rights. Ideally Amnesty is a 
moderate educator, not a moral authority and people who have ideas of justified violence 
could educate themselves as Amnesty members and believe in principle of non-violence, than 
instead it is simply imposed on them. Nevertheless, the organizational strength is one of the 
indisputable facts that have assisted Amnesty to become worldwide powerful and reliable 
human rights actor.55  
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Baehr has summarized Amnesty’s mandate in following way: 
 
“The basic premise has always been of highly practical nature: to be effective within a 
clearly defined area – working for the release of prisoners of conscience – and thus to 
contribute to the struggle for freedom of expression.”56    
 
This approach has a certain problem because the reason of human rights violations were 
deeply rooted in the cultural context of apartheid and when this problem is approach form the 
perspective of individual cases only cause can be reached. The way how Amnesty functions 
has reached good results in certain contexts but expectation how well this method functioned 
in apartheid South Africa is a matter or examination and discussions. Amnesty has set a 
principle for itself that it does not resist any political persuasion or system in itself, and 
consequently Amnesty abstained from criticizing the system of apartheid and focused its 
criticism on the actual human rights violations.57 How well it is possible to achieve results 
with this type of method in this type of scenario? At least if the question is examined from 
perspective immediate impact there is no proofs that apartheid state would have release or 
‘spared’ people in the 1960s because Amnesty or another actor would have appealed for their 
rights publicly. As seen the facts regarding the development of political scenario indicated 
that apartheid state was closing in and heightening its repression. This question will be 
returned in the second chapter when Amnesty had to admit in the 1970s that the ‘traditional’ 
method is making desired impact.  
 
 
 
1.4 Prison Conditions in South Africa 1965 
 
What where the actual human rights conditions according to Amnesty International? Prison 
Conditions in South Africa (1965) was Amnesty’s first major contribution regarding apartheid 
its human rights violations. The desires of racial order where reproduced in prison hierarchy 
and all the prisoners were divided in groups according to their sentences and Black political 
prisoners were subjected to the worst conditions. It appears that prisons functioned as 
institutions that sough to keep up the desired social order and bring back dissenter to the right 
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track. So to say apartheid’s prison can be seen as micro cosmos of mental phenomenon called 
apartheid. Examining political developments give a slippery grip to examine the mental side 
of apartheid and the insight that Amnesty reports describe a worldview that is utterly 
unconditional and it has no flexibility and all the dissenting from norms or desired reality is 
seen as fracturing sacred rule. Violence was apartheid’s solution to maintain this complete 
world and whereas from the perspective of outsider the violence appears as wrong for 
apartheiders this phenomenon appeared quite differently. Violence was a right action against 
behaviour that sought to change or brake the right social order. Besides the actual human 
rights conditions the Amnesty view gives information on what kind of social and cultural 
platform apartheid was found. 
   
The material for this report was collected from various sources such as released prisoners, 
former detainees, people who visited the prisons due to their legal professions or basically 
anybody who had experience based information what happened inside the prison walls. 
Information on prison conditions was monopolized by 1959 Prisons Act and apartheid state 
required that all the printed information on prison conditions has to be verifiable (only official 
documentation was accepted). Since the State defined the standards it became basically 
illegitimate to report on  prison conditions. According to Amnesty there had been 
prosecutions under this act and this argument fit together what Helen Suzman has written in 
her auto-biography about publicity of prison conditions.58 Apartheid state sued ‘The Rand 
Daily mail, their publishers, South African Associated news papers … as well all the Mail’s 
informants’ for reporting on prison conditions. An the results were: “Thus began sequence of 
cases which took nearly four years to come before the courts, cost the newspapers something 
like R300,000, and in effect lost the editor, Laurence Gandar, his job”.59 Amnesty report is 
based on material published on Rand Daily Mail and other information on human rights but 
the actual gathering of information has been few and far between and Amnesty’s method to 
gather information from distance caused that it was limited to second hand information and 
for example about sending letters Amnesty stated: “…although we felt inadvisable to write 
some individuals in South Africa whose letters may be subjected to official scrutiny.”60 
Amnesty has announced on the cover of report A FACTUAL REPORT but mainly this report 
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is a reproduction of information that has been published already and Amnesty had no means 
to verify this information by fact finding mission.  
 
Prison Conditions in South Africa consists of introduction that functions as motivating and 
spirit creating and this is followed by analysis of human rights development and the actual 
human rights violations. There are some remarks to make of the spirit, consciousness and 
attitude that Amnesty sought to form and foster. Amnesty framed its approach as follows: 
 
Amnesty is itself partly a product of the penological reform movement. It is not 
composed of philosophical anarchists who advance the view that society is obliged to 
tolerate any form of dissenting behaviour. It was established by, and it is composed of, 
practical reformers. Its principle contention is simply this: it is short-sighted to penalise 
people for their ideas, for there can be no progress in civilisation unless new ideas are 
allowed to spread. Of course, some ideas are bad and socially harmful. But nothing is 
gained by taking physical action against their proponents. To execute torture or 
incarcerate those who commit no other offence than to propound opinions is to ensure 
their views a currency and respect they would not otherwise obtain. In short, political 
imprisonment is not only wrong; it is stupid.61  
 
Amnesty had adopted an educating approach that consists of resisting undisputed worldview 
and blind normative demands that unintentionally corrupt human communities. But how to 
reconciliate the worlds apart? The view of apartheid was clear and it did not tolerate any 
deviations from social order (its reality) and breaking hierarchy led to violent confrontation 
and it dismissed any suggestion to open the society. The view of Amnesty could be seen as 
creating a certain attitude and this attitude is still viable and making blind normative demands 
can only lead to authoritarian and behaviourist society that consist of robotic behaviour and 
this disconnection from human experience can potentially led to violent confrontation 
disappearance of mutual security.  The remarkability of this attitude is that it resorts 
practicality and reason instead of mere emotions or moral justifications.  
 
However, the fact that Amnesty is right that destabilisation of society can lead only to general 
lack of security even though the political and security desires can be achieved in short term 
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but in long run to resort violence can lead only to social chaos. Essentially the view of 
Amnesty is right even though this does not state anything about the means how this message 
can be brought to the ones who do not comprehend it (the human rights violating States). 
Objectively this approach is right but it does not provide any tools whatsoever to approach the 
subject, but this is a problem that has to be solved according to dynamics of particular cases 
and there is no general principle how human rights should and can be approached. It has to be 
remarked that in the beginning Amnesty was a particular and small organization and in this 
part of the organization it was not a mass movement that it is today and therefore the 
philosophical appearance of Amnesty’s report is different when the material is shared by 
particular people or masses of people. 
 
Besides creating spirit by philosophical means Amnesty resorted more or less dubious 
arguments: 
 
“To those who may object that most of the evidence comes from former prisoner and 
therefore cannot be trusted, one answer is that conditions in Hitler’s Auschwitz and Stalin’s 
Vorkuta were found to be worse than any description previously given by those who had 
escaped.”62 
 
What was constructed in the preceding argument is washed away in this one and this is not 
the right way to justify the experience based information. If we cannot believe experience and 
there should be an expectation of worst case scenario how we can put the information on trial 
and examine what it actually means? Such sweeping generalizations may create motivation 
and spirit but this is not the right way to raise interest. All the human rights cases have to be 
examined on particular inter-subjective basis and to make such generalisation is not adequate. 
This argument claims that if there would have been information on these hidden occasions 
they could have been reacted, but this argument claims a load of objectified expectations and 
it is not possible to evaluate these cases on such objectified basis without knowing anything 
about the actual context. And even if there would have been information on these occasions 
and it would have prevented these happenings it does not explain why they took place. Solely 
publicity and consciousness of human rights violations cannot be accepted as meter and it is 
dubious to speculate what would have happen if there would knowledge on these occasions. 
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What is more important is that Amnesty applies shame as activating human responsibility. I 
agree with this responsibility but if it is based on this sort of comprehension it is not 
acceptable and behaviourism is not desirable even though it would lead to temporarily 
positive behaviour. This generalization creates completely wrong type of image of human 
rights that should be viewed as cultural rather than moral objectified phenomenon and 
referring to Hitler and Stalin gives an impression that these happenings were one man shows, 
which consequently averts the motivation and capability to examine the reason of human 
rights violations instead of morally condemning and denying them. Amnesty has applied in 
this case an emotional short cut that can only lead to vaguer understanding of human rights 
and fortunately such statements are missing from the other reports.  
 
If the consensus of the decent opinion of mankind has no effect on them, let them reflect 
soberly that copies of these reports will be on library shelves long after they are dead…and 
that the supporting evidence by which history will judge them is stored away safely.63 
 
Now what was published in 1965 is history and we have a chance to examine this argument 
and to what extent history has judged human rights violations and what judgement of history 
means. This argument falls in the same category as using Soviet Union’s and Nazi Germany’s 
human rights abuses as an example and whereas that was an objectified retrospective 
consideration of past that was disconnected from the subjects this is a prophecy that considers 
future. If human rights studies, at least are based on moral judgement, this holistic and 
objectifying approach will cover the actual reason of violence. Humanity has to be 
encountered as it was. There is certain bitterness present in this argument, and probably it 
offered only consolation for the writer of argument and some other people but apartheid state 
was hardly afraid of the future of its past. Author of this introduction moves in the 
borderlands of stigmatization where the rational processing of human rights became very 
difficult.  
 
And to view the question of human rights these occasions were regrettable but to make 
something useful of human rights studies they should not condemn in past or present 
perspective and the main aim should be to improve the human rights instead repeating 
mistakes of human culture. An argument that history will judge present issues can only lead 
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superstition and abandoning human responsibility because that claims that there is no way 
forward an only history can save humans in this respect.  
 
Now this issue is being viewed in historical perspective and I or any other interpreter of 
history do not have any unambiguous solution to solve this problem but I know that sending 
this question further to the future and keeping this package closed will not provide any more 
information and the only opportunity is to understand this phenomenon and the single most 
useful piece of information is that there is no certain information what leads to social 
confrontations and therefore culture that regards this phenomenon has to be examined aspect 
by aspect, not as a complete entity where everything has to exist in logic and harmony.  To 
surrender before this problem is not a solution and clearly the argument that claims that 
history will judge is based on dogmatic viewpoint and sources of discomfort are dismissed or 
cast forward which leads to escapism. Quite likely this is not what Amnesty intended but 
Amnesty should foster human rights that can be approached as an aspect of reality. This can 
be the only the only way to go towards the problem and face it instead of dismissing it to 
future generations or anybody else. To view in historical perspective gives to certain extent 
better viewpoint but that does not guarantee the most truthful view and it is not relevant to lift 
any viewpoint over another here.  
 
The main problem of Prison Conditions in South Africa is that Amnesty have not quite 
understood the means of its cause and the report is heavy to read because it consist of 
whatever Amnesty has been able to obtain rather than it would have been searching for 
something particular. The formula in short is that Amnesty should be focused on experience 
based information reinforced by facts. 
 
 Report starts with political background that describes suppression of civil liberties and 
Sharpeville massacre and the subsequent release of State of Emergency that was the first 
major display of apartheid’s violent intervention. After that follows information on political 
prisoners and Amnesty states that to figure out the actual number of political prisoners is 
impossible because apartheid state did not admit that it practises political imprisonment. The 
problem is that Amnesty does not define what constitutes a human rights violation and what is 
a political prisoner and what is the connection between these phenomena because human 
rights violations can take place even though the occasion would not regard political prisoner. 
Amnesty has relied on International Defence and Aid Fund, which reported that 1 300 people 
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had been sentenced and convicted for political offences between January 1963 and November 
1964. It is not questionable that apartheid state would have not practised political 
imprisonment but to examine this phenomenon on the basis of Amnesty’s report is simply 
impossible because there is no definition who qualifies as a political prisoners and other 
presented figures are debatable as well. Here is a statement that was made by Head Warder of 
Cinderella prison that opens more this problem: 
 
“He described the use of electric shock treatment on convicted prisoners suspected of 
smuggling dagga (marijuana), tobacco or money into the prison, and also during questioning. 
He stated that he had seen a Chief Warder beating prisoners with a leather-covered cane for 
no offence.”64  
 
How can we distinct here political dimension or the general use of violence of disciplinary 
purposes in prison context? It would be worthwhile to study what kind of history of corporal 
punishment there is South Africa and how this has intermingled with the history of human 
rights. From Amnesty’s material it is difficult to distinguish what were political motivations 
for punishing or if the prison system abandoned all the rights categorically. Here is another 
case that does not have direct political dimension either: 
 
“Orders were often accompanied by a blow. We saw Africans being into their sections 
… they were driven in like animals by “polysas” (African warders) with sticks and with 
leather straps. They used the long double strap of their truncheons or keys as a whip. 
Each man as he came past running would get a blow with the whip”65  
 
It has to be remarked that these statements are based on information that was available before 
Amnesty started composing its report. This statement was given by Harold Strachan who was 
held in Pretoria Local Prison as a White political prisoner and he published his experiences 
and Amnesty has disseminated part of his experience. Rand Daily Mail that became a target 
of censorship after reporting on prison conditions originally published Strachan’s story. The 
outcome for Strachan was that he was banned and imprisoned for 18 month more, on the top 
his already served sentence. The farce of censorship of trials stimulated Suzman under 
authority of Member of Parliament to visit Pretoria Local Prison: 
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“At the prison, which I visited early in September 1965, it was clear that there had been 
overnight transformation. Every prisoner was holding and eating bowl, glistening in the 
sun, whereas Strachan had alleged that their bowls were rusty. There were obviously 
brand-new. All the prisoners were wearing new jerseys and they told me that hot 
showers were now available. The taps in the ablution block had been repaired, so they 
could clean their teeth over the washbasins and not over the lavatory bowls, as the Rand 
Daily Mail had reported. The whole prison had clearly been cleaned up for my visit”66 
 
Nelson Mandela describes in his autobiography a similar play that was on arranged on 
Robben Island:  
 
“One morning a few weeks later, the chief warder, instead of handling us hammers for 
our work in the courtyard, gave us each needles and thread and a pile of worn jerseys. 
We were instructed to repair the garments, but we discovered that most of these jerseys 
were frayed beyond repair. This struck us as a curious task, and we wondered what had 
provoked the change. Later that morning, at about eleven o’clock, the front gate swung 
open to reveal the commanding officer with two men in suits. The CO announced that 
two visitors were a reporter from Daily Telegraph in London. He related this as if 
visiting members of the international press were a regular diversion for us.67 
 
Apartheid state’s intention to fake reality was also a challenge for Amnesty and the main 
problem was to gather accurate information that has power to challenge the official versions. 
For example in this case Suzman had managed to gather more information than Amnesty and 
clearly the networks of Amnesty were unpractised because it managed to gather only 
crumbles of information whereas there would have been more available.  
 
Amnesty has described the prison system and actual prisons comprehensively and this 
information regard regulations that regard prison activities and also rules and regulations that 
regard the authorisation of the warders and how they exceeded their authority when they 
assaulted prisoners. Warders whose abuses were reported were rarely fired and they often 
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returned or continued their career, regardless of their violent behaviour.68 What is peculiar is 
that there was a system that received some complaints because obviously the assaults were 
officially condoned. The system of accountability was on its place and it was a burden that 
apartheid state sought to vanish, even though this system could be not completely removed 
that illusion of accountability and integrity could be upheld towards outside. In the next 
chapter we are going to see how the system of accountability was made toothless and 
factually the legal system of apartheid was a hollow shell. The inquests that were conducted 
during apartheid time categorically run into predictable conclusion, which was:”There were 
no sign of misdemeanours”. This was a transitional period from prison system where there 
were leftovers of transparency left and soon it was gone completely.69  
 
Prisoners were being divided two four categories A, B C and lowest of them was D what was 
reserved for Black political prisoners who had the worst conditions.70 The classification 
affected to things such as food, bedding readings, letters and so forth.  The examination of 
Amnesty is even too detailed in certain sense because it includes absolutely everything about 
the prison conditions such as bedding, clothing, toilet articles, sanitary and washing facilities, 
food, drinking water, work etc. There is a certain problem with this detailed examination 
because giving a full story of conditions have taken over description of experiences and 
assaults. For example when comparing Amnesty’s presentation and Albie Sachs The Jail 
Diary one have completely different experience from Sachs’ presentation and the mentally 
harsh prison conditions are being mediated much more effectively and it leaves much stronger 
impression than Amnesty’s presentation. These two different types of presentations have 
essentially different kind of approach but it has to be remarked that Amnesty report seems to 
be written from perspective of people who have constructed it and they have not though that 
the contents of report will not consist a coherent entity. The interface between the subject 
constructed by Amnesty does not manage to reach well the reader. Prison conditions were still 
being described in the 1970s but little by little Amnesty recognised that mediating this sort 
information is not in the core of its interest, especially when there were more critical aspects 
to describe.  
 
                                                 
68 Amnesty 1965, Prison Conditions in South Africa, 6. 
69 Amnesty 1965, Prison Conditions in South Africa, 5-6, 7-9. 
70 Amnesty 1965, Prison Conditions in South Africa,10-12. 
 39
The rest of the report consists largely on conditions of detained prisoners and the facts that 
were earlier presented on detention condition here are largely described in the report. 
Detainees were held on arbitrary basis without prosecuting them and controlling them with 
mental and physical horror. Amnesty present as an example how detainees have been given 
electric shocks and other violence such as making detainees to stand up continuously for 
many hours. The problem with presenting this phenomenon is again that the descriptions are 
expressed on the mouth of Amnesty and the experience of assaulted people is on the 
background the report could be based more on people who were suffering demeaning 
treatment, but as mentioned Amnesty had to use second hand information and the lack of 
resources limited the fact finding and therefore connecting with victims was limited. Amnesty 
has collected in the end of the report a collection of statements and documents but this 
appears as lump of information and the report should consist of processed information that is 
being filtered and connected to corresponding context. The question of detention condition 
will be returned in the next chapter.     
 
 
 
1.5 Economical development and voluntary arms embargo; apartheid state’s alienation 
from human rights norms 
 
Why it is relevant to review the relation of economic development and human rights in this 
study? As the research made by Risse and Sikkink reveals States in international system are 
dependent on each other through the politics and trade and these connection are tied to the 
human rights development and especially the discourse around them. The objective of 
Amnesty is to affect this network and in this case the purpose was to create pressure towards 
apartheid state that it would change its behaviour and improve human rights. Reports that 
Amnesty created put pressure mainly on the actual human rights violating State, but also 
against all the States in the international community to take a stand on the issue and adjust 
their behaviour to the changed situation. This connects to the discussion that Amnesty’s work 
creates an impetus for redefining the boundaries of public and private. In other words human 
rights activities advocate the spirit and ethos of human rights and build and enlarge a network 
where the human rights message is being transmitted.71 Whereas the preceding text in this 
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chapter dealt with the structures and mental dimensions of apartheid and human rights 
activities that were directed to change it, this section deals with institutional and international 
human rights culture, or rather how network and spirit of human rights were lacking. 
 
Certain States such as Japan and U.S. continued their beneficial trade terms with apartheid 
state regardless of gross human rights violations and Japan even threatened to take over the 
economical vacuum that would be formed in a case of embargo. U.S. weapon industry was 
dependent on South Africa’s minerals and Japan’s industry was also dependent on the same 
materials and they were highly reluctant to risk these beneficial terms.72 Though the total 
proportion of the trade between U.S. and South Africa was insignificant for U.S., 
nevertheless, the quality of the trade was paramount importance because South Africa for 
example produced 47% percent of all the platinum and other minerals that were essential for 
its Cold War machinery.73 The question of economical power is in direct connection to the 
communication positions in human rights matters. Flourishing economical development 
makes possible first of all to run efficient bureaucratic machinery of the State and furthermore 
in this case apartheid state expanded essentially its violent capabilities. Risse and Sikkink 
proposes: “We would expect that countries receiving large military and economic aid flows 
will be more vulnerable to human rights pressures than those not receiving such flows.”74 As 
we are going to see here South Africa was not vulnerable or dependent at all in this sense. 
Situation was rather contrary and apartheid state dominated these areas. Many other States, 
and especially neighbouring Southern African States were dependent on South Africa’s 
economy. Besides this strong position of apartheid state made possible to seek for further 
independence in order to avoid the outcome of isolation and pressures and effects of human 
rights activities.75  
 
Economical development in South Africa and its relation to the apartheid state’s foreign 
policy and human rights is a widely discussed topic. In South Africa 1960s was the golden era 
of the apartheid state. South African economy grew more quickly than any other economy in 
1950s and 1960s, except Japan76. Barber has observed that apartheid “…was heading against 
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stream of world opinion”77 and this inspires a question that how was apartheid able manage 
for so long regardless of fierce resistance it faced. Apartheid’s performance was largely 
dependent on economic success that made possible investments on the security forces, which 
was the cornerstone of apartheid policy and generally made possible to run the system. Beck 
has noted that apartheid state’s expenditure on weapons was increasing and this hardly can be 
considered a regular defence effort: “A booming economy in the 1960s and early 1970s 
enabled the government raise the level of defence spending from an estimated U.S. $63 
million in 1960 to over U.S. $1 billion by 1975, or nearly 20 percent of the national 
budget.”78  
 
A common assumption is that South Africa became “a pariah  state”79 but punctuality is 
missing from argumentation which regards the consequences of this negative label. What 
does this actually mean apart from that apartheid state did not respect human rights and the 
international community disapproved this behaviour? It is self-evident that publicized human 
rights violations created an expectation of condemnation, but were there actual engagement 
made by the international community to contribute that change of human rights? Apartheid 
state was dependent on the foreign capital and energy, namely oil, and these two flows were 
the possibilities that international network tried to control in order to create pressure on 
apartheid state, but with what success? In 1973 Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) decided to impose full oil embargo on South Africa, but it was not 
effective because Iran supplied oil for South Africa until 1979. In 1979 the shah of Iran fell 
and subsequently the new government discontinued the oil supplies.80  After that apartheid 
state managed to buy oil but it was huge financial burden because illicit shipping were costly 
and The Intergovernmental Group estimated in 1991 that during the past 12 years oil embargo 
had imposed costs between $25 to $30 billion.81 Beck presents that the reason why apartheid 
state successfully bypassed the effects of this embargo was the soaring gold prices that helped 
to circumvent the isolation.82 Probably the wealth achieved on the sectors of mining and 
economy assisted the same outcome. The economical sanctions and withdrawal of the 
international enterprises played only bigger role in 1980s and the effect of these measures will 
be viewed in the last chapter of this study.  
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The effect of these measures and especially lack of engagement in 1960s raises a question that 
how powerful were the international human rights norms and how much they disturbed 
apartheid state that mainly rejected their validity? The role of norms is largely conditional and 
if there is no force behind the norms advocating and fostering them then the norms are lacking 
actual power. The resistance against apartheid in 1960s and 1980s makes a very descriptive 
comparison of this problem. In the 1960s UN established a discourse that criticised the 
behaviour of apartheid state, but this discussion did not change apartheid state’s behaviour 
and it did not change the behaviour of countries that were supplying it with weapons and 
investments. In other words norms were powerless. To endorse a complete isolation is hardly 
desirable but the examination of political and economical networks points out that there 
would have been political means to pressure apartheid state if there would have been political 
will.  
 
What comes to Amnesty and human rights consciousness for example between the 1960s and 
1980s the difference is immense. Whereas in 1960s the condemnation of apartheid state was 
focused on Sharpeville massacre and its aftermath the rest of 1960s the criticism was more 
moderate. It is certainly a negative phenomenon if the human rights violations get attention 
only through tragedies and there is no lasting engagement to solve these problems. On the 
contrary in the 1980s apartheid state was under wide criticism this affected also the 
economical scenario. Embargoes were released, companies withdrew from South Africa and 
investments were limited. Eades has recognized a phenomenon that the all of these actions 
were not sincere and some companies sold the management and thereby they avoided burden 
and responsibility of running businesses in a human rights violating country.83 Consequently 
the validity of human rights actions cannot be evaluated only causally that certain action 
would mean positive attitude towards human rights. The institutional rules and conventions 
can create an impetus for certain behaviour but if there is no genuine commitment to certain 
ends it is difficult to guarantee that the restrictions could not by bypassed by way or another. 
Another question is that end cannot justify the means and besides the change of human rights 
attitudes that normative school has studied vigorously but they have forgotten that sanctions 
can only be a tool that fosters to encounter the problem and to punish by sanctions cannot lead 
to meaningful change. There are no proofs that apartheid was a system that based its existence 
                                                 
83 Eades 1999, 93-94. 
 43
on economical exploitation solely and the popularity of apartheid government lasted even the 
economy of the nation suffered severely due to apartheid policies.84 Therefore it is sort 
sighted to make a conclusion that human rights violation State could be shrivelled because 
something else than stronger than economical interest was inspiring the violent intervention in 
South Africa.  
 
International community took actions against South Africa but these measures were 
inadequate and apartheid state was more determined than its opponents. The first measure was 
a voluntary arms embargo in 1963, which was a major failure from UN in terms that it did not 
prevent apartheid state to expand its violent capabilities. Embargo was voluntary and it did 
not bind the member States and for example France and England refused to ratify this 
resolution, however, they promised to sell weapons no more than for “external use”, which 
indicates that this was considered purely as South Africa’s private issue.85 The grounds for an 
arms embargo were obvious and the international community wanted to slow down 
apartheid’s violent intervention inside South Africa and possibly in Southern Africa. When 
we look at the weight of the international norms we see that South Africa was not the only 
one who mocked their validity and power. The decision that Britain and France made in this 
case indicated that they acknowledge apartheid’s human rights problem because they agreed 
that South Africa is using the guns against its own citizens and therefore it should not be able 
to buy weapons for “internal purposes”. However, as we can guess the difference between 
external and internal was a thin line that apartheid state could draw anywhere it pleased, 
regardless of the external opinion. Regarding the ethos of time I would call this a perfect 
solution considering the position of States. Rejecters of arms embargo announced that they 
have recognized human rights problem in South Africa, but in their opinion the system of 
States is capable to solve this problem, or should be able to solve this problem and the sacred 
lines of public and private shall be untouchable. Dissenting attitude consequently expressed 
that Britain and France were announcing that South Africa is a sovereign State that can buy 
and use weapons as it wishes and on top of that France and Britain should be entitled to sell 
weapons to such a country and make profit on that. This indicates the weakness of human 
rights norms, convention and especially the advocacy network in the beginning of 1960s and 
by taking dissenting attitude France and Britain refused to participate the discourse that 
defined the direction of apartheid.  
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However, releasing the arms embargo was serious opening for international discourse that 
released discussion that had been basically non-existent. The view of France and Britain 
revealed the power of the ‘old norm’ that defended privacy of sovereign States’ right to 
manage their political systems as they please. Arms embargo was an action against this norm 
and it set a new direction for the discourse and it made apartheid’s human rights violations a 
public international issue. Arms embargo was also a major victory for the opposition in South 
Africa and it declared that apartheid is being notified by UN and it is taking an action against 
it. UN action solidified opposition’s objectives and condemnation according to international 
law provided moral support for resisting unjust apartheid state. Nelson Mandela remembers 
that on the same day he was judged in Rivonia trial: “…we were praising the fact that the day 
before, the General Assembly of the UN had voted in favour of sanctions against South Africa 
for the first time.”86 This example has also power point out that for the people under 
oppression in South Africa this was a valuable issue, but on the other hand for nations selling 
weapons this was a meaningless issues. For the ones who were demanding political rights this 
was a symbolic victory.   
 
Risse and Sikkink and Black on the basis of their theory conclude that the communicative 
process forces human rights violating governments to change their behaviour and respect the 
ruling norms. On the basis of political development in South Africa it seems to be that the 
grave rejection of the human rights norms was strongly reflected to the behaviour of State and 
arms embargo that was a demarcation point in the discourse and from this point apartheid 
state further alienated from norms. Arms embargo gave a signal that international community 
has right and it is willing to take action against apartheid state and apartheid state considered 
this as a threat to its existence. However, apartheid state was able to recognise that there is no 
consistent spirit against its existence and it could prevail without making political 
concessions. Apartheid state considered the State security and the White supremacy were the 
first priorities and this priority took over the international norms and demands to follow them. 
Apartheid state knew that it was dependent on the international network and therefore  to seek 
connection and also to seek independence from dependency formed a two pronged attitude to 
manage international affairs. To achieve this aim South Africa developed a powerful domestic 
weapon industry which was backed up by co-operation and arms deal with European 
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countries, United States, Israel and Taiwan. Beck states: “To provide a modern arsenal for the 
military and police and to reduce dependence on foreign imports, South Africa established the 
Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR) in 1964.”87  With French and Israeli 
assistance apartheid state even developed a nuclear capability which in 1993 consisted of 
seven nuclear bombs.88 Besides nuclear bombs in the 1980s apartheid developed chemical 
weapons and this was one of issues that was uncovered and investigated after the fall of 
apartheid state and what kind of secret networks were behind this activity.89 
 
Development of domestic arms industry eradicated one key dependency that international 
community could have used for pressuring apartheid state. The objective of this manoeuvre 
was to guarantee apartheid state’s authority and independency from international norms and 
in this case especially human rights norms. This is quite an opposite what Risse and Sikkink 
and Black propose on the basis of their theory. They suggest that human rights violating 
government get thrown into spiral of rational argumentation which forces actors such as 
apartheid state into discourse that eventually forces the change. Spiral model has reservations 
for slow periods but the case of South Africa forms a peculiar exception where a State 
strongly searches for permanent distance to the international human rights norms. The arms 
embargo and subsequent establishment of domestic arms production was regression to this 
development and by seeking independence from international norms apartheid state ensured 
that it did not have to participate rational argumentation and reasoning because there was no 
need persuade other States to sell weapons for it. Economical and energy issues also ensured 
apartheid states ability to self-determinate. In 1960s apartheid state managed to arrange 
military and economical independence and this combined with suffocation of domestic 
resistance guaranteed the period of confidence. This offered more privacy for apartheid state 
to manage its issues as it pleased and external actors had as a result lesser possibilities to 
affect this persistent State.  
 
Weapon question was one of the priority issues for apartheid state because its existence was 
dependent on the violent intervention, which was a project that needed to be equipped with 
weapons for the police and the military. Arms embargo issue was a fight over a vital gateway 
that played a major role in the apartheid’s future. International community knew that 
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apartheid state should not have those weapons and apartheid state knew that it could not carry 
on without weapons, which means that it was crucial question symbolically as well as 
materially. This was a point of redefinition that the international community lost and it could 
not affect future development on that area. Not only it did not prevent apartheid state’s current 
demand for weapons but it also blocked the future attempts to restrict apartheid state from 
increasing it military capacity since as a response apartheid state developed strong domestic 
weapon production in case there would be an effective embargo in the future.90 Apartheid 
state knew that its dependence on the international network can be lethal and it started to 
weave its own network that the opponents of apartheid could not affect. This network 
includes also the branches of trade and not only weapons. Later on South Africa managed 
circumvent successfully an oil embargo and the demand gold and other minerals was steady 
and that kept apartheid state’s economy going. The self-sufficient weapon production 
supported by arms deals made with countries that were willing to deal with it, increased the 
strength and independence of apartheid state. Later on other projects were established to 
increase independency, which were implemented by South African Coal, Oil and Gas 
Corporation (SASOL). These projects completed two facilities that convert oil from coal and 
in the late 1970s the production met 10 percent of South Africa’s consumption and in the 
early 1980s this one-third.91 Objective of these costly projects was to reduce dependence on 
the external oil and to free apartheid state from external demands to make concession 
regarding the project of White supremacy.    
 
 
 
1.6 Human rights in the 1960s, a success or a failure? 
 
The confronting heading is inspired by content and style that Black is putting forward in the 
section of Power Of Human Rights where he examines apartheid and human rights on the 
basis of spiral model. There are major differences between the argument that Black puts 
forward and the ideas of this study. Black argues that apartheid responded affirmatively to the 
criticism and consequently Black claims there was a connection between the human rights 
norms and apartheid state. To affirm the communicational connections depends largely what 
is considered as adequate experience to demonstrate that there was a connection between 
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apartheid state and international norms. Black claims that: apartheid state displayed 
“sensitivity to international criticism and isolation”92 and as empirical proofs he uses the 
establishment of Bantustan system and some other concessions. Bantustan system was a 
response to de-colonisation and this system was designed to simultaneously cherish two aims. 
To grant the majority of people with self-determination and to separate undesirable people 
from the Republic of South Africa that was thereby reserved for ‘Europeans’. Another 
question is that how valid were the norms and if the agreement on adequate foreign relations 
was adequate enough to foster human rights. The basic problem is that spiral model claims 
that communicational connection can be created on the conditions of normative context, but 
does this method create a tangible encounter between the human rights violating States and 
proponents of human rights? To approach communication from perspective of norms 
inevitably rules the preconditions for the encounter and even what should happen after the 
encounter. According to this logic the dissenter is brought back to normative consensus. 
Spiral model focus on encountering the opposition movements (this will be examined in the 2 
chapter) and the importance of encountering the human rights violating State is 
underestimated and it is seen as target of pressure rather than source of knowledge and 
comprehension. How is it possible to investigate and advance human right if there is no 
willingness to learn more about the phenomenon and roots and reason that have contributed 
the appearance of human rights violations? The normative approach trusts that the normative 
objectifications are universally valid and therefore they can bypass the human rights violating 
State. The starting point for the encounter should be much more humble and modest and 
instead of predefining the encounter the phenomenon should be encountered as it is and by 
doing that the path to foster the norms or some other mean can appear and open. Solely norms 
do not have power capture entities such as apartheid state. 
  
Bantustan system on the level of idea was suppose to create pure and separated African 
communities based on ethnicity. The vision was based on scientific worldview, not on human 
experience and whereas there were ‘separate’ communities they had been intermingling and 
there were no clear cuts between people as apartheid claimed. Bantustan system created an 
ethnoterritorial federal State dominated by apartheid state and instead of granting these areas 
with autonomy they remained under indirect and often direct authority of the State. Apartheid 
administration encouraged irresponsible leadership in Bantustan and where the colonial 
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system had been based on direct intervention in 1900s now apartheid state adopted the 
popular strategy of indirect control. This policy was based on controlling and weakening the 
African communities and bringing them to sphere of apartheids power whereas before the 
colonial State had sought to destroy the ‘tribal’ structures.93  
 
The problem with Black’s interpretation from normative perspective is that there is no 
vindication for his argument that could be found by logic or thinking or from historical or any 
other type study. It is a generally agreed fact that Bantustan system was apartheid state’s 
extension and to attach positive qualities to this development is extremely difficult.  Besides 
suppressing the citizenships and human rights of the Black population group Bantustan 
system justified the homogenization of White population group and whereas the South 
African society had been characterized by strife between Afrikaners and British colonialism 
now all the people ‘European’ ethnicity were declared as the property of apartheid 
management. Apartheid has been mostly viewed as system that defends Whites and rejects 
Black but when such interpretation is made it discreetly justifies that such categories are 
logical. Apartheid and Bantustan system denied rights from all the population groups and 
these rights were handed over or usurped by the apartheid state. It is undeniable that the 
majority of White people were content that their rights were managed by the apartheid state 
but that does not make any less wrong the way how apartheid state controlled rights by 
monopolizing them for the use of the State. It was not an option for a member of White 
population group to resign for the racial duty. White as well all the other population groups 
were dominated by White tyranny.     
 
Amnesty reported about Bantustans in following way: 
 
“For those Africans who are released at the end of a political sentence, the pattern 
seems also to have set. In the Cape, as prisoners leave the prison they are now served 
with an order endorsing them out of their home areas; they are sent from prison, under 
armed guard, to Transkei, without being able to return to their homes even to collect 
their possessions.  This has happened even where a man had a family in Cape Town, or 
had worked there for 20 or 25 years.” 94 
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This experience points out how apartheid state applied the Natives management and people 
were torn from their roots and brought to areas that they were unfamiliar with or these areas 
did not have any preconditions to support rural or urban life. Amnesty presented the 
dimensions of Bantustan system more profoundly in the report that will be examined in the 
next chapter. The topic of human rights is wide and especially in the end of apartheid a 
question of human rights in Bophuthatswana Bantustan became urgent, however this study 
cannot cover this branch but how human rights were managed in Bantustans could be a vital 
perspective to examine human rights. Apartheid state set Tomlinson commission to examine 
that how much money would have to be invested in the Bantustan system that they could 
provide sustainable conditions for human life. The Prime Minister Verwoerd dismissed these 
investments as obsolete and consequently Bantustans became poverty stricken remote areas 
that did not have decent roads, health care, education employment and this served one of the 
aims of apartheid state that was to expel undesirable people from urban areas. This desire was 
cherished by restricting the migration to urban areas and simultaneously Bantustans 
functioned as labour reserves where people could be picked up in case there was need for 
labour. Mines and such areas of employment accepted only men as labour and these people 
lived away from their families in single sex hostels and when their work was over they were 
expelled back to Bantustans.95 Police force actively monitored these rules and regulations and 
thousands of people were imprisoned under the provisions of pass laws that lined the spatial 
segregation.96 Apartheid tackled three of its problems simultaneously by establishing the 
Bantustan system. It managed to continue the segregation and even deepen it by expelling 
people from urban areas and denying citizenship and at the same time the supply of labour 
was secured. Besides internal problems according to Black’s interpretation apartheid managed 
to ease the criticism towards its policies that recalled downright colonial exploitation. The 
difference between the Black’s affirmative interpretation and interpretation here is that 
apartheid state managed to cherish its desires through various manoeuvres and avoid its 
responsibilities whereas Black claims that this development was positive for human rights and 
it was created as a result of adequate human rights discourse. 
  
Yet another problem with Black’s argument is when it approaches this problem from 
perspective of international politics and norms it rejects encountering and obtaining 
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information if the norms and what they suggest is actually adequate for the particular 
problem. Human rights activities could be divided into two components and the view consist 
of particular attitude that shapes the approach towards certain issue or object and the actual 
human rights problems is accessed ‘through’ or ‘from’ the attitude. In Black’s interpretation 
there is only the attitude present and the actual problem is not encountered at all. Furthermore 
the problem can be divided into content and quality of attitude and how this affected the view 
on apartheid and then on the other hand that how well the actual problem was encountered. 
Clearly the normative attitude on the international context was insufficient because it was 
based on flat acceptance of certain action (self-determination) for the particular problem 
without estimating that how adequate the solution is or if even logically corresponds to the 
norms. This type of international system is based on façades that each State represents 
towards the outside and this cover-up hides the actual construction behind the façade. This 
was a general non-encounter pact where States were committed to maintain the status quo of 
unaccountability. Spiral model suggest that key feature of rising human rights was that the 
unaccountable becomes accountable through entanglement which is brought about inquiries 
and publicity of human rights, however, Black has jumped over this phase and he goes 
directly approving the normative system. What comes to attitude towards human rights they 
were definitely inadequate and what comes to culture on encountering it was totally missing 
and out of proper interaction between States. The human rights politics of 1960s maintained 
the culture of unaccountability that efficiently prevented progress of this issue.  
 
What about the answer to the question if human rights activities was a success or a failure? 
The first remark to make is that the demand to examine affirmatively this question can lead 
only a methodological dead end. This is how Black argues about success of human rights 
activities: “National party regime never denied the validity of key international and liberal 
norms such as self-determination, the rule of law or representative democracy.”97 In the first 
part of this chapter I presented on the basis of Helen Suzman’s experience and various other 
sources that the Rule of Law was eradicated from South Africa and what comes to 
international norms and international context that is criticised above and hardly there are 
traces that could lead to interpretation that Black is endorsing. In the contemporary 
perspective human rights activities are absolutely affirmative and they aim at improving 
human rights immediately and as fast and efficiently as possible but in historical perspective 
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the strength is to detach from this demand. The rise of Amnesty could be seen as coming of 
human rights from one direction and unaccountability of States could be seen as remaining 
and perhaps waning of certain cultural layer. The initiative of human rights came from 
activists and ‘normal’ people whereas States ran political system still on corporation base 
where the facts and figures and conventions ruled the relations and actual experience based 
information was seen as irrelevant.. In this sense there was success because the role of civil 
society was rising and ‘technological state’ was fading and human rights violations did not 
remain solely a game of States where achieved positions and privacy are seeing as sacred 
virtues. There was a trend towards better. If this question would be approach by affirmative 
science factually human rights activities were in the 1960s a failure because there was no 
tangible immediate change that could be measured. However, Black by applying this logic 
has barely turned the facts into a teleological explanation that corresponds to the aim of 
improving human rights. And when this question is thought openly we can see different layers 
and problems that fostered and prevented the coming of human rights.           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III  
Increased polarization and ‘total strategy’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 52
 
3.1 The renewed resistance and apartheid state’s response to the resistance 
 
The domination that apartheid state enjoyed in 1960s started to crumble down in 1970s due to 
various factors. ANC and PAC were still banned organizations and their activities inside of 
South Africa were still weak and they tried to affect liberation struggle from exile. However, 
two forces filled in the vacuum that absence of ANC and PAC had left and these were Inkatha 
and Black Consciousness (BC). Inkatha, which is mainly Zulu organization and it used the 
existing structures of apartheid state (Bantustan policy), Zulu culture and especially the 
KwaZulu Bantustan as a political implement. Inkatha and its prominent leader Buthelezi were 
accused of cooperating with apartheid state and Inkatha’s opponents claimed that it is 
approving apartheid by acting within the system.  Inkatha diverged clearly from the line of 
PAC and ANC that both had adopted communist sponsors98 and communist ideologies that 
affected the strategies and political persuasions of these movements. Besides this difference 
Inkatha did not officially approve violent reform and Buthelezi believed strongly that 
confrontation between people has to be solved by non-violent means and through constructive 
engagement.99  
 
The other organization that rose to resist apartheid state was Black Consciousness and its 
origins were in Black people universities and students associations that Steve Biko, the leader 
of Black Consciousness had found and subsequently Biko became the leader of Black 
Consciousness. Black Consciousness was an organization that searched results through 
rational argumentation and peaceful protest and mass movement. Biko was the main voice of 
BC and he saw that apartheid state had stolen Black people’s identity and this identity has to 
be returned before Black people can see clearly how apartheid state is making them obedient 
and modifying their identity and provoking population group’s hatred towards each others. 
Biko rejected Bantustan policy and he said that the aim of system is to make African people 
to believe in false promises of freedom and to deceive outside world. Biko was also one of 
criticisers of Buthelezi and in his opinion: ”The combination of Buthelezi and the white press 
make up the finest ambassadors that South Africa ever had”.100 In the beginning apartheid 
state was not worried about BC’s and Biko’s activities but as they managed to gain more 
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attention apartheid state started to consider them as threat and State imposed banning orders 
on BC officials and eventually Biko died in security police custody in 1977 which caused a 
worldwide outcry.101  
 
A fact that concerned apartheid which was paranoid about the security of the state was that 
the ‘White buffer zones’, Portuguese colonies Mozambique and Angola and originally British 
Rhodesia, that had kept ANC and PAC military camps away from South Africa’s borders. 
When Portuguese dictatorship collapsed in 1974 one of last African colonies Mozambique 
and Angola became independent. This meant that when Portuguese military presence was 
gone from these geographically enormous countries it was possible for South African 
liberation organizations to create connection with these countries that shared borders with 
apartheid state and establish cooperation. Angola became a playground of Cold War and 
South Africa supported anti-communist troops and tried to protect the border of Namibia from 
SWAPO (South West African Peoples Organization) fighters. The change of power in 
Mozambique was a major strategic change for Rhodesia that was controlled by White 
government and the aim of Black opposition was to overthrow the government by liberation 
struggle. Umkhonto we Sizwe assisted ZAPU (Zimbabwean African Peoples Union) and 
ZANU (Zimbabwean African National Union) in this endeavour and when the Portuguese 
power was gone from Mozambique it left the vast border open between Mozambique and 
Rhodesia. Through the struggle that was in Mozambique ZANU managed to achieve 
independence and in 1980 Rhodesia became Zimbabwe. These developments posed a new 
threat for apartheid state that was already fearful about its security and it tried to protect its 
external and internal security by all the conceivable means.102 
 
The danger that Biko and BC posed to apartheid state was that they started to build and shine 
the Black identity that apartheid state had manipulated and people had become passive 
subjects of social engineering. This was largely an achievement of apartheid state policies that 
aimed containing the Black people and their emotions and this identity manipulation and 
mental oppression was seen as the biggest obstacle preventing change. As the name Black 
Consciousness indicates the movement was based on Black people’s consciousness and the 
knowledge of identity and the sense how apartheid state is suppressing Black people was 
asleep in 1960s. This is one more reason that guaranteed the period of confidence for 
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apartheid state, besides economical and international political success. BC started to raise this 
consciousness intentionally in the beginning of 1970s and this had far reaching consequences 
and this movement managed to raise the feelings of Black people and this can be seen as one 
contributing factor to heightened polarization in the 1970s. The old generations had stiffened 
under the suppression of apartheid state but the youth that was open to the future was full of 
energy and therefore it was open to the message of BC. The clash of identities began when 
apartheid state announced that Afrikaans shall be used as a medium of instructions at schools. 
Most of the teachers were not fluent in Afrikaans and on the top of that this was a strong 
symbolic deed from apartheid state, which provoked identities to clash. Afrikaans was largely 
associated with Afrikaans people and the suppression that was directed against the Black 
people and compared to English that is widely spoken international language it does not 
provide the same possibilities. Decision to force Afrikaans on people was an attempt to force 
Afrikaner identity or at least part of that on Black people and justify the cultural 
supremacy.103 
 
As a result of increased tension the pressures of pent up anger were released in Soweto, which 
is a large township or group of townships south of Johannesburg. Secondary school pupil 
marched against the government’s intention to establish Afrikaans as a medium of instruction. 
When the march reached Orlando West High School the amount of crowd had grown to about 
14 000 and marchers clashed there with the police. Students threw stones towards police and 
police responded with tear gas and warning shots and eventually police shot into crowd by 
killing at least one, Hector Petersen, who became the symbol of resistance. Rioting continued 
and it spread all over Soweto and eventually all over the Republic. The material and human 
losses were substantial and The Minister of Justice Jimmy Kruger announced that alone in 
Witwaterstrand there had been 130 deaths and 1100 people injured and on the top of that 33 
Bantu Administrative buildings, 27 beer halls and 90 schools had been burnt down. The final 
damage was much greater and the moderate evaluation by the government estimated that 575 
people were killed and 2 389 were wounded by the end of 1977.104 
 
What was remarkable about Soweto happenings that it was truly an uprising and it was not 
organized particularly by any organization or institution. Exiled liberation movements had 
wished such an insurgence to take place inside South Africa but they did not expect it and it 
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was a surprise for both the apartheid state and liberation movements. As mentioned before the 
work BC had done to reinforce the Black identity and provoke the disapproval towards 
apartheid certainly played a role in the development of growing consciousness. The reason 
why the uprising began from Soweto was that the consciousness was growing there fastest. 
Soweto was group of townships were apartheid state contained Black people with minimal 
costs, yet near enough that they can commute for work in Johannesburg. The housing 
conditions were therefore insufficient and problems of apartheid’s enforcement were piled up 
and they were clearly present in places such as Soweto. This caused that there were millions 
of people living in unsatisfactory conditions and especially young people saw how the 
government’s policies were blocking their future’s possibilities.105      
 
Apartheid state did not understand what kind of threat the radical and violent resistance posed 
to the State and they dismissed the criticism that for example Desmond Tutu and Inkatha 
presented. They claimed that if government does not make fast and radical changes there is 
huge risk that the resistance will turn into violent permanently. Government dismissed this 
criticism and they gravely believed that there were “certain organization and people” that 
deliberately “bring about polarization between Whites and Blacks”.106 But the differences 
between 1960s and the latter half of 1970s were obvious. Whereas in 1960s there was very 
little insurgence from other actors than liberation organizations and in 1970s an unorganized 
movement of students rose and created an insurgence that was out of apartheid state’s control 
and lasted for many months. The radical youth of 1970s had actually very little connection to 
traditional liberation organizations and they felt that those organizations could not do much 
for them and instead they believe in radicalism and instant action. This brought in a new 
power to the game that was before played between the apartheid state and liberation 
movements and the consensus that apartheid state had managed to achieve was now partly 
lost.107  
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3.2 Mental platform of human rights violations 
 
Apartheid had come to situation where the sense of siege was ever increased and its internal 
strength was under attack and its borders were under threat as well. Consequently apartheid 
state developed a policy of “total strategy” that was designed to halt the “total onslaught”.  
Apartheid state claimed that total onslaught implied that the sovereign and legitimate 
apartheid state was under attacks from multiple directions and the acts of aggression  regard 
political, social and economic deeds besides military intervention and according the General 
Magnus Malan, the chief of Defence Staff the enemy uses many techniques which include 
coercive, persuasive and incentive and the attack takes place on multiple fronts which are 
political, diplomatic, religious, psychological, sports, as well as military. Confrontation is 
being described by military terms by military people and yet the actual military confrontation 
seems to be almost non-existent. Barber describes: “Army generals openly stated that the 
dangers were 80 percent political and 20 percent military.”108 The political construction of 
enemy and change of politics has been portrayed in this manner by Barber: 
 
“Alongside the specific incidents broader developments were taking place. Soweto and 
its aftermath had shattered the Verwoerdian apartheid vision. As a result the 
government steadily abandoned the high moral ground and replaced it by pragmatic 
policies designed to defend the white state.”109 
 
Barber has interpreted that there was significant change of policies and behaviour and 
apartheid state transformed from moral utopia to pragmatism. When we look at the 
redefinition of apartheid’s state enemy we can see that almost every actor that did not approve 
apartheid state’s policy of White supremacy was its enemy and this implied that Amnesty fell 
in the category of enemies as well. Now apartheid officially announced that people, 
organizations and states that threaten the identity of advocators of White supremacy or the 
White supremacy are endangering the state. Government used skilfully the rhetoric of Cold 
War and claimed that: “The enemy’s aim was to overthrow the existing constitutional order 
and replace it by a communist black government” and “The vehicles they employed for this 
were the ANC, PAC and SACP, supported by communist states, the OAU, the UN and western 
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anti-apartheid groups.110 Apartheid state claimed self-righteously all the actions that aimed to 
political change were subversive communist actions and liberation movement and communist 
forces used organizations such as Amnesty as the vanguard of the revolution. Now apartheid 
state first time officially announced that organizations such as Amnesty and UN threaten the 
identity of supporters of White supremacy and this announcement made clear that apartheid 
state considered actors such as Amnesty as a relevant threat in the information/symbolic 
warfare that threatened to alter identity of White state and its supporters. 
 
 Whereas Barber sees this as a change compared to the preceding I would argue that these 
fears were already embodied in concrete actions in 1960s and long term development was 
reflected on the statements in 1970s and what was already part of reality was now announced 
officially. Establishment of total strategy reflects the treat that was posed to apartheid’s 
symbolic order it had reached a saturation point and this consequently was reflected to the 
security effort. The distance that apartheid took to the international system in 1960s by 
establishing its own arm production and by creating strict security laws apartheid state created 
a space that protected White supremacy and was not accessible by the liberation 
organizations, international community or anybody else. The “total strategy mentality” was 
already established in long historical process and it was finally activated by Sharpeville 
massacre that was a demarcation point for apartheid state and started mentally and tangibly 
isolated itself from national and international surroundings. Then by restricting information 
on prison conditions and banning people that politically resisted apartheid it showed that 
information and White supremacy are the monopoly of the state and these official truth shall 
not be distorted.  
 
This means that apartheid state already saw much earlier that its existence depends on 
confrontation on multiple fronts and the outcome of these confrontations will define the future 
of the White state. Barber talks how Verwoerdian vision shattered and how during the time he 
was the Prime Minister there was a strong belief that apartheid state is successful social 
project and the success was based on well-designed social engineering and Soweto uprising 
proved that it was a failure. This is a two pronged question because the government already 
forsake the principles of Rule of Law and started arbitrary treatment of detainees and 
prisoners in 1960s which means that social engineering failed to maintain order already in 
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1960s. However, due to the lack public protests and riots apartheid state managed to create an 
illusion that state is running successfully by the social engineering and the role of violent 
suppression was therefore hidden. Nevertheless, Soweto uprising and the insurgence that 
followed proved to all the sides that there are masses of people who are frustrated of life 
under the rule of apartheid and they were willing to risk their lives for violent actions to 
change the system. The effect of Soweto uprising and consequently the “total strategy” for the 
White people was dual and the new threats provoked fears and uncertainty. Then again the 
“total strategy” provided consolation and verified that state is taking a harsh stand on things 
that threaten them.111 Government’s action kept on the balance of fear and loyalty that 
guaranteed the support of government. Fears made possible government to run harsh 
repressive policies and the claimed “attacks” by multiple “aggressors” towards the state 
provided justification for these actions. 
 
The way how the apartheid community was shaped up mentally and symbolically had drastic 
effect on the human rights violations and new tangible and ‘imaginary’ threats increased the 
sense of siege and mutual hostilities created a civil war type of situation where the actions of 
enemy provide reason and justification for violent counter actions. Apartheid state still 
considered itself as unchallenged, sovereign and the only legal political force in South Africa 
that is challenged by illicit terrorist attacks and subversive communist forces. When Minister 
of Justice was asked an explanation for using live ammunition against people on the street he 
answered that: “blacks must be made tame to the gun”. This reveals how the representatives 
of security institutions considered themselves arrogantly as heroes in the righteous 
confrontation against the enemies of the state and this attitude made possible inhuman 
treatment of thousands of people. The violence and killing on the street posed a new challenge 
for Amnesty because such occasions are more difficult to account. Though, Amnesty had 
restricted its reports to prisons and detention conditions and this policy continued and this 
formed the core of human rights violations for Amnesty. This chapter concentrates on 
examining on torture and deaths in detention and the last chapter will deal with the problem 
how Amnesty sough to report about issues that did not take place in state institutions and yet 
were perpetrated by state actors directly or indirectly. When a person is detained and he or she 
does not return alive police faced burden to explain death of a detainee. Apartheid state gave 
vivid sagas about the destiny of killed people and these explanations always sough to justify 
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the means for the end. Therefore Amnesty obtained information from people who were 
detained to what type of treatment they suffered and what happened to people who died 
during detention. Detainees who survived the detention heard through the walls or saw 
directly what was done to detainees who did not survive detention and these people gave their 
experiences to Amnesty.  Thousands of people were brought before courts or detained without 
trial and large quantities of people also flee South Africa.112    
 
The process of eradicating the Rule of Law and establishing the state of exception that was 
started in the 1960s affected the state even stronger than before. As we saw a representative of 
the military Magnus Malan started to line political development and this indicates how 
military and civil were combined as one political organism. Confrontation was described by 
military terms by military people and yet it included social and political elements and military 
threat was seen as a minor menace, yet the response was violent. The question is that why 
were police and military in the apex of this development if the military contribution was 
seeing as a minor factor? Reasons for this will be examined later on this chapter and to realize 
violent and military visions was possible because the security organization were privately 
deciding about reasons and motives of security projects without public debate in the 
Parliament. The process where of Rule of Law was suspended was described in the first 
chapter and this chapter concentrates to examine what the privatized security culture implied 
in respect of human rights.  
 
 It is a complicated question to answer that what was the relation of politics and security in 
apartheid South Africa because they seemed to act as one organism and there was no public 
qualifications of ideas and therefore it can be said that things happened rather than they were 
decided. It appears to be also that former politicians are not enthusiastic to talk about their 
participation in designing and commanding security operations because they were private and 
obviously the reasons for privacy have not been lifted even though time have past from these 
happenings.113 After all there were discussions about human rights violations in Parliament 
when Helen Suzman raised questions about the inhuman treatment of police, prison and 
military officials. Mrs. Suzman writes in her memoirs:   
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“I also asked many questions relating to civil rights the Rule of Law-detention, bannings, 
whippings police brutality and executions. So infuriated was one Cabinet Minister that he 
shouted in Parliament, “You out these questions just to embarrass South Africa overseas.”114      
 
The comment of the Cabinet Minister indicates that he was outraged that the private 
information of the actions of security institutions should not reach overseas because it was not 
favourable for image of South Africa. Suzman was generally treated as a traitor for ‘leaking 
information’ and she was the only person in the apartheid parliament was outside the spirit of 
apartheid. It is shameful that parliamentarian could not publicly speak about issues that regard 
the sphere of Parliament’s power.  This argument also indicates what was the Parliament’s 
stand to resort violence – it was justified, not a human rights violation. Consequently the 
Parliament approved the methods that security institutions applied on political opponents and 
found them fully justified and this pseudo-democratic organ could not do anything for 
improvement of rights. When the main task of the Parliament, research of reason was halted, 
Suzman acted on a forum where she did not  belong to, at least according to principles of 
apartheid that claimed that it is managing things in the best possible way. 
 
When spiral model present that how norms function it focuses on the political level and the 
actual grass root level is somewhat neglected. But why was Suzman able to broadcast human 
rights message through the State apparatus even though apartheid state had strong censorship 
project that exterminated political voices? In this type of situation publicity and norms can 
make a change but people who did not have such protecting status as Parliamentarian were 
targets of apartheid’s persistent persecution. I see that human rights norms, or generally 
norms can have only superficial effect, at least when the development is seen by short time 
range (spiral model concentrates of long term development). Of course it is not insignificant 
that Suzman could act as human rights activist through the political system, even though it 
was an accident from the perspective of apartheid, but the theoretical norms did not have a 
profound effect or they were not advocated in profound manner and consequently the final 
effect in overall rights was faint.      
 
One more issue that regards the suspension of the democratic process is that when the 
Parliament imagined that the security forces do their best to protect the State and accepted all 
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use of violence categorically without having information that could have confirmed that these 
security measures are somewhat ‘rational’. How is it possible to make decisions without 
having relevant information on the issues under evaluation? Suzman travelled a lot in South 
and Southern Africa and she was human rights activist in actual sense because she 
encountered the people who were the objects of apartheid’s policies whereas usually the ones 
with power stayed within mental fortification and refuse to face the reality.115  
 
Amnesty practised similar method of convergence and besides information that Amnesty re-
broadcasts the organizations supports victims of human rights financially and mentally and 
through the face to face encounter it is possible to experience the reality. The ones who kept 
the power in apartheid state had an ideal of extreme segregation and this attitude prevented 
constructive social encounters. Apartheid declared that for the apartheiders the social 
recognition is possible when individual binds one’s existence to the State and its norms and 
for all the others being an apartheider is not possible under any circumstances, or at least not 
very likely. Usually the mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion are more discreet and 
individuals can be initiated to social existence whereas apartheid single-handedly denied this 
possibility, especially from people of the ‘wrong race’. Consequently apartheid claimed that 
the only acceptable way of existing is apartheid and segregation and it is supreme and 
omnipotent compared to other ways of existing. As a result there was no desire to know about 
others because apartheid defined others as obsolete and inferior. Beyond this apartheid did not 
want to give a chance for experience and the obsession to segregation seemed to derive from 
fear that interaction and encounters between different kind of social settings would stimulate 
emotions and experiences that might functions as catalyst of change.  
 
The tactic that Amnesty and civil society generally applies that it publicize and broadcast 
issues that it imagines that can appeal general interest and the provide experiences that 
stimulates individuals. This contributes to the change through providing experiences and in 
this case Amnesty was providing experience that apartheid state tried to vigorously hide. The 
ones who wish to remain ignorant, passive or irresponsible are set in motion by this process 
and therefore civil society does irreplaceable work that the ones with comfort and power do 
not bother to take part in social projects.  
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Apartheid is a textbook example of a society of the chosen ones who monopolize the power to 
use of particular people.  What kind of equal political system can function successfully if the 
effects of action is always alleged or presumed and the system never practises evaluation 
through trial and error? Subsequently all the decisions are inherently good and outcomes are 
always successful regardless of reality. For example, how could the parliament evaluate that 
how a ‘policy’ of torture functions if security police does not produce annual reports how they 
torture people? Yes, I know that this is utterly insane argument but it points out that the 
parliament was just turned into public scenery that functions without power and the actual 
play takes place behind the stage, whereas majority of the people are watching what is 
happening on the stage. Amnesty particularly and many other actors sought to uncover under 
surface reality of apartheid This is also a problem when South African history is described 
from political perspective because there is a need of special method to get to the roots of 
apartheid instead of listing the happenings on the stage.  
 
Therefore the security segment has to be seen as an autonomous faction that was loosely 
connected to the Parliamentary system and this faction was mostly disconnected from the 
rational argumentation that spiral model sees the tool that can install cognitive socialization 
process. Beyond this apartheid state has to be seen as disconnected from the international 
system because it claimed completeness and omnipotence and obviously this sort of exclusive 
attitude prevents construction of adequate multilateral relations. Naturally apartheid state had 
international relations but I see them more as act of opportunism rather than exposing itself 
genuinely to process where multiple desires can be defined. Certainly this is not solely a 
problem of apartheid and I try to argue in this thesis that a group of omnipotent nations cannot 
form a community of nations because each of them seeks to underline supremacy. Whose 
supremacy is then the most supreme? This is inevitable outcome of this process. A beginning 
for pro-human rights international system is that States claim that their existence is limited 
and therefore there has to be a chance to redefine the internal and external relations in 
reasonable manner.  
 
This means that spiral model needs to be supplied and that theory does not expect that there 
are significantly different levels of control inside the State. Or this case the state functioned as 
an organism and that sough to keep a façade towards outside and the core of the state, 
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security, was embedded deep in the layers of society.116  Spiral model expects that there is 
already a functional democratic state apparatus, or at least some political apparatus that can be 
used for rational argumentation. This argumentation can take place by supporting opposition 
movements the reluctant state can be bypassed. When reading the Amnesty’s reports it seems 
to be that there was very weak connection between the shaming that organizations such as 
Amnesty applied and human rights violations that took place in South Africa. The blatant 
violence continued on from year to year and violence ever increased even though the 
international audience became more aware of apartheid’s human rights violations.  
 
Risse and Sikkink present that shaming and rational argumentation are powerful methods 
against human rights violating governments and they have good reasons for that conclusion 
on the basis of case studies presented in the Power of Human Rights. However, in South 
Africa these tools did not affect the behaviour of security faction because it was loosely 
connected to the State, or it was a State within the State, and it was therefore out of range of 
the rational argumentation and shaming. People who commit human rights violations saw 
themselves rather as brave defenders of the legal state than threats to apartheid state’s 
international image.117 This does not mean that the symbolic effort of Amnesty would have 
been in vain but when the impact of human rights activism is being evaluated we must not 
overestimate and exaggerate the impact.   
 
The people who represented apartheid state internationally had to face allegations on grave 
human rights violations and they knew how damaging this information could be for South 
Africa’s international status, but their internal reality seemed to be stronger than the pressure 
to change behaviour. This is tied to the platform of spiral model that relates its argument on 
norms, behavioural claims and cognitive aims. Norm sets impetus for certain behaviour and 
when this demand has been fulfilled, dissenter can return back to the community of proper 
States and there is no more need for making behavioural claims and exclude the State. How is 
the realization of cognitive goal confirmed? The answer of spiral model is that when 
behaviour correspond to the norm. This cognitive conditions has been realized when the 
apartheid state learned that human rights violations are an issue that causes shame and 
undesired publicity and therefore the security activities were hidden as well as possible. 
Apartheid state became prudent, not sensitive. This is the process of learning that began in the 
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1960s and security and secrecy were increased in the 1970s. However, spiral model claims the 
observers should not be hoaxed by the rhetoric of human rights violating states and the actual 
deeds should be the meter of norms. I see the extensions to normative theory mere patches 
that try to cover theory that leans on social dynamics of local communities and cognition that 
will not take place if human rights authorities cannot threaten the human rights violating 
states by for example cutting military and economical ties.118       
 
This problem becomes even more complicated when it is seen from the perspective of 
security community and the members of security institutions were socialized to the security 
culture as were the political leaders. Spiral model suggest that by creating an atmosphere of 
human rights it is possible to transfer human rights through socialization. But is socialization 
a viable tool in international and inter-cultural context?119 It is easy to get socialized to 
cultural and social context when one lives in it but it is not credible that socialization could be 
engineered and designed on global level. This does not mean that there would not be other 
ways of learning and transferring knowledge but the approach of spiral model is essentially 
failure because it leans on methods of learning that are virtually impossible. In this case 
apartheid state could afford to cherish its desires without worrying about economical or 
military success and therefore to change apartheid would have required more imagination 
than setting one-way behavioural demands. What is generally right does not necessarily 
matter to human rights violating State and if there is a communicational connection (which I 
cannot see that spiral model could demonstrate) then it is possible to seek for remarkable and 
meaningful issues that can foster reaching the settlement. When a State that is deeply 
entwined in siege mentality moral discourse is bound to weaken the communicational 
connection and consequently improvement of human rights is impossible. This does not mean 
that there is no way forward but it needs to be searched whereas spiral model claims that the 
path has been opened already. The intention of this argument is not to claim that human rights 
activities would be doomed to fail (or succeed as spiral model claims) but to see that on what 
kind of knowledge and comprehension human rights activities are based on and how they can 
be improved. 
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3.3 The Political Imprisonment in South Africa 1978 
 
The Political Imprisonment in South Africa is a report that Amnesty released in 1978 and this 
report set the renewed course for Amnesty’s approach towards apartheid state and its human 
rights violations. The situation from the last larger report (1964) had changed in many 
regards. Amnesty had managed to reach a stronger status as a human rights actor and this 
increased power was in relation to growing membership and resources. Long term 
engagement in South Africa had enabled to take advantage on experiences and connections 
and this had an impact on the improvement of reporting. When the major features of 1964 and 
1978 reports are being compared one can conclude that Amnesty had gained more courage, 
recognition and talent and therefore the grip on human rights issues seems to be greater than 
before. This is clearly reflected to content of the report and whereas Prison Conditions in 
South Africa was a fragmented and mild description what happened on the backstage of 
apartheid The Political Imprisonment in South Africa has avoided this problem and it seeks 
put forward more profound view on the human rights violations than before. The most 
remarkable change is that Amnesty abandoned policy where it tries to avoid ‘political’ 
confrontation in the name impartiality. Human rights activities cannot be free from values and 
ethics and Amnesty should rather clearly pronounce where it stands rather than avoid 
contradictions. Naturally Amnesty has to declare neutrality in a sense that it will advocate 
general values and it seeks to avoid endorsement of particular and private intentions.  
 
This is a tricky problem because as spiral model has showed that power is always present in 
human rights activities it means when one side is disapproved another side gets more 
recognition. The problem of revolt in South African context is apparent because the political 
system used all the means, including violence to prevent social redefinition and therefore 
violent reform seemed to be the only possible way to question political power. However, if a 
revolt brings to power another faction that refuses to share power and run an open state it 
means that the aim of revolution was not reform but takeover. For instance the central 
argument of Jean-François Bayart’s State in Africa the politics of the belly is that African state 
is defined by violent reform where one faction is stealing power from another faction and 
consequently there is continuation of takeovers and lasting and gradual political and social 
advancement is not possible. This argument should be recognized by spiral model when it 
carelessly states that human rights activities should be directed at supporting ‘opposition’. 
Spiral model claims that human rights activities should intentionally aim at ousting the 
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‘tyrant’ regime and opposition that is capable to endorse human rights should rule.120 This 
sounds self-evident but the principle should be that it is not primary who is ruling, but that the 
redefinition of politics is possible without violence and that all the people have a chance 
express their political views. Apparently human rights activities reshape power but ideal 
should be that these activities change the structure not the content, and when a forum where 
redefinition can take place people can find out themselves the content of political existence.  
 
Now Amnesty declared openly that it sees all-inclusive human rights impossible under 
political power of apartheid. The position had before been more neutral and Amnesty had 
tried to establish a gap between the networks of power and human rights even though these 
issues are without doubt intermingled. The lack of courage, resources and status had caused 
that in the preceding coverage human rights violations were weakly conceptualized and 
faintly connected to the social and cultural context. The feature that how the state had 
structured power was the prime source of violence and this was insufficiently presented in the 
1960s. Amnesty set the new course for its activities: 
 
"Certainly, material improvements are desperately required in many areas to protect 
prisoners from physical ill-treatment, but Amnesty International believes that no 
reforms in the present structure will be sufficiently far-reaching to remove causes of 
political imprisonment unless the whole system of apartheid is dismantled. It is to be 
hoped that this report will help to generate international pressure to achieve this 
end."121 
 
Here Amnesty lines that it does not believe that reforms could bring about any considerable 
change and only the complete removal of apartheid could bring lasting improvements. The 
reason for this is that apartheid state had halted all meaningful reforms and therefore harsh 
attitude of Amnesty was justified, even though what this attitude implies is another question. 
This is in many senses was a considerable change, especially when compared to 1960s when 
Amnesty had a relatively weak grip on apartheid’s human rights violations. Now Amnesty 
abandoned the principle of absolute neutrality, which was the only conceivable decision in 
this situation. Ultimate neutrality was groundless and Amnesty had to have enough of courage 
to be on the side of human rights and defend and foster them and stay out of political rivalries 
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as long as possible, but when it is unavoidable Amnesty has to act under the renewed 
circumstances as well as it could. Taking a decisive approach does not necessarily imply 
partiality but there should be aspiration to keep activities transparent and open that 
impartiality of human rights activities could be credible. 
 
The new approach meant also that when the emphasis was given to prisoner work before, and 
it was still considered as essential part of activities (material improvements are desperately 
required in many areas to protect prisoners from physical ill-treatment) but now Amnesty 
had understood that the hard-boiled apartheid state is not going make any concession if 
Amnesty continues to apply the same methods as before. The prisoner work where Amnesty 
members send letter to the victims of human rights violations was a tactic that was doomed to 
fail in apartheid’s case, even though Amnesty had achieved results with this method in other 
countries. I don’t want to be cynical and it might be that the some letters sent to prisoners past 
prison strict censors and provided momentarily consolation, but any permanent change these 
campaigns did not make. 
 
Instead of prisoner work Amnesty decided to give more stress on publicity and according to 
the profound results of The Power of Human Rights this is the way forward when human 
rights are being effectively fostered and improved. The communicative process creates a 
spiral that affects State’s diplomatic, economic and political relations and eventually the 
pressure and disapproval force the state to change its behaviour. This spiral does not have 
necessarily a direct impact but it has to be also noticed that this rotating and expanding spiral 
was able to capture more attention and resources that increase the popularity and importance 
of human rights issues internationally. Whereas in the 1960s it is difficult to see that there 
would have been an expanding network, in the 1970s the interest towards apartheid was 
clearly growing.   
 
Compared to preceding neutral attitude now Amnesty condemned apartheid but took even one 
step further and gave its support indirectly to the political opposition: 
 
"The primary reason for the publication of this report is Amnesty International's deep 
concern about the plight of political prisoners in South Africa. It is necessary to inform 
a wider public of the suffering and hardships endured by South Africa's political 
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prisoners in the hope that more people will understand the reasons for their actions and 
appreciate the values which they uphold."122  
 
Here Amnesty expresses the importance of informing the public about violations and 
Amnesty appeals its audience that more people should sense and comprehend the hardship 
endured by political prisoners  (understand the reasons for their actions and appreciate the 
values which they uphold). This could be interpreted according to spiral model as creating 
moral authority and giving moral authorization to loosely defined political opposition, and 
obviously Amnesty created a positive spirit towards people who struggled for their rights. In 
this part of the study this does not constitute problem, but in the third chapter when many 
different faction perpetrated the violations it became dubious to provide moral and symbolic 
support for a certain side. We have to remember that the moral support that Amnesty gave 
came as a bulk, and Amnesty did not take favourable particularly favourable attitude towards 
any particular actor. The paradigm here is that if Amnesty creates a policy to support the 
opposition is that it might imply something about future’s policies and decisions, especially if 
the opposition is looking for violent revolt and instead of social reform.  One could argue that 
Amnesty now forsake the principle of neutrality but supposedly the human rights work rally 
inevitably the opposition or the people who are lacking rights. The paradigm is that it should 
not be any open authorization and there are certain dangers with this process and Amnesty 
should be capable to change its policies if needed and also have versatile approach that the 
organization will not find itself in a dead end where it cannot cancel an approach that it had 
taken before. Beaehr is claiming that Amnesty’s sensitivity to react to changes of environment 
is not great and therefore the process of crafting new policies is not flexible. The problem is 
not that Amnesty is giving moral and symbolic support but it should be capable to withdraw it 
in a situation where the symbolic support is in contradiction with the actual human rights 
situation.123   
 
Amnesty had strictly refused to appeal for prisoners who advocate violence and people that 
Amnesty defended sought change solely through political and peaceful means. Though 
Amnesty creates larger cultural phenomenon and it cannot be considered that the symbolic 
mission would have been prisoner specific and therefore what Amnesty put forward had 
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larger implications. The problem is that principles cannot always provide guidance for 
particular problem and therefore Amnesty has to resort to situational solutions which vary 
greatly in their success. Francis Boyle has been claiming that Amnesty is abstaining from 
condemning Israel and he argues also that the desires of U.S. foreign policy has dictated 
Amnesty’s mission in Israel.124 In Clark’s presentation of Amnesty Clark mentions a case 
where Amnesty was entangled with British political intention regarding mission to 
Rhodesia.125 There would be probably much more examples that could be applied for a study 
that would examine categorically that how viable Amnesty’s methods are and how it can 
proceed from general ethical, moral and symbolic conceptions to particular problems. 
Amnesty functions in multiple scenarios, but is Amnesty’s approach adequate enough to 
understand the particular reason for problems and consequently contribute to the social 
advancement and improvement of human rights? The proponents of human rights viewed 
apartheid through perspective that mediated by Amnesty and there is a great danger that 
certain aspects are being vigorously underlined and others forgotten in this type of 
perspective. This has to be noticed when this type of material is being used as historical 
source material.  
 
Now the first time Amnesty managed to forge a connection between its organization and the 
victims, and this established situation that Risse and Sikkink describe a situation where 
political opposition creates pressure from below and the international (transnational) actors 
such as Amnesty act from above by creating consciousness by disseminating information on 
human rights violations. Spiral model sees this process primarily as political, but I see it as 
primarily social because people of various persuasions were victims and it cannot be said the 
victims would have been predominantly politically orientated. Simple acts of free speech 
were politicized and given symbolic importance by apartheid state. Issues such as marriage 
and work were politicized even though these issues should definitely not be part of State’s 
direct jurisdiction. Though, mainly Amnesty adopted people who were politically orientated 
and Amnesty broadened its mandate to regard people who were punished for ‘social 
crimes’.126 Nevertheless, the human rights problem is not primarily political but social in this 
case.  
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The process of human rights was halted in 1960s due to intense repression the State managed 
to cut the connection between Amnesty and political prisoners. As mentioned in preceding 
chapter Amnesty claimed that State persecution troubled connecting to the political prisoners 
and their families. This also crumbled down Amnesty’s information gathering mission and 
organization did not manage to collect completely representative information on human rights 
violations and this situation was all different in the 1970s and Amnesty was able to gather 
from various sources information on human rights violations. As we can understand Amnesty 
does not reveal all its sources because as seen before it was in apartheid state’s interest to 
destroy Amnesty’s mission and BOSS even stole documents from Amnesty’s office in 
London.127 However, victim’s identity is revealed in many cases and I expect that to publicize 
the identity of the victim provided some sort of protection because from then on it was 
general knowledge that these people are attacked by apartheid’s security machinery. What is 
important is that Amnesty was able to establish connection between the victims of human 
rights violations and gain actual information and interview the people who were mistreated by 
the State and it could investigate the matters itself whereas before the organization had to use 
second hand sources, which might be less reliable than accurate investigations. With 
resources and skills that Amnesty had before it could barely produce information for its own 
prisoner work, let alone for bigger publicity campaigns, but the Political Imprisonment in 
South Africa constitutes a major leap forward on Amnesty’s mission to foster South African 
human rights through publicity. 
 
Part of Amnesty’s new approach was that it started analyze the overall system of apartheid as 
violation of human and civil rights: 
 
"The report is mainly about people who have been imprisoned for their conscientious 
opposition to apartheid, rather than about those who might be termed victims of 
apartheid. The latter category includes those convicted and imprisoned for 
contraventions of the country's discriminatory racial legislation, such as the pass laws 
and the Immorality Act."128          
 
Here Amnesty defines entities of political prisoner and generally victims of apartheid who 
suffer from the regulations imposed on them in everyday social life. The main emphasis was 
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still on the human rights violations and political prisoners, but the perspective was widened 
and human rights were not distinguished as separate phenomenon but as an inevitable part of 
apartheid. The new approach sought to understand South Africa as an overall political, social 
and historical entity. Report has even reviewed history back to the Union of South Africa 
1910, which is quite irrelevant regarding contemporary human rights violations. Amnesty 
presents also how Bantustan system functions as a part of repression, besides that Amnesty 
presents in very detailed way how the Rule of Law was eradicated and the grave effect that 
this process had on human rights is profoundly described. 
 
Reviewing the legal system is followed by description of the court process that was modified 
to serve apartheid state’s desire to suppress political opponents. Court process section is 
followed by portion that deals with banning and banishment and eventually case studies of 
human rights (seven prisoners of conscience) violations are being presented. One could argue 
that Amnesty is a human rights organization and it should only report on human rights cases, 
but the conceptualization of the rights is required that it is possible to comprehend the 
violations and what the advocator of violence seeks to achieve.129 As a matter of fact Amnesty 
endeavoured this approach (faint conceptualization) in the preceding coverage and this 
approach was not as successful as the new one in the 1978 report. If violations are being 
presented without contextualizing them, reader cannot form a picture who is the source of the 
violations and what are the reasons for the violations and consequently this affect the opinion 
of the reader which constitutes the attitude towards the corresponding phenomenon. Amnesty 
succeeds to describe successfully the culture of violence in Political Imprisonment in South 
Africa. This was particularly remarkable now when Amnesty had changed its approach to 
more publicity orientated and that meant that people who were not Amnesty’s members had 
to be able to form a picture on apartheid’s human rights violations by reading a report without 
searching any major background information. Amnesty put forward a complete conception of 
human rights rather than collection of human rights violations. The examples that Amnesty 
provides would be left empty if there would be no proper background provided for the report 
and therefore the process of conceptualization was essential. 
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3.4 Development of arbitrary security mentality and court process  
 
Under the rule of apartheid the court process became a mallet of political repression that 
constituted of the justice system and police whereas military controlled the streets and 
townships and its actions were not necessarily as focused against political opponents as was 
the secret police orchestrated deeds. The role of justice system is not particularly stressed on 
historical presentations and Amnesty presented how justice system participated in the process 
that were defined by lack of Rule of Law. Judging political prisoners was based on security 
laws such as Terrorism Act and Internal Security Act, which was an amended version 
Suppression of Communism Act. “The Terrorism Act (1967) gave authorities the right to 
detain indefinitely for interrogation any person thought to be a “terrorist” or who might have 
knowledge of “terrorists”.130 It has to be remembered now that apartheid state had labelled 
social redefinition as act of war and aggression and these laws were crafted as a counteract 
towards this alleged ‘menace’.  
 
Amnesty presented what according to Terrorism Act were valid foundation for prosecuting a 
person; promotion of “general dislocation, disturbance or disorder”; “prejudice” to “any 
industry or undertaking”; “the achievement of any political aim, including bringing about of 
any social or economic change, by violent of forcible means”; cause “financial loss any 
person or the State; increase “hostility between the White and other inhabitants of the 
Republic”; “obstruction” to the “free movement on any traffic on land, at sea or in the air”; 
or “embarrassment” to “the administration of the affairs of the State”131. As we can see this 
sort of laws left too much space for interpretation and articles such as increase “hostility 
between the White and other inhabitants of the Republic” could be interpreted that the 
apartheid government should have been imprisoned because it was the prime source of 
instability in South Africa. The ones who crafted the law did not have to design and express it 
in general style because they knew that it is going to be interpreted favourably for the one 
who created the law. Partiality was implied in the spirit of law.  
Terrorism Act constituted an effective repressive tool for apartheid state but on the top of that 
apartheid state manipulated the court process in a way that the power of this law was even 
beyond the inexact and supreme definitions. Even the state that had created arbitrary law was 
not content to power it granted and the law without limits was too limiting. This is the 
                                                 
130 Beck 2000, 130. 
131 Amnesty International 1978, Political Imprisonment in South Africa, 21. 
 73
problem that was connected to torture and general maltreatment of prisoners. If a suspect was 
assumed to be guilty any of the articles listed above that incriminated automatically the 
defendant to culpable of terrorism unless suspect could prove that there are reasons to believe 
that the alleged actions were not intentional terrorism. This gives an upper hand for the State 
because in such cases defendant has to prove that he or she is not guilty and state assumes 
guilt automatically. “In other words, the burden of proof is placed upon the accused to show 
innocence of their intention rather than the State to prove their guilt”.132  The trials under 
Terrorism act were kept on summary basis which means that: “The summary nature of 
proceedings is generally disadvantageous to defendants, since defence counsel may be kept in 
ignorance of the precise content and direction of a State case until the actual start the 
trial.”133 If a person is convicted under Terrorism Act the minimum sentence was 5 year 
imprisonment and the maximum penalty was death.134 It can be said that these penalties were 
hardly in any proportion with the “crimes” that people had commit and taking part in any anti-
apartheid politics imposed a great threat to freedom and even to life since these people 
represented the invisible threat that apartheid sough to wipe out.  
 
This was the ‘legal’ setting for persecuting political opponents in the court of law but 
Amnesty uncovered meritoriously information on the ‘unlawful’ means of persecution and the 
infamous section 6 of Terrorist Act made possible the assaults that police directed towards 
political prisoners.  
 
“The section authorizes any police officer of, or above the rank lieutenant-colonel, to 
arrest, without warrant or charge, anyone suspected of being a “terrorist” as defined, 
or of possessing information relating to terrorists or terrorist offences. Such detainees 
are held incommunicado, often in solitary confinement, until such time as the 
Commissioner of Police considers that have replied “satisfactorily” to all the questions 
put to them by their interrogators, or until it felt that further detention will serve “no 
useful purpose”. In effect this section of Terrorism Act provides the security police with 
powers of indefinite detention without charge or trial.”135              
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This reveals how the security legislation gave entirely open authorization to detain people and 
police was not accountable to any sense to anybody and they even did not have to meet the 
broad definitions of terrorism that were laid down by the Terrorism Act. Under the open 
authorization of this legislation police freely arrested and detained people and many people 
were never charged in court of law even though they were detained for prolonged periods and 
regardless of that they were detained time after time.136 What is even more bizarre that 
Terrorism Act defined that courts of law were particularly denied to question a detention or 
appeal for release of a detainee and even releasing any information whatsoever on the state of 
detainee was a legal offence, which means that detention was entirely isolated from judicial 
process.137           
 
What is described above were fully legal means under the state of exception that South Africa 
was in, however, these ‘legal’ means were exceeded and apartheid state applied illegal or 
unlawful means to demonstrate the guilt of political prisoners. Amnesty presents seven cases 
how police forced detainees to give false statements in the court of law or to sign false 
statements that were composed by the police. Terrorism act made possible to detain people as 
State witnesses and according to Amnesty increasingly political prisoners were detained as 
State witnesses and consequence for refusing to testify was maximum 3-year prison sentence. 
Mr. Ian Rwaxa was one of the people who was forced to testify against his will and Amnesty 
describes his case: 
 
“At another trial in Pretoria involving 12 alleged members of the ANC, chief state 
witness Ian Rwaxa testified in June 1977 that he had been severely assaulted and 
threatened with death while in security police custody. He said he had been forced to 
make a false statement indiscriminating the accused, and had been made to rehearse the 
evidence he was suppose to give in court. When agreed to this, his conditions of 
detention were greatly improved and he was promised an indemnity against 
prosecution.” 138 
 
Amnesty presents nine cases altogether where security police has broken the detainee’s 
resolve by solitary confinement and violence and forced to make false testimonies. These 
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processes were encouraged by promising alleviations in contrast of threatening and torture. 
Victor Vuyisile Selanto’s case is another incidence that Amnesty reported: 
  
“Victor Vuyisile Selanto, a State witness at the trial of Eric Molobi in November 1975, 
said he had been kept in solitary confinement for nine months, physically assaulted by 
security police and induced to make a false statement indiscriminating Eric Molobi. As 
he left the witness box, he was taken back to into detention and subsequently charged 
with perjury. He was acquitted eight months’ later after two security police gave 
conflicting evidence concerning his interrogation.”139  
 
These cases were not secrets or mysteries because detainees when brought in front of court 
told what type of treatment had been imposed on them and for example “William Tshimong, 
told the court that that he had been woken in the middle of the night by five security police 
who forced him to make allegations against one of three accused”.140 Patrick McGluwa who 
claims that he was assaulted by the security police describes in his testimony: ”I was told 
what to say, which was contrary to my knowledge. The contents of my statements are thoughts 
of security police”141  
 
Amnesty’s research reveals that security police has unscrupulously attacked detainees that 
were under their invincible power and broken their ‘defiant’ will by violence and isolation. 
Security police drove detainees on the verge of self-destruction and the state of mind that 
detainees were in made possible to extract any statement even thought some people like, 
Patrick McGluwa resisted to testify for the state and he received one year imprisonment for 
that.142 Amnesty describes a peculiar case where Joseph Tseto who had detained for six 
month appealed the judge that he “might get into trouble” if he forget any part of his 
statement and “All I know is that if I give my evidence satisfactorily I might go free”. 143 This 
describes the hopeless fear that that security police managed to provoke and that led to 
circumstances where security police was able to manipulate and extract false statements. 
What is remarkable about these accounts that how thoroughly security police distorted the 
mind of the detainees and how these people were under indefinite power of their 
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interrogators. A person who is engaged to political opposition is first of all reluctant to co-
operate in any way with the ‘political enemy’, let a alone providing false evidences from 
further political repression. These people were transformed from sturdy State opponents to 
people who followed every command of security police and were even willing to learn long 
false testimonies that security police had composed. To present a false testimony that is 
composed by the defendant or a witness is already difficult to present credibly let alone to 
present a false statement that somebody else has composed. This indicates security police’ 
determination to participate the repression of political opponents and how they subsequently 
managed to break their will by variety of violent means. Some people resisted to co-operate 
with the security police regardless of severe assaults and some people were even tortured to 
death and the information that Amnesty has given on these accounts will be reviewed later in 
this study. 
 
The amount and similarity of these cases indicate that it has been a common method to abuse 
detainees and force them to provide false testimonies against the people that the State wished 
to be imprisoned. But what is actually integrity of the information that Amnesty gives here on 
security police attacks towards detainees? I will start unravelling this problem from the 
security legislation and the Internal Security Act made possible for the State to detain people 
as State witnesses on a basis that they held information that could be essential for a particular 
case. Can it be an incriminating factor that person holds information on some particular 
“crime” (non-classified political crime that was defined on arbitrary basis) and therefore he or 
she can be detained incommunicado until the crime is being solved? If the same principle is 
applied generally on legal matters that would mean that if a person witness a bank robbery or 
any other crime the witness has to be captured in order to protect the collection of evidences. 
Anybody can understand that to hold information on a crime is not a crime. Not to express 
knowledge of a crime in the court of law when particularly requested is certainly a crime or a 
breach but apartheid state criminalized expressing the truth and people were punished for not 
giving false testimonies. In these cases there was no chance to abstain from pronouncing 
evidences because there were no evidence in the first place that could be hidden. There was 
only the falsified case that security police had forged by applying violence. What we can 
undeniably and factually see that apartheid state already defined by law the frame for fraud 
trials and if this application was intentionally created I cannot see why it would have not have 
been used. This creates a strong basis for what Amnesty is presenting and creating such an 
awkward legislation lays already a suspicion on the character of the justice system. Browsing 
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internet, which contains for example news articles considering human rights cases, and TRC 
material did not produce any further information or confirmation for the nine cases that 
Amnesty presents, but there is no credible accounts from security police officers available that 
could provide their version of these occasions. As a matter of fact the security police material 
was destroyed after dismantling of apartheid and we have to relay on the accounts of victims 
and I cannot see why they would have been presenting something that would be considerably 
out of reality.144 The absolute integrity of these cases cannot be checked but the ethos of 
security policies can be recognized from these reports. 
 
What is remarkable about these happenings when compared to material that Amnesty 
produced in 1960s and especially the Prison Conditions in South Africa that the actual 
assaults towards prisoners were fewer before or Amnesty did not manage to report of them as 
successfully as in the 1970s.  Even though the detention conditions are in minor role in 
Amnesty’s 1960s coverage it can be said that the torture and extracting false statements from 
detainees was not a common policy in 1964 when the Prison Conditions in South Africa was 
released. Or before it might have been coincidental and for example what Albie Sachs 
describe in his prison diary indicates that prisoners were not assaulted immediately, whereas 
Amnesty’s 1978 that indeed all the prisoners of ‘political’ persuasion were categorically and 
immediately given a ‘lesson’.145 Two major developments made these arbitrary treatments 
possible and they were the eradication of Rule of Law and particularly the release of 
Terrorism Act and consequently the secret police organized and ran the security activities. 
The ill-treatment of detainees in the beginning 1960s was based on indirect persecution, such 
as insufficient prison conditions, and officials relied more on psychological means and now 
the patience was over a mentality of total strategy ruled. In the 1960s the prisoner and 
detainees were treated bad, but not assaulted categorically to extract information from them. 
There were some assaults but they were initiative of individual warders and they seem to lack 
‘political’ motives that they definitely have in the 1970s.146 The major difference between 
1960s and 1970s is that the rage towards prisoners had heightened and such systematic 
features as manipulation of court process had stepped in. People were given ‘lessons’ also in 
1960s, which means that they suffered of instantaneous corporal punishments, but in the 
1970s the culture of ‘giving lesson’ and systemizing the violence were essentially utilized for 
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institutional purposes. Generally speaking in the beginning of 1960s there was some respect 
for Rule of Law left and State bothered to build cases that were based on law even though not 
in any time of apartheid was equality before the law realized, but in the 1970s even the 
remains of respect were gone irreversibly.  
 
State should create conditions where individual preferences of police officers, whether 
peaceful or sadistic should not affect the actions of police and thereby equal conditions should 
be provided for citizens and police should protect and not attack people. Now the Parliament 
or the lack of parliamentary control had created an opposite situation where individual police 
officers could conduct their sadistic intentions or if they did not have them, yet the capability 
of brutalizing detainees was expected from them. State intentionally (or the security faction) 
created an apparatus that persecuted its own citizens and the security faction mandated 
security police to fulfil this function. Now a person who vouched for laws in Parliament that 
made possible the establishment of security faction could argue that what happened later on 
was not the favourable or intended outcome.147 Unfortunately if there is a reason to remove 
the ‘burden of accountability’ then there is most likely issues to be accounted that were now 
moved from public account to private one.  
 
This means that when such favours are asked from the keepers of the State that such unlimited 
rights should not be granted. Of course this argument is a little naïve because as a result of 
one desire politics there were no politics, there were just institutions realizing desires. 
Nevertheless, the power was already transferred to the security faction and to halt and the 
reverse this process came about only when system of apartheid was permanently dismantled. 
In other words what matters is that the Parliament gave voluntarily share of its power away 
and pseudo political decisions created basis for apartheid’s human rights violations and 
consequently an exclusive group of people started to control the future of the State and what 
happened in 1970s and 1980s was totally out of range of the parliamentary control.  
Regarding all these factors apartheid’s human rights violations should be examined as an 
overall cultural phenomenon and to claim human rights violations were solely a matter of 
police and some co-incidental political corruption is not possible, because larger historical 
and cultural development forged the situation where the State was abusing its own citizens 
from all the populations groups.         
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3.5 Torture and deaths in detention 
 
Presenting gross human violations, torture and deaths in detention formed the core of 
Amnesty’s mission against apartheid and these emotionally outraging accounts were the 
happenings that invoked international revulsion against apartheid state. Presenting such 
material Amnesty advocated efficiently the objective to shame apartheid state and thereby 
creating pressure that should force the State to re-evaluate its violent intervention. As argued 
before that the view of this is rather sceptical towards shame as conception because apartheid 
state experienced pride of its actions rather than shame. Shaming labelled apartheid state and 
affected ‘outsiders’ attitude towards apartheid state but it did not have direct impact. 
Therefore the effect of shaming of human rights violating state captured more people and 
actors to join the human rights activities.   
 
As already argued before Amnesty did not manage to create entirely sufficient connection to 
the victims of violations and therefore the coverage on torture and deaths in detention was 
insufficient. Before The Political Imprisonment in South Africa Amnesty presented some 
doubts about torture and deaths that were attributed to the police and prison authorities but 
tangible and systematic evidence were lacking and therefore Amnesty could not put forward 
as comprehensive illustration as it could in the end of 1970s. Now Amnesty managed to 
collect information that revealed the widespread and routinized torture that security police 
was imposing on the political opposition. Compared to preceding situation this was a huge 
leap because Amnesty managed to broadcast how systematic and institutionalized the human 
rights violations were and what is even more important that Amnesty managed to put this 
information forward to actors that could have otherwise been ignorant about operations that 
apartheid state sough to run secretly. This sections of the study seeks to examine what kind of 
overall picture Amnesty put forward on torture and what this implies about the history of 
apartheid. Some comparisons are made to conform if the picture that Amnesty gave 
corresponded to other views on reality and how accurate is that picture when being compared 
to other human rights accounts such as ones from biographies, TRC and other human rights 
organizations.  
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Amnesty presented that multiple demands for Minister of Justice were made by various 
people who requested thorough inquiries on the security police actions and alleged torture and 
deaths in detention. However, these demands did not have actual effect on the human rights 
violations and there were no real investigations made by the destiny of killed and tortured 
people and Minister of Justice arrogantly averted all the demands for inquiries as mere 
fabrications and communist plots. However, this posed a significant burden for the State even 
though it imagined that it its self-righteous actions are justified and organizations such as 
Amnesty performed investigations on the human rights and pointed out that the State’s 
assertions were blatant misrepresentations. The typical setting was that  the State faced 
demand to explain that why such and such amount of people had died in detention and why 
there is no credible inquiry performed and there are no relevant reasons provided why these 
people did not survive police detention. The normal excuse offered by the state was that the 
communist leaders of SACP and ANC have commanded detainees to commit suicides in 
order to protect the cause of communist revolution and remain silent about actions of 
mentioned organizations. Apartheid state claimed also that this is a plot against it, that 
detainees commit suicides intentionally to shame apartheid state.148 Nevertheless, these 
explanation were far fetched and hardly any human being or group of human beings commit a 
suicide voluntarily and systematically and there are no vindication for such suicidal logic. 
However, it might be that some detainees committed suicides but reason was that security 
police drove them on the verge of self-destruction, not because they voluntarily would have 
done it.  
 
Amnesty stated about the attitude of apartheid state:  
 
"Ultimately responsibility for those deaths, and for the torture of other political 
detainees, lies not with the security police but with the Government, particularly the 
Minister of Justice. It was therefore ironic when, as a result of the widespread 
international protest following the death in detention of the Black Consciousness leader 
Steve Biko in September 1977, Minister of Justice James Kruger threatened that "heads 
will roll" if any member of the security police is found to have been negligent. It was he, 
after all, who has steadfastly refused to draw the obvious conclusion about security 
police misconduct from information given to him by the press, and from the results of a 
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series of inquests, after the deaths in custody of at least 20 political detainees during the 
previous 18 months".149 
 
Basically police security officers were untouchable and State did not prosecute them for 
misdemeanour which means that their behaviour was desired in the eyes of the State even 
though it was also desired to run these operations secretly. This was of course not fully 
possible because security police did not kill and silence all the detainees and former detainees 
gave statements to Amnesty that spread the information all over the world. And in the case 
where security police silenced people they still faced the burden to explain what had 
happened to people who died in detention and suicide was applied as a common explanation, 
yet not very credible one. On the statement above Amnesty pinpoints the Minister of Justice 
as ultimately responsible for the violations, but this does not give a fertile basis for historical 
study and the reasons for human rights violations are much larger phenomenon than negligent 
attitude of Government and its one particular minister. Nevertheless, this was a conceivable 
action from Amnesty to identify the responsible one because Amnesty’s objective was to 
create and direct pressure, and they needed to name the responsible people who shall be the 
targets of the pressure.  
 
As already presented earlier, torture was used as a method to extract information that could 
falsely incriminate either the detainee or some other political opponent. Amnesty presented as 
a proof of torture that number of detainees who have been released from security police 
custody bore scars and abrasions and the frequency of these accounts indicate that this activity 
has been regular. Victims also told comprehensively what had been done to them and 
Amnesty used also method that people who have been in detention simultaneously tell what 
they had heard and seen done to other detainees.150 These crosswise statements give a sense of 
credibility of what reported Amnesty because, these stories were told separately and 
independently and when they conformed each others’. The relatives of detained people sough 
justice and they appealed the magisterial or supreme court and demanded them to release the 
detainee or receive information on his/her condition, however, as the security legislation 
defined that no court shall pronounce appeal for people detained under security legislation 
and therefore detainees were out of court system’s jurisdiction. Therefore I expect that 
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organizations such as Amnesty functioned as reparative part of insufficient judicial system 
and relatives and friends invited Amnesty to publish their cases. When investigations on the 
allegations of security police officers misbehaviour took place and justice system 
‘investigated’ these cases security police testimonies were used as the (invincible) foundation 
of the case. By simple act of bringing the alleged victim to courtroom it would have been 
possible to discover that the detainee has been tortured and this would have proven that 
security police testimonies as mere fabrication.151  
 
 
Now I will reconstruct the detention and interrogation situation on the basis of statements 
given to Amnesty’s (6 statements) and this is not probably the complete picture of reality but 
it gives a good picture what type of visualization Amnesty put forth of reality and what 
happened in the security police custody. First of all the person was detained under one of 
security laws that granted arbitrary and unlimited rights and this formed the setting for 
detention and torture. Detention usually took place in security police premises even though 
one account described by Amnesty takes place in a remote camp and detained person does not 
identify the capturers. When the actual interrogation started there is no description of normal 
interrogation methods such as persuasion or even discussion and the interrogation began with 
threat of assault:  
 
 
“…that he would hit me to death if I did not tell him the truth. He stood menacingly in front of 
me with clenched fists.“152    
 
"we arrived at the headquarters and I was taken into one of the interrogation rooms where 
Mr. Welman began to threaten me. He said I had not told the truth and he was going to beat 
the truth out of me.”153           
 
Which was followed by the actual assault that was implemented through varying means: 
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"I was made to stand against the wall on my toes, run on the spot; ordered to take off my 
shoes. Zondi brought gravel which was put into my shoes. I was forced to tie up the 
laces and stand. They beat me from the back of the knee, punched by all three in the 
back and on my sides, made to stand against the wall on my toes in the gravel-filled 
shoes. Whenever I feel down they picked me up and knocked my head against the wall. 
Scars of my left foot still remain from the stones in the both my shoes."154 
 
"Different groups of SB's came in, and each had their own specialized torture. One group 
came in and one SB beat me on the head with his ring."155 
 
Mental violence and demeaning treatment were part of tactic in breaking up the detainees: 
 
"The first night I had no food. I was allowed to go to the toilet twice in four days and three 
nights, and in that period in did not wash."156 
 
"I was asked about my family and about my children in particular. I gave them the answer 
and thereafter I was told I will never see them again."157 
 
"The whole operation was so nerve wrecking that never in my life have I attempted to commit 
suicide but during this period I did."158 
 
After persistent assaults against the detainees police either extracted false statement from a 
person they had broken and it seems to be varied considerably from case to another what 
police wanted to achieve by torture. Actually the word interrogation is inaccurate to depict 
this process because the detainee was brought into a state of imbalance where giving rational 
information was a mere impossibility. The objective was to extract false statements and 
testimonies and generally uncover information on the activities of the opposition and usually 
the objective was to fake evidences. 
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"I was forced to re-write a document of my activities as guided by the security 
policemen. Their guidance involved information that would give the impression that I 
voluntarily gave the policemen information that involved several people because I co-
operated with the police. Also I was forced to sign back-dated receipts that gave the 
impression that I was on the police payroll."159 
 
Although it is difficult to sketch from the statements what have been the actual objective of 
assaults and it seems to be that people have been assaulted in hope of information, but if the 
tortured persons simply did not have the information the security police was after the detainee 
was in troublesome situation because police imagined that detainee is just hiding the 
information. Then again it is difficult to say if the security police activities were objective and 
rationality orientated or if the actions were just based on arbitrary punishing. In some cases it 
seems to be that detainee has been released after they had expressed the information security 
police was after and some other cases there is no obvious objective or it might be that the 
police is trying extract information from a detainee that the detainee simply did not have. 
Altogether these both reasons were tied together, assaulting political opponents and extracting 
information from them, but it is impossible to draft from these statements if security police 
always knew what it was looking for or if it in the first place was even looking for 
information or just giving a ‘lesson’ for the detainee.  
 
The torture methods that Amnesty had uncovered in its research: 
 
"Various methods of torture have been alleged: these include physical attacks, and 
beatings, the application of electric shocks to the body, being made to stand for long 
periods, wearing shoes containing small stones and to assume a sitting position-the 
"invisible chair" - for several hours at a time. Many former detainees have also alleged 
that were subjected to murder threats, to threats against members of their families, to 
prolonged interrogation, sleep deprivation, and psychological disorientation through 
long-term solitary confinement."160 
 
On the basis of this description the torture can be divided in two categories, psychological 
violence that constituted from threats, solitary confinement and complete domination that 
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security police had over the detainee, and then there were the corporal punishment that was 
applied to extract information from detainees. However, to see the torture and interrogation 
process as merely functional practice is not correct because all the procedures that security 
police directed at detainees cannot be considered simply reasonable and there is not direct 
relation of cause and effect. Here are a couple of extracts from accounts that Amnesty had put 
forward and they portray the ‘non-reasonable side’ of violence that has inspired to examine 
violence as feature of human mind and experience: 
 
“…I had to sit on an imaginary chair. He said I must sit there for two hours, which was 
impossible. I fell and they laughed.”161 
 
“We are going to throw of the window because you are a communist – throughout they 
shouted abuse at me.”162 
 
These kinds of experiences evoke question that what were the actual reasons for violence and 
what essentially motivated the perpetrators? TRC has traced the motives of torture in its 
investigations and it had ended to dual conclusions and the motives for torture can be traced 
back to routinized police activities and certain communal glory.163  People who tortured 
detainees worked in shifts and it was their daily routine to assault detainees and when facing 
the violence, for example in the context of this study, it may shock but torture was an act that 
hardly shocked people who produced it on daily basis. It means that the encounter between 
torturer and tortured was not an encounter between two acknowledged human beings, but it 
was an encounter of invincible supremacist (torturer) and a person who was seen as a menace 
apartheid society (tortured) and this person had to be punished. The action of torture was seen 
as a necessary and even heroic act and the people who practised the violence did not consider 
it as indifferent and it had certain positive tension. This phenomenon is even more clearly 
present in action of covert units and members of these units were granted medals for their 
activities as the keepers of security.164 TRC has stated that violence was more emotionally 
remarkable for the victims than for the perpetrators. In certain sense this is true and 
perpetrators did not experience every act of torture as a separate personal experience, but 
these experiences are not directly comparable even though they took place in the same 
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physical reality, but on a level of phenomenon these things did not happen in the same mental 
sphere. Victims experienced as personalities and the experience of perpetrators was more of a 
communal quality. Victim had to face the violence personally and perpetrator faced it as 
members of community. 
 
The samples cited in this are taken from The Political Imprisonment in South Africa and they 
are parts extracted from bigger statements (usually from 1-2 pages). Objective here is not to 
censor the contents of statements but presenting complete statements would not serve the 
purpose of this study and the statements are not complete that they could be used as fully 
representative sources. Amnesty already has edited these statements and qualified them from 
a group of statements as the most representative ones. These extracts were relevant when they 
were released and Amnesty presented all the information that was possible to gather by 
feasible and credible means. However, when viewing the question in retrospect there is more 
relevant information available such as biographies and TRC reports. Torture will be examined 
in this chapter through accounts that have been described in an autobiographical presentation. 
There is no conceivable way to prove that Amnesty material is absolutely right but by 
constructing credible and conceivable arguments it is possible to point out that torture existed 
as a phenomenon regardless of the exact content of the phenomenon. Many of these accounts 
are 30 years or even older than that and TRC put emphasis on violations that happened during 
1980s and 1990s and a lot of the cases that Amnesty reported do not appear in TRC papers. 
Besides, Amnesty’s investigations cannot be considered as thorough as TRC’s backward-
looking investigations. Nevertheless, Amnesty managed to uncover reality fairly well 
contemporarily whereas TRC’s retrospective challenge was essentially different. When deaths 
in detention will be examined in this study a case that has been studied both TRC and 
Amnesty will be presented and the comparison of these cases will reveal how accurate 
Amnesty’s view on human rights violations was. 
  
It has to be recognized that Amnesty’s description are summarized versions of the reality and 
they do not seek to reconstruct the reality. What is important is that Amnesty managed to 
forge a link between the victims and outside world and consequently disseminate information 
successfully. Even though this information would not be 100 percent accurate it was still 
more than government was willing to provide and if there are/were factual inconsistencies the 
actor to blame is apartheid state that established situation where it sought to falsify reality. 
This, of course does not give right for historian to neglect the ones who sough to erase part of 
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reality and their views and this should rather courage to seek traces of what has been 
eradicated, and in this quest the general shape of history is more important than to hang on to 
details of particular cases. Amnesty managed to uncover the culture of violence and security 
police participation in human rights violations relatively well and there were no severe factual 
or methodological mistakes in the parts that describe the security police activities and TRC 
has ended up in corresponding conclusions about security police actions in its investigations 
and information. This information will be reviewed in the following section.  
 
Another phenomenon that derived from torture and culture of corporal punishment was deaths 
in detention. The reason why Amnesty was investigating this issue was a succession of deaths 
in detention that occurred in South Africa and this attracted also international media’s 
attention to torture in South Africa. Between 1963 and 1972 at least 22 people165 died in 
detention and after Soweto uprising deaths in detention occurred with an unprecedented 
frequency and according to Amnesty at least 20 political detainees were known to have died 
in security police custody (until the release of the report 1978). The method how Amnesty 
gathered information of these events was that when such a happening took place they 
observed the public discussion about it and probably used other possible sources as well. For 
example Steve Biko’s death caused a raging debate inside and outside of South Africa and the 
feeble result that Biko inquest brought about were denounced widely.166 This means that 
Amnesty was not alone on mission against the arbitrariness of apartheid and in this sense it 
was not remarkable that what Amnesty can investigate, but how well it succeeds to mediate 
the sense of arbitrariness in the international context. Often there were major inconsistencies 
between uncovered facts about detention and the security police explanations. As we can 
understand, Amnesty did not have access to security police institution or any other source that 
would have made possible to make accurate factual investigations, and therefore Amnesty 
was part of public debate that surrounded apartheid and violence. Amnesty sought to cause 
reaction with its report that induces international debate about human rights and expectation 
was that this would put apartheid state in uncomfortable positions that creates impetus for 
change.  
 
Apartheid state sought to explain deaths in detention with suicide that was usually committed 
either by hanging and jumping from the upper floor of security police premises. Steve Biko’s 
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death formed incredibly shameful case for apartheid state and when prominent political leader 
and thinker died in security police custody the official explanation was that he died of hunger 
strike and when this explanation was challenged widely and the Minister of Justice announced 
that to define the final cause of death there is a need to carry out more investigations and the 
final cause of death was brain injury that corresponded better to the treatment that Biko 
receive in security police custody.167  
 
Now we take a look one of the cases that Amnesty reported and compared that to view that 
TRC has reached in its research regarding the same issue. This is one of the many cases of 
deaths in detention that Amnesty presented:  
 
“In Kimberly, 27-year-old Phakamile Mabija died when he fell from a sixth floor 
window of the Transvaal Road police station on 7 July 1977. There were cuts on his 
face, hands and on the liver which could have been caused either by an assault before 
his death or by impact of his fall. The security police said he had broken free suddenly 
and thrown himself from the window. However, his mother told the inquest in August 
1977 that after his arrest Phakamile Mabija had been taken back home by security 
police who were searching for a certain document. She said that when the police did not 
find it they told her son in her presence that he would not see family again. This was 
denied by security police.”168  
 
Amnesty presents several cases in the same manner and the report includes cases of Joseph 
Mdluli, Malebelle Joseph Molokeng, Mapetla Mohapi, Tenjiwe Mtintso, George Botha, Dr 
Hoosen Haffajee and on top of these cases Amnesty presents names of people that security 
police claimed to have committed suicide by hanging and these people are Luke Mazwembe, 
Ernest Mamasila, Wellington Tshazibane, Aaron Khoza, Bayempin Mzizi. This reveals that 
Amnesty did not pick up few random cases, but it strived to reveal wide phenomenon of gross 
human rights violations. What is remarkable is the reasonable manner that Amnesty aspired to 
report these events without exceeding the available facts and even though speculations on the 
basis of Amnesty’s presentation are inevitable Amnesty itself did begin to speculate on these 
cases. Naturally some reports included parts where Amnesty argues that inconsistencies 
between the final destiny of detainee and security police explanations were obvious. 
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TRC states on the case of Phakamile Mabija: 
 
“Anglican Church warden and youth worker Phakamile Mabija (27)  [CT04513, 
CT00635, CT00135] died on 7 July 1977 after ten days in detention in the Transvaal 
Road Police Station in Kimberley. According to the police, the detainee committed 
suicide. At the inquest, Sergeant Oscar Ntsiko said that he was escorting Mr Mabija 
from the toilet when he suddenly broke loose and ran into an office. He rushed after 
him, only to see him crash through the window. An independent pathologist said Mabija 
had cuts on his face and hands which could have been caused by clutching glass, and 
lacerations of the liver that could have been caused by assault. The inquest verdict was 
that Mabija died of multiple injuries following a jump from a sixth floor window. 
Nobody was found responsible for the death. The Commission notes that cases of 
torture took place in the same police station during that period, by a similar group of 
perpetrators.”169 
 
As we can see the inconsistencies still remain between the security police explanations and 
reality but finally we can conclude that Amnesty was able to collect all the essential facts on 
this case and present how security police treated people in its custody, or at least Amnesty 
imposed a severe suspicion that required further investigations. When reading the actual TRC 
hearing that was participated by Mabija’s mother, cousin and sister, on the case of Phakamile 
Mabija one gets much more diverse picture than the final conclusion of TRC gives. It has to 
be remarked that the motivation of this study and TRC are different and therefore here it is 
possible to view these cases in a different way. First of all TRC could have announce that 
police is entitled to take care of people in their custody and this concerns both mental and 
physical health. Thought, TRC mentioned that cases of torture have been taken place in the 
same location and this indicates that torture and maltreatment was involved to this case as 
well. If person who does not have suicidal tendencies that seems to be the case in this 
occasion (comments by his friends and relatives170) commits suicide in police custody the 
conditions of detention should be under suspicion. Police is also responsible to keep the 
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windows and doors closed especially during particularly volatile times when absurd incidents 
might take place. At the inquest that followed Mabija’s death security police had stated that: 
 
“…that normally all windows are locked. On that particular day he and a Mr Van der 
Merwe had opened a window in Van der Merwe’s office to allow fresh air in. Sergeant 
Oscar Ntsiko explained that he escorted the detainee from the toilet, when Mabija 
suddenly broke loose and ran into Van der Merwe’s office.”171   
 
It seems to be an amazing incidence that detainee who did not possibly know that there is a 
window open in a particular office, runs to the office and takes a leap out of the window and 
at that moment security police claims that officers Du Plessis and Van der Merwe were in the 
office and they could not prevent him from doing that. This statement appears even more 
dishonest when it is being compared to the fact that there were more police stations where 
detainees just suddenly run away and found an open window and jumped out of it. 
International Defence and Aid Fund had listed at least five similar cases and many other cases 
where apartheid officials claimed self-inflicted death through suicide or ‘natural causes’, 50 
cases altogether between years 1963 and 1978.172 The officials who try to present illogical 
claims should be able to provide extremely strong evidences for their behaviour or otherwise 
we can conclude that most likely security police threw their detainees out of the window or 
offered a possibility to submit to further torture or commit suicide by jumping out of the 
window or fostered by some other way the ‘suicide’ and outcome that detainee will fall out of 
the window. A former detainee has also announced that he was hung out of window as a form 
of mental torture which means that it was possible that detainees fell down ‘accidentally’, 
while they were scared.173 
 
However, it is conceivable that TRC’s work is based on tangible proofs and work of such 
commission has to be based on voluntary or semi-voluntary statements (that were persuaded 
by promise of full Amnesty in exchange for full confession on human rights violations) and 
tangible proof can be a statement from former security police officer but regarding cases that 
are particularly old or otherwise difficult to solve or perpetrators have died and such 
confessions are lacking. Therefore the evaluation in particular cases has to be based on what 
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is available not on speculations as here. However, the burden of ‘truth’ is not present in this 
study which makes possible different perspective. Amnesty did not have to take denouncing 
and condemning position towards particular cases because by showing the facts it was 
possible to see that the stories that security police was giving were largely dishonest, which 
led to strong suspicion of security police’s integrity.  
 
A question remains and that who should be believed as the voice of the past in these 
occasions? I would say that all the voices tell something about past and even though some of 
the voices are telling a dishonest message it still carries something about the spirit that the 
source of the voice kept. The word of the officials have been inherently considered as futile 
because the security system was designed for using supremacist power and therefore it 
considered its own reality primary compared to the reality of others’. Some of the underlying 
security spirit is capture from the past by reviewing auto-biographical description of torture 
and this account gives stronger sense on the spirit of the security police than the material that 
Amnesty has presented. Raymond Suttner was detained for distributing and writing paper 
called Vukani!/Awake!, which was banned because it broadcast message of ANC. Suttner ran 
this project with two other people and when security police captured Suttner they wanted him 
to uncover the identities of these people and first police tried to persuade Suttner to pronounce 
this information but as he refused decisively and the interrogation proceeded through ‘dead 
ends’ eventually to torture. 
 
“It must have been in the early hours of morning that Warrant Officer A.Taylor, a very 
tall man, entered without his glasses, wearing a white butcher’s apron, carrying 
handcuff. He took off my glasses and put handcuffs on my hands, saying quietly that O 
would now be taught a lesson. He then blindfolded me and led me to a lift, which went 
up a floor or two. 
 
I was stripped all my clothes and made to lie down. One of my arms was put very 
painfully under my back. I am not sure how I was held down but there were bruises 
afterwards, possibly because handcuffs were still on. They held me at various points – 
by my legs and shoulders, and a cloth was put around my mouth.  
 
Electric wires were attached to my penis. (A voice, which I later came to believe was 
that of Captain Dreyer, said in a loud, whining tone that he was some or other rhyming 
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name, perhaps “the monster of Main Street”. I cannot remember exactly what the called 
himself.) He said that they wanted to hear everything. “You are going to tell us who 
your comrades are now!” “Comrades” was always sarcastically emphasized.  
 
Dreyer, while making some or other obscene remark, pulled out some of my pubic hair 
and hair from my head, beard and legs. The electric shocks started and they blocked my 
shouting with the gag. They would stop periodically to se whether I would tell them 
what they wanted. Many obscene remarks were passed, for example: ”I want to see him 
come [ejaculate] now.” 
 
They seemed aware of the danger of electric shocks. They wanted me to know that 
damage or death could result from such torture. Dreyer said: “This is bad for your 
heart, you know.” They said that my mother and sisters had been arrested in 
Johannesburg – while they continued to torture me, presumably so I would associate 
torture not only with myself but with my family, who were supposedly also being held. I 
knew these were tricks used to break a detainee’s resolve and did not fall for them. 
 
When the shocks stopped, I would try to burst into talking immediately before they could 
interrupt. They would respond by jeering and insisting I was lying (which was true) and 
that I had better “fucking tell the truth.”   
 
 (Interrogation was stopped for a while and they announced to Suttner: “We must put 
our kaffirs (derogatory word used for a Black person) onto him. Tell him to speak!”) 
 
A little later, they resumed my interrogation. In the course of the morning, I was taken 
to Colonel Steenkamp’s office. Behind his desk were bookshelves filled with confiscated 
books of Lenin and Marx. He sat, his lip quivering, as he studied my diary and the most 
recent issue of Vukani!/Awake!. 
 
(Suttner was intimidated and demanded to reveal the other people) 
 
He lost his temper again and I responded with “you might as well arrange for me to be 
tortured with electric shocks again.” Without saying anything, Steenkamp raised his 
eyebrows as if saying something incomprehensible or insane. I was to get this same 
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reaction from Taylor and others. The police operated according to a fiction that if there 
were any irregularities, these occurred without the knowledge of the senior officers. 
       
Interrogation continued, with teams of two men questioning me at a time, and two or 
three watching. …  
 
Periodically, people would enter the room momentarily to shout things, such as: 
“Hierdie Jood hy lieg. Ek sê vir jou, hierdie fokked Kommunis hy lieg!” [This Jew is 
lying. I am telling you, this fucking communist is lying.”] 
 
(Suttner was transferred to Durban North police station and there he was told that he can 
“tell everything in the morning” and yet about an hour after that he was woken up and 
taken to the security police headquarters) 
 
“Sitting” meant keeping my back straight against the wall, and sliding down to a sitting 
position without my calves touching the back of my thigh muscles. My arms were 
stretched out in the front of me, and I had to balance what they called bibles on my 
arms, a work of Lenin’s on the other. I was not very fit the time, so that it did not take 
long to feel great pain and exhaustion. 
 
When I dropped the books or fell to the floor, additional volumes were put on my arms. 
Drawing pins were put on the floor to force me not to fall. Occasionally, I was pulled up 
by my beard or by the hairs of my head. At one point, Taylor slapped me repeatedly on 
both sides of my head because I “sat” too low. They also stamped on my toes. 
 
I was threatened with being “fucked up” properly. They also threatened to put kaffirs 
onto me. When I protested that I couldn’t think, crouched as I was, they swore at me. 
Eventually they allowed me to “rest”, lying on the table, flat down, with my head 
uncomfortably raised, so that I could read from “my bible”. Since my neck muscles 
were in great pain , I couldn’t read clearly. I can still remember, however, what it was: 
Engels’ introduction to Capital. 
 
I still did not tell them what they wanted, which led to various threats. One SB said they 
would get a rat and put it on my stomach under a pot, so that it had no of escaping other 
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than eating into me. “Hendrik” said that when they put the kaffirs onto me I would 
really be “fucked up”. He would sometimes hold a match in front of my eye while 
speaking. Remarks were repeatedly passed about my being Jewish, which predisposed 
one to criminality and communism in the eyes of police. It was claimed that I had 
extensive relations with women, and even worse, in their eyes, with black women.  
 
Some of those present did little more than hold my legs on the table or occasionally 
point a threatening finger when I dropped the books on the floor or read Capital. One 
would clap his hands next to my ears and keep on making inane remarks, such as: “He 
wasn’t born. He happened.”  
 
At times, one or two of the police would fall asleep and it was left to the others to 
continue the barrage of obscenities and to pile further books on my arms. 
 
As morning approached, I was exhausted. I was made to sweep up their cigarette ends 
with my hands, even ordered to remain on my knees and bark like a dog at the 
moon.”174 
 
The reason why such a long extract is presented here is to give a strong impression of the 
spirit that was present among the officers of security police and compare this account to the 
ones that Amnesty has presented. The reports that Amnesty has produced describe largely 
similar violence that Suttner has experienced and police beat up detainees and also electric 
shocks were applied habitually. Though in historical perspective it seems to be Amnesty has 
moderated the statements of detainees and therefore the description of Suttner gives more 
representative visualisation what actually happened during the torture. The reason why 
Amnesty’s reports appear limited from this perspective is that Amnesty tried to confine its 
expression to ‘facts’. This is conceivable regarding that Amnesty reported on highly 
disputable issues and therefore it had to moderate and focus the expression in order to 
maintain credibility. The experience of Suttner also demonstrates that this side of the human 
rights violation is very difficult to examine from ‘theoretical’ perspective. For example spiral 
model examines human rights as political science and consequently this theory has no muscle 
to explain the actual human rights violations. In fact there is no methods and studies to 
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approach human rights as experience based field of research. For example TRC has provided 
a large quantity of experiences and it has provided some sort of systematisation but basically 
those experiences would need to be systematised before they can be relevant information. 
Amnesty material can lead to traces to examine how apartheid’s security machinery 
functioned and how the victims experienced torture and detention but other material is 
required that these traces can be followed further. This is an area of research that should be 
definitely developed more. For example the security police organization and its role in the 
apartheid state has not been sufficiently explained and one reason is that security police 
intentionally destroyed traces of its existence. However, through reflective methods it is 
possible to estimate how security police functioned and for example the presentation of 
Suttner gives an suggestion that to what kind of community security police was and to what 
kind of results it is possible to gain through reflection.     
 
How should we comprehend Suttner’s experience - a stereotypical empirical proof that 
reveals how security police treated most of the people or a highly exceptional case of extreme 
brutality? Both of these interpretations have something right and something wrong. First of all 
security police has hardly applied these methods only on Suttner or wouldn’t it be peculiar 
that particular if an institution would be applying some certain method or procedure only 
once?  Instead of this the description that Suttner gives reflects comprehensively the ethos of 
security police. Instead of peculiarity of Suttner’s case most likely other people in the custody 
of security police received same type of treatment and police continued it under the 
authorization and acceptance of political system. However, Suttner’s case cannot be used to 
typify all the cases and they all have to be examined from individual basis and police have 
applied different kind of tactics on different people, but what it is clear that security police 
used torture, both physical and mental as a method of interrogation.  
 
The account that Suttner gives is valuable because Amnesty and TRC material fail to describe 
in certain sense the complete experience of torture. Amnesty could not present such details on 
torture because it did not have any tangible proofs except the marks and abrasions that the 
victims carried but there were no chances of proving details and the utter measures that 
security police sought to hide. In TRC hearings the subjective views were submitted to 
institutional discipline and such detailed accounts as Suttner provides are few and far between 
and the views of the perpetrators do not provide much for researcher to reconstruct the past 
and obviously perpetrators did not have motivation to describe events as vividly as victims 
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did and to memorize happenings that are 30 years old can be problematic especially when the 
importance of events is much more unique to the victim than to the perpetrator that conducted 
torture as routinized profession. An eloquent example of differences between the perpetrator 
and victim is descriptions Colonel Taylor who summarized Suttner’s torture in following 
manner to TRC:  
 
“The aforesaid was, I think, a lecturer at Natal University and was detained for the 
promotion of ANC activities through the distribution of pamphlets. He was assaulted 
with the open hand during interrogation by myself, although I do not remember exact 
details. Other members that I recall who were involved in this were a Captain Dreyer. 
These are the only members that I think were present and might have assaulted him, 
although similarly to what is stated above, I am unable to supply exact details as to who 
did what although I do admit that I hit Suttner with the open hand. He was also tortured 
by electrical shocks, which was applied through the dynamo of a telephone, which when 
wound, caused electrical shock to him.” 
 
“[Extract from Amnesty Application of Colonel Andrew Russell Cavill Taylor (who died of 
cancer before the application could be heard), supplied by South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, Durban, April 1, 1997.]”175   
 
It is remarkable that TRC has made torture an official and public phenomenon and if such 
confessions would not exist we would have to base our argumentation on speculation whereas 
now the both sides, the victim and the perpetrator admit the torture and now it is question that 
whose account is considered as the most relevant regarding the past’s happenings. As already 
argued before that perpetrators or former security police officer’s views hardly give us a 
complete view what actually happened and their views have to be treated with certain 
suspicion because there is no motivation or capability to memorize individual cases.  Also the 
way in which officials experienced is different and these experiences were not exposed in 
front of TRC where the shame of these deeds was obvious whereas in the context where these 
deeds actually took place shame (at least in the same form) was not present. Therefore the 
people who were heard by TRC showed (expected) remorse rather than what they actually 
experience when working for the secret police. 
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The comparison of different sources, TRC and Amnesty material and biographical material 
show that the allegations that human rights organization imposed on apartheid state were 
well-found. However, Suttner’s description goes beyond the allegations and each individual 
case there was a whole range of happenings and only people involved in security police 
activities could have known the reality of the torture and for outsider there were appropriate 
reasons to suspect what is happening “inside” and even though they had to construct their 
picture on the varying stronger and vaguer traces of torture. The comparison of different cases 
also reinforces the picture that torture was designed police activity and police had developed 
habitual readiness for torture. Secret police combined mental as well as physical violence and 
when the different forms of violent were combined capturer had totalitarian power over the 
detainee.  
 
It is remarkable that how the phenomenon of total strategy was present of multiple level of 
apartheid society and the security police seemed to be the main keeper of the social and 
political boundaries lined by the total strategy. What was declared in total strategy was rather 
a reflection of the state of apartheid community than a release of a new policy and in this 
conception the fears and hopes of apartheid were cherished. The fears were provoked by 
communist subversion and its methods of revolution that arises from below and onslaughts 
the moral society. The hopes were delivered by the security system and essentially the only 
relevant response to this menace and threat was violence. The discourse of anti-communism 
and pro-apartheid had large implications and we can see how the mentality of total strategy 
were strongly present in security police activities.  
 
Another amazing phenomenon is that the ‘global’, symbols of antipathy such as anti-
communism and anti-Semitism176 appear in these accounts occasionally and I see this as a 
reflection of how the organism of apartheid functioned. These symbols were not based on 
rational information of the potential menace of these phenomena but a belief that this sort of 
phenomena threatens apartheid community. This behaviour does not indicate that communism 
would have been combated on reasonable foundation, but the intention was to attach and find 
symbols of disgrace on people who were tortured. For example if one would have asked a 
security police officer to specify what particularly corrupting there is in communism most 
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likely the answer would have not been profound. Therefore what is understood by 
communism here does not have necessarily anything to do with actual communism and 
communism functioned for security police as a red cloth that launched the revulsion towards 
invisible enemy that was constructed by total strategy. The loathing against communism was 
intuitive. The encounter of communism and anti-communism could be characterized as 
unfortunate because both sides got what they wanted. This means that symbolic provocation 
was crosswise and both sides provoked and got provoked on the axis of capitalism-
communism that became all-encompassing symbolic categories.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV 
 
Reaching the dead end and dismantling apartheid 
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4.1 Intensified conflict and the international response 
 
The explosion of violence continued in 1980s and especially year 1983 was a problematic 
year due to constitutional changes. As a result of general uncertainty apartheid state proposed 
a constitution that included Indian and Coloured people within parliamentary power through 
Indian and Coloured chambers but it continued the exclusion of the Black majority. This 
proposition was put onto a referendum where voters of White population group decided to 
adopt the new suggested constitution. The result was that the majority of the people remained 
outside of the parliamentary power and consequently the representatives of Black population 
group interpreted this as a hostile gesture. The anticipation of apartheid state was to divide 
and rule but this certainly failed and violence remained the only cohesive force that kept 
apartheid state in the power.  Constitutional manoeuvre was response to the increasing 
popular protest and but it followed the previous one-dimensional logic, which sought to 
practise politics of divide and rule and simultaneously create an atmosphere of concessions. 
However, if the objective of this manoeuvre was to gain control and pacify the political and 
violent conflict it failed because South Africa fell deeper in the spiral of violence after the 
release of new constitution and parliamentary elections.177 While spiral model claims that the 
change of human rights becomes through moral bargaining this chapter presents that moral 
demands played a minor role in human rights development and the eventual change came 
through the cascade of social and economical problems and apartheid state had to reach the 
bottom of the dead end before it could admit that state that excludes majority cannot be 
functional.  
 
When there were no sufficient concessions or reasonable policies to construct multiracial 
society liberation forces based their strategy on ‘people’s war’ and this tactic was based on 
corrupting the economical, social and political basis of apartheid by driving South Africa to 
demise by rioting and violence. This was not a human rights embracing policy and through 
increased polarization various factions violated human rights widely. ANC continued its 
freedom struggle by military and political means and also by inciting people to resort anarchy 
and chaos. Besides the traditional liberation forces and State security organizations Inkatha 
entered the scene of violent conflict. The cause of Inkatha was motivated by particular interest 
to foster Zulu identity and power in the South African politics and Inkatha saw liberation 
struggle as internal power struggle that ANC and other liberation forces are being winning on 
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the cost of Zulu interest. The scene was ever more complicated in the 1980s and Amnesty had 
to face the situation where the ‘victims’ became ‘perpetrators’ and Amnesty had to deal with 
this chaotic and complicated scenario. The interest of this chapter is largely defined by how 
Amnesty managed to cope with this renewed challenge and how it was portrayed in the 
reports. The traditional strife remained as permanent part of the scene and this chapter deals 
with the transformation of human rights violations inside security police institution (deaths in 
detention) to killings by covert units and operations, that were favoured in order to avoid the 
burden of monitoring and connecting killings to apartheid state.178  
 
Regarding the proposition of spiral model that human rights progress takes place through 
gradual cognitive process is not viable structure to explain the human rights development in 
1980s South Africa and instead of cascading norms the cascading phenomena were the social, 
economical and political implications of apartheid politics that had been stubbornly prolonged 
regardless or their apparent inadequacy. Now the cascading problems started to pile and fall 
over and instead of putting apartheid policies on trial they were continued and social and 
political mistakes led to intensified conflict. Probably spiral model would counter argue this 
assertion by asking that how it is possible that human rights were eventually realized in South 
Africa when the democratic elections took place in 1994? The answer is that spiral model 
relies too much on the graduality of the change and when problems start cascading the change 
become a mere necessity not a moral or cognitive option. Besides that the end cannot be 
justification for means and here spiral model analyzes overall political development that is 
dissimilar to actual human rights scenario. In South Africa the change was primarily driven 
by compulsion and human rights perspective played a minor role in this development.  
 
The process of political change could have been driven much more efficiently through human 
rights norms if general willingness to intervene human rights in South Africa would have 
been compliant to foster human rights. Cold war had brought about situation where ruff 
political identities defined the superficial level of communication and to make progress from 
these apparent positions was difficult and the real problems were buried under political and 
symbolic skirmishes. However, the contained identities started disrupting due to collapse of 
Soviet Union and this had impact on apartheid state and its opponents that had firmly 
connected to identity formations of cold war. Nevertheless, for example the U.S. regime was 
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living in a cold war illusion that apartheid state was still practising politics of legitimate 
‘exception’.179  
 
In fairness sanctions and other action started appearing in the latter half of 1980s but this 
reaction could have appeared a little earlier and for example the support of sanctions was 
ambivalent both from UK and U.S.180 The human rights boomerangs went to right addresses 
and they returned with moral support but the political boomerangs tent to get stuck into the 
political spider webs.181 Liberation effort was not fully accepted and identified as legitimate 
political force and possibly the intensification of conflict simultaneously alienated and 
involved onlookers. The methods of liberation were dubious but that could not dismiss the 
legitimacy of political demands. The 1980s was a result of domestic and international failures 
and there was no easy way out of the dead end. The attitude of liberation sceptics and 
‘western setting’ was ambivalent and paradoxal because the reason for violent protest was the 
lack of political and social opportunity which created the violent conflict. Comments of ‘west’ 
indicated that the political opposition was occasionally held responsible for the destruction. 
Whereas the international determination to guarantee political opportunities for people was 
missing or had been missing, and people seeking for rights had to resort to violent means 
achieve to them. It was not a reasonable argument to deny the need of political change by 
saying that liberation movements sought to achieve them through immoral and violent means 
but simultaneously it was not possible to condone the terrorizing liberation methods. This is a 
problem that was not possible to approach unambiguously, which questions also the viability 
of normative approach. Whereas Black claims that apartheid state started distributing political 
rights in the 1960s I claim that apartheid state’s concession were inadequate quality 
continuously and they did not guarantee sufficient political opportunity and reconciliation 
before dismantlement of apartheid was established. Spiral model claims that concessions are 
steps of entanglement that indicate the embodiment of human rights progress but every time 
apartheid state introduced political changes, whether concession or something else they led 
always to spiralling violence.  
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And what comes to international intervention it was too late to affect profoundly the security 
basis of apartheid state and therefore human rights violations grew and continued regardless 
that there was heightened international consciousness on human rights violations. It seems to 
be that the by watchers sought to entangle with apartheid conflict either on their conditions or 
to remain away from the conflict. In any case the phenomenon was not encountered but is was 
interpreted by prejudicing standards. Communist sponsors supported unquestionably for 
example ANC and the basis of support was not human rights norms but egocentric desires of 
power. On the other side apartheid state received irrelevant support from the ‘western’ side of 
cold war. Without doubt this question was not easy for UK and its anti-terrorist discourse is 
conceivable to certain extent but when the world political conditions were conducive for 
apartheid there was a paradox of State terrorism that UK did not wish to admit.182   
 
The process of involvement was finally initiated in the end of 1980s and embargoes were 
imposed on apartheid state and the objectors of embargoes such as Margaret Thatcher claimed 
that they only damage the oppressed population and the ‘wealthy’ and ruling population 
remains unharmed.183 This stand was condemned as hypocritical by the liberation forces and 
for example Desmond Tutu was outraged by this logic: 
 
“It is amazing how solicitous for blacks and such wonderful altruists everybody has 
become. It is remarkable that in South Africa the most vehement in their concern for 
blacks have been whites. Few Blacks have repudiated me for my stance… They are not 
stupid. They know whether they are going to suffer… Two recent surveys have shown 
that over 70 percent of blacks support sanctions of some sort.” 184   
 
However, there are certain problems when sanctions are applied as an indicator of human 
rights attitude. For example flamboyant human rights activist Helen Suzman has argued in her 
memoirs that shrivelling up South Africa was not a reasonable solution to foster human and 
civil rights and she suggest that cultural exchange and reasonable intervention and 
involvement were needed instead of sanctions. On the other hand Suzman argued in the 
apartheid Parliament that after the death of Steve Biko the pro-sanctions movements was 
rising steadily in the international context. Suzman warned the Parliament of the implications 
                                                 
182 Barber 1999, 252. 
183 Barber 1999, 251. 
184 Eades 1999, 92. 
 103
of human rights and power of human rights can bring about negative status and isolation and 
exclusion is threatening South Africa.185 However, Suzman’s critical attitude towards 
sanctions uncovers the paradigm of human rights, which is the lack of encounters. Human 
rights problems are conceived through prejudiced attitudes, complicated hierarchical theories 
or political models and that covers what could be uncovered in encountering the actual 
reasons of human rights violations. This means that the tide had turned, human rights norms 
were growing and this led to establishment of sanction, but by no means it is possible to argue 
unambiguously that this would have been favourable for human rights. For example Suzman 
claims that the effect was opposite. This is exactly the problem of normative developments. 
They develop certain political trends, which are disconnected to the actual scenario and 
therefore normative cannot always the nexus of human rights problems.  
 
The popular prejudice of 1960s was that there is no human rights problem and therefore for 
example the voluntary arms embargo was blatantly bypassed. In the 1980s the urgency of 
sense and intensity of conflict had reached world’s consciousness and there was wide protests 
and demands internationally to impose sanctions on apartheid state. This indicates how much 
more connected and conscious the world had become compared to 1960s when the 
international human rights movement was virtually non-existent. However, if human rights 
are dependable on the trends of human rights mind setting it is difficult to reach the problems 
as they are. Human rights activities in 1960s and 1980s to certain extent were more dependent 
on human rights attitudes than on what kind of intervention the improvement of human rights 
required. In the 1960s the major concession of apartheid state was Bantustan project that 
Black has interpreted as a successful beginning for a cognitive process. Factually this 
corresponded to popular prejudice of the time without having a positive impact on civil or 
human rights development. Also the sanctions of 1980s can be questioned and if they could 
have brought about consolation regarding human rights. At least it can be mentioned that the 
popular prejudice of the time supported sanctions, perhaps without critically contemplating if 
that will have a positive impact on human rights. Spiral model has not put on trial how viable 
a certain cognitive approach towards a particular problem was and therefore ‘a positive 
prejudice’ can qualify under such theory as acceptable. Normative school has been celebrating 
sanctions as a success, but at least the ambiguity of this development should be mentioned 
rather than it would be one dimensionally glorified.186 
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What was Amnesty’s stand on demands towards sanctions and imposed sanctions? There is 
no directs relation (at least I have not found it) but certainly Amnesty’s activities affected the 
discussion on sanctions. This is how the Chairman of Anti-apartheid committee Leslie O. 
Harriman commented what Amnesty’s 1978 implied on its opinion about sanctions:  
 
“I would earnestly hope that the Security Council will meet the challenge flung by the 
apartheid regime. The Special Committee considers that mandatory economic sanctions 
under Chapter VII as requested by the oppressed people of South Africa and their 
national liberation movement, and supported by an overwhelming majority of Member 
States, are the only effective means to enable the South African people to eliminate 
apartheid and repression.”187 
 
This statement begins with comment where the Harriman pronounces that Amnesty’s report 
has uncovered urgent information in a time when demands to release political prisoner and 
end torture were critical and necessary. Consequently Amnesty’s investigations and findings 
were used as a vindication to approve the sanctions. There problem that Suzman has 
uncovered still remains and sanctions are not necessarily the most meaningful and efficient 
way of improving human rights. Sanctions on apartheid regime has been researched widely 
but the intention of this study is not to entangle with the sanctions discourse, but to show the 
there are various ways of contemplating and approaching human rights and encountering the 
problem and opening a way forward has to be on the background of sanctions or any other 
punishing actions. Otherwise the ethical and practical vindication of sanctions is dubious.   
 
But are human rights always dependable on the current human rights trend and certain 
tragedies will receive more attention than others? Here is an opinion of extreme quality from 
Francis Boyle that considers the issue of apartheid: 
 
“Let's take an older example -- apartheid in South Africa under the former criminal 
regime in South Africa. Amnesty International refused adamantly to condemn apartheid 
in South Africa. Despite my best efforts while I was on the board, and other board 
members, they would not do it. They are the only human rights organization in the entire 
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world to have refused to condemn apartheid in South Africa. Now they can give you 
some cock-and-bull theory about why they wouldn't do this. But the bottom line was that 
the biggest supporter, economic and political supporter of the criminal apartheid 
regime in South Africa was the British government, followed by the United States 
government. And so no matter how hard we tried, no matter what we did, they would not 
condemn apartheid in South Africa. Now I just mention that as one among many 
examples.”188 
 
The attitude that is reflected from this statement implies pro-sanctions stance and also 
Amnesty should have started shaming U.S. and UK governments in order to bring about a 
positive change of human rights. Once again it is difficult to estimate what would have been 
prosperous for human and if the outcome of human rights development was dependent of 
foreign and economical relations of U.S. and UK. What comes to Boyle’s argument that 
Amnesty refused to condemn apartheid regime, it is not simply true and Amnesty expressed 
in the 1978 report that there will be no sufficient change inside of apartheid’s structure and 
therefore the system has to be dismantled. But obviously Boyle was not satisfied with this 
policy. Nevertheless, Amnesty betrayed its principle of political neutrality when it condemned 
apartheid state as a political system, but principally this was a no win situation because 
apartheid as a political system denied human rights categorically. Therefore Amnesty cannot 
be blamed for betraying its principle but this chapter concentrates on the negative 
implications of this decision because the focus was on the State apparatus whereas human 
rights violations became a question beyond State in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the 
attitude of Boyle and the form of activism that he suggests is simply unbearable and human 
rights organization cannot entangle to political crisis on a level that Boyle demands. That 
would remove Amnesty autonomy and capability to act as an independent and critical actor. 
  
It was remarkable that UK changed its approach on apartheid state and by the initiative of 
Thatcher Commonwealth sent a group to monitor human rights violations in South Africa. 
The group that was authorized for this quest was called EPG (Eminent Persons Group) that 
sought to ‘to encourage through all the practicable ways the evolution of political 
dialogue’.189 Finally UK as powerful onlooker accepted that there is a need to foster dialogue 
and there is need to intervene the South African scenario. Another remarkable phenomenon 
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was the change of attitude and approach and whereas UK had refused to examine apartheid as 
a question of human rights violation and consciousness now EPG mediated what Amnesty 
had been suggesting all the way from 1960s. This is what EPG encountered: “On our first 
visit to … Soweto we were confronted by the spectacle of a policeman chasing and shooting at 
an apparently unarmed man”.190 This demonstrates the difference of human rights as a purely 
political phenomenon and human rights as a matter of consciousness and how much more 
urgent sense there is for involvement when one actually encounters and experiences the 
violent reality.  
 
But why were not Amnesty reports accepted as valid basis for making valid political decisions 
and why the certainty of consciousness had to be reached through a special group? First of all 
the agenda of EPG and Amnesty were remarkably different and EPG mission was 
concentrated of constructing political dialogue and Amnesty sough to alienate itself from 
political issues. But what is remarkable is the amazement of EPG that there was an open 
violent conflict and that EPG ‘became persuaded that there was, in fact a systematic and 
seemingly orchestrated campaign of intimidation directed at activities in the democratic 
cause’.191 While examining Amnesty material that has been produced two decades before the 
EPG’s report one can conclude that the violent conflict had been based largely on apartheid 
state’s massive assault against civil society and obviously this message has not been received 
by the ‘outside’ sufficiently. I do not approve or endorse that States and other actors would 
develop prejudiced and pre-knowing attitude towards human rights but this was information 
that had been available long before EPG ‘uncovered’ it. This was rather a question of 
comprehension and motives than availability of information. Though, UK’s reluctance to 
participate human rights activities has been apparent and UK demanded that it wishes to 
accomplish its own investigations before making conclusions. For example when Amnesty 
released a representative report in 1985 in Uganda UK was willing to admit the urgency of 
human rights problem even without UK orientated investigations. Though, this was preceded 
by development in which UK rejected the facts presented by Amnesty.192 We can conclude 
that UK’s willingness to accomplish human rights missions is a double edged sword. On one 
hand encountering and approaching the problem is necessary and primary but on the other 
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hand there should be a capability to trust human rights actors and also desire to create 
dialogue with the international civil society.  
 
Apartheid state’s response to sanctions and external intervention was extremely hostile but the 
bolstering rhetoric had lost some of its edge because State had to accept the external 
involvement and the entrance of EPG and apartheid state was also secretly negotiating with 
imprisoned Nelson Mandela. A group consisted of people who represented business interest 
travelled to Zambia to meet ANC representatives and besides that ANC was also gaining 
legitimacy in international context. There were ‘leaks’ on multiple fronts and the core of 
apartheid started crumbling down but regardless of these leaks the security machinery 
remained virtually untouchable. The biggest challenge of them of all was to uncover the 
secret organizations and bring externalized security under reasonable public control. 
Securocrats such as President Botha allowed EPG group to enter South Africa that this did not 
affect the management of security issues at all and human rights were violated like before.193    
 
 
 
4.2 Altered conflict and Amnesty’s response  
 
South Africa fell into bitter spiral of violence and the cures that apartheid state had applied on 
disarming the political opposition before were still considered as viable tools for making 
politics in South Africa but rather than gaining control apartheid state was on a suicidal 
course. The detention and political imprisonment and torture and political killings were 
portrayed in Amnesty’s reports as previously, yet the rate of human rights violations had risen 
to completely new level and the end of 1980s was the last push to save the project of White 
supremacy and State applied all of its forces to halt the civil society and violent protest that 
‘threatened’ the White monopoly of power. The 1980s is probably the period that most clearly 
reveals the failure of apartheid as a political system and the mistakes State had done cascaded 
and caused a massive social and political crisis. The two pronged freedom fight continued and 
where the civil society sought to raise consciousness and campaign for popular protest and the 
violent struggle also intensified because apartheid state refused to share power and defence of 
downright supremacy was backed-up by exaggerated violent effort. Trade unions became 
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important instruments of the social struggle and exiled movement continued the military fight 
regardless they had not been able to militarily challenge the apartheid state since the 
beginning of armed liberation struggle. This was one of the reason why ANC resort a 
different kind of liberation method and instead of organized military or guerrilla operations a 
tactic to stimulate people to cause chaos was adopted. This strategy based on people’s power 
and how all the                                                                            South African oppressed 
people shall turn against the State and advance that South Africa will become ungovernable 
which makes impossible to run the minority power of apartheid.194 
 
The renewed scenario presented a challenge for Amnesty that had sworn that its activities 
have absolute loyalty to the principle of UDHR and principles that Amnesty had imposed on 
itself.  This chapter examines what kind of provisions these frames set for Amnesty’s 
activities. The first demarcation point from violent liberation struggle was in the 1960s when 
Amnesty refused to adopt Nelson Mandela regardless that there were popular demands to do 
so. However, the situation was now much more complicated and instead of making clear 
decisions on single cases Amnesty had a challenge to redefine its overall attitude that 
consequently defined the interests of its fact finding missions and eventually how human 
rights violations were portrayed and presented. Before human rights were categorically being 
violated in State organizations and primarily in security police institutions and these 
organizations carried burden of accountability and they were popularly held responsible for 
the people who they detained, even though these responsibilities were openly neglected. 
However, this provided some sort of leverage for Amnesty to report these cases and demand 
accountability and responsibility. When non-State actors started applying violence for various 
purposes it was not as easy to keep track on these deeds and obtain information on them as 
before and this posed a practical challenge along the mental challenge. As presented in this 
study that State organizations started imposing disciplinary corporal punishments for people 
who were subjugated to the power of security institutions. Disciple became also central 
feature of the liberation activities and deeds that were seen as betrayal towards groups 
discipline were punished immediately without further investigations and this phenomenon 
posed a bigger threat to realisation of human rights than apartheid state’s actions. People such 
as civil council executives who responded for housing conditions and other similar persons 
who were seen apartheid’s collaborators became targets of violent disciplinary actions. An 
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activity called neglacing became common is South Africa and this punishment was often 
imposed on people who were suspected of collaborating with police and providing 
information for them195:    
 
“Necklacing, so ran an account, started with the victim’s hands being chopped off or 
tied with barbed wire to prevent a struggle. Then a tyre was placed around victim’s 
neck filled with petrol and set alight. ‘It can take up to 20 minutes before the victim dies 
… The victim’s relatives are often encouraged to try to help him – which is impossible 
because of the tyre’s enormous heat. The melted rubber is like boiling tar and cannot be 
removed from scorched tissue’.”196 
 
Necklacing was a popular ‘liberation method’ that was imposed on people who for reason or 
another were seen by community or mob as a threat to the liberation struggle. What kind of 
impact such change in this conflict should have had on the Amnesty’s attitude and reports? 
Largely Amnesty continued reporting ‘conventional’ human rights violations that were 
perpetrated in State organizations and this study seeks to examine what is missing from 
Amnesty’s reports and why certain issues such as necklacing and also largely human rights 
violations committed by ANC are missing. Before the violent conflict was largely defined by 
apartheid state that sought to maintain discipline by violence now other groups started seeking 
change through disciplinary and somewhat organized violence. The setting from perpetrators 
and victims changed to violent power struggle and the idea of spiral model that human rights 
activities should be directed at supporting political  opposition became particularly obsolete. 
Not only the main source of conflict had adopted dogmatic position but now the oppressed 
tried to brake free from by adopting dogmatic and one-dimensional methods. Reasons 
obviously originate from apartheid state but since Amnesty is a human rights organization the 
renewed situation caused confusion between social and human rights justice.   
 
What is the proper way to form an attitude under such circumstances? To contextualize this 
question I compare principles that Amnesty and CODESRIA197 have developed for 
investigating human rights violations and what it states about violence perpetrated by 
opposition and non-State actors. The general principle is that all the sides regardless of their 
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official authority (or lack of it) are bound to respect human right norms and principles defined 
for armed conflicts. However, there is no consensus on how the violence and abuses by non-
State actors should be approached and UN and human rights community generally claims that 
human rights demands can be only imposed on State actors and regardless of this dispersion 
Amnesty and CODESRIA and a number of other actors: ”have decided to oppose killings 
perpetrated by armed opposition groups.”  Regarding the context of this study this principle 
can be considered the only valid approach and this chapter points out that how the violence by 
non-State actors was not unambiguously considered belonging to the sphere of human rights. 
Consequently this functioned as an incentive for apartheid state to transfer violent control 
from State institutions to other scenes which can be claimed to be outside range of 
responsibilities. It is not a viable idea to start divide human rights conceptions by institutional 
means and everybody has to be kept liable of human rights laws and principles regardless of 
the faction or motivation of the group that practises violence against or for something.198 The 
standards of Amnesty state that: “killings by armed opposition groups constitute human rights 
abuses when they present…”:   
 
• They are deliberate: that is, they are committed in self-defence, of by accident. 
• They flout even minimum standards of human behaviour applicable to government 
and armed opposition groups alike. 
• They are committed on the authority of a political entity or with it acquiescence. 
They are part of a policy to eliminate specific individuals or groups or categories, or 
they occur because such abuses are allowed to be committed or tolerated.199 
 
These principles have distinguished killings of formal State organizations as extrajudicial 
executions and the ones by informal groups’ deliberate and arbitrary killings. Comparison 
of these principles to the situation in 1980s South Africa reveal that these deeds were 
deliberate in a sense that violence and discipline were designed to destroy the structures of 
apartheid and therefore they had a function and therefore this definition is exact. These deeds 
were deliberate yet arbitrary and they were not individual accidents and for example 
necklacing could be called a liberation policy. Winnie Mandela was one of the people who 
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endorsed necklacing and she gave a notorious statement how South Africa is going to be 
liberated by a box matches and petrol.200  
 
The violence of informal groups indeed flouted all the minimum standards of behaviour and 
people were condemned to death by momentary and arbitrary decisions. And what comes to 
the last principle that regards acquiescence and connection of violence to authority or 
influence of certain political group perpetrators and victims were habitually associated to 
ANC, UDF or Inkatha. All the these groups were perpetrators as well as victims, but in this 
study the Inkatha-ANC conflict will be examined particularly because Amnesty has especially 
reported on these occasions. To define on whose acquiescence these deeds were executed is a 
problematic question and for example TRC has unravelled this question and it appears to be 
that the comprehension of the perpetrators and leaders is often contradictory, but it is possible 
to conclude that all the factions had their leaders and promoters and even though they have 
clearer or vaguer motivations to comprehend and pronounce their participation to violence it 
is indisputable that most of the violence was executed for or against something.   
 
If Amnesty now has such clear guidelines (in 2000) why were such procedure missing in the 
1980s and a lot of violence perpetrated by non-State sector is missing from Amnesty’s 
coverage? Above this question is dealt as a problem of practise and Amnesty and CODESRIA 
give practical guidelines but human rights activities have also motivations that arise from 
consciousness and this probably affected human rights conceptions as much as practical 
features. Amnesty had forged consciousness for more than two decades that the human rights 
violations are a result of apartheid state’s overwhelming assault against civil society and now 
the oppressed people started a counter attack that intensified the violent confrontation. In the 
1950s the resistance was based on defiance and after the 1960 Sharpeville massacre liberation 
movement(s) initiated violent combat but since the movements were exiled they could not 
cause considerable damage inside of South Africa. The 1970s and Soweto uprising brought 
about popular revolt that came inherently from inside of South Africa and it was not installed 
or stimulated by the exiled liberation movements. There is a certain trend in this development 
and gradually mutual hostilities grew and in 1980s and the beginning of 1990s was the height 
of political and social violence. How should a human rights actor prepare for such changes 
where the human scene became more versatile or should human rights actor prepare mentally 
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for such a change? Spiral model pronounces unambiguously that there is no need for such 
reservations and human rights activities are definitely designed to support political opposition. 
If only the problem was this simple but human rights are violated by organizations that are 
authorized by the State power as well as associations and groups that function informally. To 
expand human rights norms regarding informal groups demands mentality change and as a 
result different kind of conventions and ways to approach human rights. There is a threat that 
when human rights, as a matter a consciousness are presented a simplified phenomenon of for 
or against somebody and to initiate a mentality change from these locked positions might be  
troublesome. To study this problem by using only printed Amnesty material is problematic 
because that is only a part of Amnesty’s activities but a problem remains to explain why 
violence to achieve political aims by one group was considered as human rights violations and 
corresponding actions by an another group was not considered, or it was it was not reported 
for reason or another. It appears to be that Amnesty was inexperienced regarding the human 
rights violations that were committed by non-State actors and therefore there were no 
guidelines and mental reservations how such scenarios should be faced.  
 
 
 
4.3 From deaths in detention to killings conducted by covert units 
 
As presented in the first chapter South Africa was in constant state of exception which 
granted security system rights that made it law unto itself and during emergencies these rights 
were even widened and every police officer regardless of ranking could detain anybody 
without any charge for 14 days and further unlimited detention could be authorized by the 
Minister of Law and Order. In the end of 1980s emergency became a permanent state of 
affairs and an emergency after another was released. The same principles applied on detention 
as before. Police was not responsible for presenting charges against the detainee and courts of 
law were not entitled to apply for the condition of detainees or obtain information on their 
condition. Besides that all the law and enforcement personnel, government ministers and State 
officials were granted immunity for acts committed “in good faith” regarding the 
enforcement of emergency regulations. On the 21 of July in 1985 the Minister of Justice 
announced that detainees can be subjected under the emergency regulations to variety of 
punishments for “disciplinary contraventions”. This banned almost any human behaviour in 
detention and this rule included giving deliberately false answers, whistling, singing, making 
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noises at all, and disobeying a command. On the top of that prisoners who complained of their 
conditions could jeopardize their situation if the complaint is considered as “false, frivolous 
or malicious”. Amnesty had criticized the anonymization of security forces already in 1978 
report. Apartheid state introduced 1977 January Indemnity Bill that guaranteed the rights and 
anonymity described above.201  What is remarkable here that when this attitude is compared 
to the beginning of this study and Amnesty’s first report it appears to be like time would have 
been stopped and exactly the same tools to engineer reality were seen desirable. This attitude 
ruled the security development with an exception that violence intensified due to mutual 
provocations and this deepened and intricate the security culture. 
  
The end of 1980s did not introduce anything knew and the old policies were underlined and 
increased. The effort of State’s repression had been considerable before but during 
emergencies it was ever intensified and vast amounts of people were detained and during the 
first week of emergency 1 100 people were captured and by the end of October in 1985 
(released on 20.7.1985) authorities had acknowledge detention of 4 300 people.202 The 
situation looks all more urgent when we see the death rate that was announced by State. In 
1984, 175 people were reported to be killed in political violence and this figure rose to 879 in 
1985, and it reached its peak in 1986 when 1 298 deaths were reported and in 1987 
government gained some sort of control and 661 were killed.203 Emergencies had also 
profound impact on publicity and apartheid state openly detained reporters and newspapers 
were published with blackened or simply white columns where the undesired article was 
designated.204 Therefore to mediate information on topics that apartheid state desired to ban 
became more important and the role of Amnesty and generally civil society increased. 
 
Neil Aggett was a doctor and trade union activist and he worked in hospitals that were 
provided for the Black population group and he learned Zulu language while working as a 
doctor.205 Aggett was labelled as a communist and enemy of the State by apartheid system 
and he was detained incommunicado without charge or trial on 27 November 1981 and on 5 
February 1982 and he became the first White to die in the security police custody. What 
happened during detention is disputable but it has been proven than Aggett was ill-treated 
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while he was detained. Suzman writes in her autobiography that she received a note from a 
person who was detained simultaneously with Aggett and this piece of paper was smuggled 
from detention and it was no bigger than a size of a postage stamp and Suzman needed a 
magnifying lens to read it. This paper claimed that a detainee had seen Aggett badly beaten, 
kept naked and forced standing for many hours.206 The same information was confirmed in an 
inquest that was arranged after Aggett's death. Amnesty representative attended this inquest as 
well. Former detainees witnessed that they had seen Aggett ill-treated and subjected to 60 
hour interrogation shortly before his death, however, the magistrate judged that there are 
inconsistencies in detainees' statements and therefore it has to be concluded that the cause of 
death was suicide and security police officers have to be therefore acquitted of all charges. 
Police officers claimed that they had not assaulted Aggett even though he had made a written 
complaint of ill-treatment shortly before his dead.207 TRC has found out that Brigadier Muller 
commanded Lieutenant S.P. Whitehead and Paul Francis Erasmus “to gather evidence 
relating to the psychological make-up of Dr Aggett with the aim of proving that Dr Aggett had 
suicidal tendencies" which indicates that it was in authorities interest to manipulate the 
inquest and they constructed intentionally fake evidences.208 Aggett’s family demanded a 
verdict of induced suicide and they interpreted that the cause of death was directly the 
detention conditions.209 This can be considered as a reasonable request because several 
detainees had died in similar way which indicates that conditions were conducive for 
committing suicide. As the case presented in the preceding chapter where a detainee 
(Phakamile Mabija) was either thrown out of the window or detainee was driven to mental 
state that was conducive for suicide and this cannot be considered as a suicide in conventional 
sense and this has to be called an induced suicide.  
 
Security faction had recognized the burden that killings and deaths in police institutions had 
caused to it and it started to apply new methods for harassing and eliminating opponents. The 
significance of the Aggett case and other public inquests for the general human rights 
development was following: 
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"Disappearances are usually a very effective way of avoiding international opprobrium. 
There is no doubt that a large number of troubling inquests – such as the inquest into 
the death of Mr Neil Aggett – led to government setting up new mechanisms to deal with 
opponents. The policy on disappearances saved the former state the cost and publicity 
of trials and inquests, and the acknowledgement of both imprisonment and torture. The 
state was spared from having to account for its actions in any way."210 
 
Apartheid state deviated from the international norms whereas one would imagine that the 
pressure from Amnesty and other actors would have fostered human rights and pressurized 
human rights violating State to alter its behaviour in order to relieve the pressure. In this case 
the effect was opposite and the security measures tightened and the doors and windows of the 
apartheid garrison closed. Apartheid state sought further secrecy under the international 
monitoring. Killings in detention were preferred to killings conducted by covert units and 
operations. The way in which TRC presents the vanishing of cause and consequence is 
connected to the larger phenomenon of the complicity of violence and other cases that caused 
confusion will be reviewed later on. This problem regards also the argument of spiral model 
that claims that initial reaction to human rights intervention is closing in but that persistent 
claims force opening up, bargaining and concessions which cause that human rights violating 
State is forced to narrowing path where it has to negotiate. It is undeniable that this kind of 
development is recognizable and apartheid state allowed EPG to enter South Africa, and ANC 
gained legitimacy internationally which created pressure towards apartheid and its human 
rights violating polices. Apartheid state negotiated secretly with Nelson Mandela in prison 
and this is one of the signs that present the compulsion of change.211  The problem is that 
spiral model endorses primarily a political theory that is somewhat connected to human rights 
but not fully. Apartheid state’s reaction to the publicity was increased repression and secrecy. 
Whereas spiral model claims that after period of closing in there is opening, but in this case it 
appears that apartheid state was closing in the more there were demands to stop repression 
and the more miserable the human rights scenario turned into.  
 
Eventually apartheid state established institutions such as Vlakplaas that was an undercover 
unit that ran undercover operations that were designed to liquidate apartheid’s opponents. 
Vlakplaas was based on a farm outside of Pretoria and this location reveals the new level of 
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secrecy and autonomy that apartheid sough from demands to stop violence. Whereas the 
killings that happened in security police custody it is difficult to say if they were always fully 
intentional or if people died ‘accidentally’ as a cause of torture or if the assaults towards 
detainees were a result of certain security police culture. Detainees’ right to life was denied 
but to classify these acts as political murders is questionable because there is no proof that 
somebody would have been intentionally and directly exterminated in detention. This is a 
complicated question because the commands were covered in euphemisms that in retrospect it 
would be impossible to claim unambiguous commands and responsibility on particular 
persons. Things inside of security police rather ‘happened’ than they would have been directly 
designed and commanded. This constructed a non-designed and chaotic system where nobody 
knew actual what the function and aim of security measures is.212 The common way of 
commanding a killing by covert units was veiled in euphemism ‘make a plan’213 which 
implied the target of the operation has to be killed. Similar commands do not appear in ‘non-
covert’ context, perhaps because security police had to face the burden of explaining the 
condition of detainees whereas covert units operated fully outside the law. Consequently this 
difference might explain the confusion and inconceivability of security police activities. 
Security police organization could not put forward a command of ‘making a plan’ and the 
communication took place even on more intuitive level.  This consequently explains killing 
people with such insane methods as beating them to death or torturing them to insanity and 
creating conducive conditions for suicide were favoured, because merely exterminating a 
person in security police custody would have been an unambiguous murder.  
 
This might have been a result of pressure on one hand from the apartheid system to deal with 
political opponents and from the other there was a public pressure to make security police 
officers accountable for their actions. Apartheid state sought to solve social problems by 
resorting exaggerated violent means and on the contrary there was no recognizable State 
behind these actions. The State functioned as an organism, which caused that security 
measures followed an irrational flow that was not under reasonable control. For example 
killing Neil Aggett cannot be justified by as legitimate or reasonable security action. Under 
these contradictory conditions it might have been a half-way solution to torment the prisoners 
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until death and to create in publicity pseudo-conditions for explaining the death. The insane 
pressure that the apartheid community laid on security police led to construction of self-
deceptive reality where the security police tried desperately to prove clumsily its integrity. It 
has to be remembered that this just an aspect among the others and there are many other ways 
to approach the same question. 
 
The problem of publicity and deaths in detention was ‘solved’ by disconnecting the security 
projects and killings from public context and running them secretly. Vlakplaas unit had a 
variety of projects and methods that they used for eliminating apartheid’s opponent. One of 
them was lawyer Griffiths Mxenge who was murdered by Vlakplas agents 19 of November, 
1981.214 As describe above these cases were largely out of range of publicity and therefore 
Amnesty had a problem and challenge with these kinds of incidents. Here is description that 
ex-Vlakplas operative Dirk Coetzee has given of murder of Griffiths Mxenge. This should not 
be considered as an absolutely factual source because there is no possibility to verify what is 
presented here, but this should be considered as relevant perspective to the security culture 
and as an illuminating example that what kind of operations Vlakplas practised.  
 
Dirk Coetzee and number of other Vlakplaas operatives were sent to Durban for surveillance 
purposes and on discussion with the local security police and Brigadier Van der Hoven 
instructed Coetzee that he should make a plan regarding Griffiths Mxenge. Coetzee was told 
that Mxenge was an ex-Robben Island215 convict and they have found when examining the 
transactions of his bank account that he is receiving funds from ANC and the fact the Mxenge 
had acted as defence attorney in cases regarding ANC members was mentioned. The entire 
story is available in book The Hidden Hand: Covert Operations in South Africa and TRC has 
also investigated this case. The intention was that Mxenge would be killed discreetly in a way 
that it could not be connected to State authorities and Van der Hoven instructed Coetzee that 
killing should look like a robbery and Mxenge should not be therefore shot or abducted. The 
result of this scheme was that Mxenge was stabbed to death in his home area Umlazi, Durban 
and his mutilated body was found from local sports stadium. Afterwards Coetzee disposed 
Mxenge’s belongings that had taken from him that the incidence would look like a robbery 
and Mxenge car was hijacked during this happening and through various plans the Coetzee 
and some other people drove the car to border of Swaziland and South Africa. It was found 
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from there later and according to Coetzee the Durban murder and robbery squad came to 
check the car and took pictures of the car. Coetzee claims that killing of Mxenge was a typical 
death squad operation and in his opinion a number of other similar killings were conducted in 
the same manner. 216 
 
What Amnesty could find out of the case was not much because it was framed to look like a 
robbery and besides intuition there was no evidence to connect this happening to apartheid 
state’s security organisations. When Amnesty first time reported about Griffiths Mxenge’s 
case there were no strong accusations towards apartheid state and the only mention about 
possible perpetrators was that Griffiths Mxenge’s wife had suspected that right-wing 
extremists were behind this act. In this phase the general understanding that State is behind 
these killings had not yet dawned and these accusation started to appear more frequently from 
1985 on when also Victoria Mxenge the wife of Griffiths Mxenge was killed.217 Even though 
it was impossible to prove anything Amnesty strongly demanded that these events have to be 
investigated by autonomous and open judicial inquests. In the 1980s apartheid state 
categorically dismissed these inquest but in 1990s the scene started changing and the impact 
and implications of these inquest will be examined after presenting another covert operation.  
 
As the case Griffiths Mxenge reveals organization of apartheid state were behind killings that 
were planned and conducted by covert units and similar type of operation continued to take 
place in the beginning of 1990s and besides shootings and abductions people were killed by 
using explosive devices and poisonings. Bheki Mlangeni was killed by an explosive hidden in 
walkman, Ruth First was killed by parcel bomb in Maputo, Albie Sach was severely injured 
by a car bomb to mention few cases that were conducted by security officials. Besides covert 
units of police such as Vlakplaas another covert organization was ran by the military Special 
Forces deviously called CCB (Civil Corporation Bureau). The existence of this institution was 
uncovered in 1990 and this unit has been connected to multiple killings. Between August 
1977 and November 1989 at least 50 government opponents had been killed and only in one 
case the perpetrators were apprehended, which meant that in the beginning of 1990s the 
information considering these incidents was vague but there were plenty of leads to follow 
that could provide further information. Amnesty collected facts of these cases and by doing 
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that it sought to clarify the confusing situation where security forces still had a strong desire 
to manipulate reality even the dismantling of apartheid had been set by political decisions.  
 
One of victims of parcel bombs was Bheki Mlangeni who had supplied information to Harms 
commission218 and Mlangeni used consequently Dirk Coetzee as source of information. He is 
the very same person who had participated killing of Griffiths Mxenge and acted as Vlakplas 
operative. The security ring that was closed in the 1960s started opening now and it could not 
tie people indefinitely to its authoritarian means at it has been able to before and the leaks 
from the ring started tearing down its secret mission. 
 
 Amnesty material indicates that the bomb was directed at Dirk Coetzee and Mlangeni was 
not the target of this bomb even though he accidentally received the package and was killed 
by it in 16 of February in 1991. TRC has investigated this case as well and they have come to 
a conclusion that Mlangeni was an accidental victim. Amnesty suggested that this bomb 
attack was a response to the work of Harms Commission that had started to get on the traces 
what kind of operations the covert units were running. Dirk Coetzee had left Vlakplaas unit 
and he was dedicated to dismantling of his former unit by giving information on the covert 
operations, which made a formed insider a target of killing operations.219  
 
Originally the explosive that killed Mlangeni was sent to Dirk Coetzee in Zambia but he did 
not accept the package due to high import fees but he had also suspicion on the contents of the 
package and he informed ANC in Lusaka about the package. The return address on the 
package was the office of legal affairs where Mlangeni worked in Johannesburg and only 
“Bheki” was written on the top of the package and Amnesty assumed that the one who sent 
the package did not know Bheki’s last name and there was also suspicion that information 
that Coetzee and Mlangeni would have been in contact would have obtained by tapping 
Coetzee’s telephone. Mlangeni received the package in his office on 16 of February 1990, 
opened the package and brought the walkman that was in the package to his home. It was 
written on the top two cassettes that were included in the packages “Evidences of hit squads”. 
And this is what happened consequently: 
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“At about 9.30pm, according to the evidence of this wife Seipati, he took the tape player into 
a room on his own, put on the headphones and pressed the play button. Simultaneous 
explosion in both earpieces blew holes in this skull, killing him instantly.”220 
 
When the explosive was investigated it appeared that it had highly sophisticated technology 
and to construct such device presume certain skills. This referred to army or police that had 
special skills for producing complicated explosive devices. Besides that two ANC members 
had been attacked by explosive devices and in another case Leslie Johannes Lesia, a self-
confessed agent of South African Military Intelligence had given ANC official Frank Chiliza 
a television set containing an explosion. Michael Lapsey, an Anglican priest and ANC 
member received a bomb through mail and explosive was skilfully hidden in a church 
magazine. All of these cases indicate that covert units had means and motives to conduct 
these cases and these cases have been studied in retrospect and people who had took part to 
these operations have admitted these happenings. It was remarkable that Amnesty released the 
different perspectives regarding these cases because there was no certain information who is 
behind the acts and for example pro-government newspaper claimed that regarding 
intelligence sources most likely the attack was carried out by the victims of hit squad 
operations who wanted to retaliate attacks on their relatives. This was a dubious and 
ridiculous claim because now the paper admitted indirectly that government organized hit 
squad operations do exist even though the preceding stand had been a total denial of these 
cases and on the top of that its not very likely anyone in South Africa would have had 
expertise to construct such an explosive.221 
 
It can be seen here that the entanglement that spiral model has presented as factor towards 
construction of human rights positive reality started taking place right away when there was 
public debate about these issues and the pro-apartheid press contradicted itself immediately. It 
has to be recognized as well that the scenario had changed completely and whereas leading 
securocrat P.W. Botha was replaced by De Klerk who announced the dismantling of apartheid 
and acted as a leader of the transition period. The desire of State and the security faction was 
no longer entirely bonded and the organism of State and security that had had strong impact 
on State was gradually separating from arbitrary security desires. There was a certain 
                                                 
220 Amnesty International, State of Fear 1992,  22. 
221 Amnesty International, State of Fear 1992, 22-23. 
 121
willingness to change, and as a result entanglement began, but mostly under the power 
apartheid entanglement in form that spiral model suggests it cannot be recognized.  
 
In TRC investigations the people who actually constructed the explosive that was sent to 
Mlangeni told how it happened and this information largely corresponds to the information 
that Amnesty reported. The killing was carried out because Dirk Coetzee was announcing 
information publicly that was disturbing the security officials. There was a dispute who 
ordered this operation between the Vlakplaas commander Eugene de Kock and commander 
General Van Rensburg, but it is clear that the construction of explosive was ordered and 
eventually the package was sent to Coetzee who refused to receive it and according to TRC 
Coetzee immediately said when he saw the package that it is a bomb and he asked to inform 
the police and Mlangeni to whom the package was returned, but obviously nobody informed 
him of danger and device directed at Coetzee killed Mlangeni.222 On the other hand it does 
not make any sense that cassettes with text “Evidences of hit squads” would have been used 
as a bait for Coetzee because he had no desire know about these operation since he had first 
hand information already. However, this case appears to be continuation of coincidental 
impulses and obviously the intentional target was Coetzee.   
 
Amnesty gave plenty of other examples that described undisciplined and arbitrary behaviour 
and the sense of impunity that had been established in the security forces reached now its 
peak. Police broke into people’s houses and for example in case Samuel Padi and Nocozola 
Ncalo and killed both of them by shooting. Police claimed that they had shot in self-defence 
but the independent post-mortem indicated that victims had been lying down when they were 
shot and this conclusion was deducted from bullet marks in the bodies and on the walls. 
Whereas police had been vary with killing detainees and because they caused always raging 
national and international protest but now even the remains of control seemed to be vanishing. 
In another case Tsepo Lengwati was detained and when he made a complaint of his 
conditions he was taken to Sharpeville Township where he was supposed to point out suspects 
to police. Police claimed that they were a target of a ‘sudden shooting incident’ and Lengwati 
died in this mysterious attack. According to independent pathologist Lengwati died of 
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multiple gunshot wounds and some of them had hit them back and some from front. 
Regardless of the alleged crossfire none of the police officers were wounded in this attack.223  
 
Amnesty’s view on the general situation was following: 
 
“Without this, President De Klerk's policy, articulated in January 1990, of transforming 
the politicized state security forces into professional and accountable bodies is unlikely 
to succeed. On the contrary, the slowness with which the authorities and the 
prosecutorial system have responded during the past years to compelling prima facie 
evidence against members of the security forces can only have served to strengthen the 
sense of impunity that they developed during the years which Judge Kriegler described 
as the period of "undeclared war".224 
 
There first part of this argument criticises the disparity of the talk and the actions and the 
slowness of change on the grass root level where the security faction continued to play 
remarkable role. But what is the actual problem here? Was this a problem of responsibility as 
Amnesty and spiral model generally claims or are there another way to approach this 
question? When the system of apartheid started crumbling down and it became more apparent 
that somebody with professional methods and resources is running what were called ‘death 
squads’. Vague label death squad was used because there was no public and credible 
information who were behind these operations and how they were organized and what is 
presented here as certain in retrospect was disputed and argued in the end of 1980s and the 
beginning of 1990s. Two commissions were set to investigate the death squad killings and the 
first one of these was Harms commission and it largely failed to unveil the real character of 
State violence and this commission put forward the partial view and myth that was favoured 
by State President de Klerk that these killings are conducted by random rogues and State 
cannot be accused for these happenings.225 This was an outcome that for example Amnesty 
criticised and the commission clearly dismissed tangible evidence that pointed out that there 
would be at least need for further investigations. Harms commission was followed by 
Goldstone commission, which managed to reach more profound level in its investigations, 
                                                 
223 Amnesty International, State of Fear 1992, 25. 
224 Amnesty International, State of Fear 1992, 27. 
225 Barber 1999, 290. 
 123
even though it narrowly announced that Inkatha/ANC rivalry was the main security problem 
and therefore the role of State security organizations remained vague.    
 
Barber’s view on this problem is following: 
 
“As the violence increased so did the disputes about the degree of responsibility of the 
leaders. Did they actively promote the violence, or turn a blind eye, or did it flourish 
despite their best efforts? Fingers were pointed at all the leading figures, but de Klerk 
was the most exposed, because not only was he party leader, he had final responsibility 
for the state and security forces. He had served on the SSC (State security council) 
during Botha’s time, and although not an insider he must at least have had a general 
idea of the scope and methods used by forces.”226 
 
Barber continues his argument by explaining the difficult conditions in which de Klerk had to 
respond to the extremist who kept on living the dogma of total strategy and condemned the 
change as treachery and from the other side ANC demanded harshly to accelerate the 
dismantling of autonomous security organisations within the State. This made the change 
more complicit and yet Barber claims de Klerk was responsible of the shortcomings of 
apartheid state during the transition period that were clearly spawned by larger structural 
distortions.227  
 
The subjective view of de Klerk for the same problem is this: 
 
“…but things happened which were not authorised, not intended, or of which we were not 
aware … I have never condoned gross violations of human rights … and reject any 
insinuation that it was ever the policy of my party or government.”228 
 
How could we reconciliate these differing views on reality? The facts and what de Klerk 
states on reality do not meet and therefore Barber has interpreted that his view on the past is 
dubious and therefore it has to treated with suspicion or even dismissed completely. TRC has 
made similar interpretation and both Barber and TRC has based their examination on Eugene 
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de Kock’s views who acted as the commander of Vlakplas unit. This is what de Kock stated 
about the role of politicians and human rights violations: 
 
“I had not acted out of some kind of depraved personal motive. My orders had come from the 
highest levels.”229  
 
TRC has also used extracts from de Kock’s book to question the views of political leaders: 
 
“…he (de Klerk) simply did not have courage to declare: “yes we at the top levels 
condoned what was done on our behalf by the security forces. What’s more, we 
instructed that it should be implemented. Or – if we did actually give instructions we 
turned blind eye. We didn’t move heaven and earth to stop the ghastliness. Therefore let 
the foot soldiers be excused”.230 
 
De Kock has been speaking openly whereas many others have remained silent possibly in fear 
of being punished for their action in the past. The reason for this is  probably that: “de Kock 
was sentenced had been tried in criminal court, found guilty on 89 charges and sentenced in 
October 1996 to two life sentences and 212 years” 231. Since he was already convicted and 
there was no need to hold back the information. Whereas the arrangements of TRC where 
information was traded for amnesty was conducive for appearance of information on hidden 
and secret cases the commission quite did not manage to persuade all the information to 
appear. Even though the view of de Kock is open it should not be followed without critique as 
for example Barber has done and the view of de Kock has become central in the discussion on 
the human rights violations. The law and politics is often entangled with fact that it has to 
attribute its successes and failures to some certain person(s) and for example the discussion in 
this case is limited to role of de Klerk. Has this perspective power to reveal anything essential 
in the historical perspective? For example Barber points out how the secrecy and the power of 
secret organizations was constructed during the era of P.W. Botha, but why is de Klerk 
criticised instead of Botha?  
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Whereas de Klerk tried to find settlement Botha dismissed any kind of settlement and like he 
dismissed the mission of TRC.232 This uncover the paradox of entanglement. People who are 
willing to accept responsibility can be successfully held responsible but persons such as Botha 
are left on background when the failure of a complete social and political is loaded on de 
Klerk. The shortcomings of de Klerk are easy to hold on but it is more important to 
concentrate on the general development than concentrate the examination on certain persons. 
The fact that de Klerk had vague picture on reality and whereas he may have or may have not 
had access to the facts of covert operations but the comments that he has given to TRC 
indicate that from his perspective the reality did not appear in the same way than for people 
who viewed apartheid critically from outside. The mere knowledge and information do not 
guarantee consciousness, perspective or comprehension and the self-deceptive view on reality 
was not solely problem of de Klerk and the appearance of this phenomenon can be seen 
throughout apartheid. Apartheiders and outside viewers did not share the same view on reality 
and therefore agreeing on it was highly problematic. The very same problem regards 
historical examination where expecting objective reality cannot lead to constructive 
interpretation and therefore human rights cannot be simplified as question of general 
responsibility. Making a behavioural claim of responsibility reveals what we expect from a 
political leader in this type situation but it actually does not present the mental phenomenon 
that were behind the lack of human rights.   
 
If we take a more careful look into the argument of Barber that history can be interpreted 
through the responsibility of political leader(s) we have to look that what were the 
preconditions for being responsible. First of all the politicians rejected their responsibility and 
capability to influence the security development and public debate on human rights issue was 
thereby informally banned. Security became a sacred issue that should be not criticised by 
amateurs and it should be left on the responsibility of security professionals. This 
consequently prevented use of human reason and security became an issue that was based on 
intuition and not on reason. Simultaneously on the political level a myth of justified defence 
became stronger and the intuition that had led to establishing secret security network 
maintained the sense of meaningfulness even though the politicians did not have capability to 
actually check what was done by organization that they had authorized. The intuition of 
necessity and meaningfulness prevented gaining the information and contemplating the 
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information that was already available and public. This is how the Adriaan Vlok (later on 
Minister of Law and Order) commented detention conditions on request of Helen Suzman: 
 
“He said he could not understand my concern about loneliness of detainees: ‘In the same 
breath she says they are interrogated hours. I want to ask her – in that case when are they 
lonely?”233  
 
As seen before security police used habitually torture as interrogation method and often the 
interrogation was not the main practise, but it was the tormenting of prisoner and many 
prisoners commit suicide or attempted it due to repressive detention conditions. But how does 
the reality appear to Mr. Vlok here? The first impression is that this was a public debate in the 
Parliament and therefore to deny allegations of human rights violations appears sensible. 
Besides that such comments point out that many politicians actually did not have mental 
capabilities to understand and contemplate the actions of security organizations. This 
argument shows how human beings appeared only as security targets and any type of inter-
subjectivity or adapting to the role of the victim was a taboo. There was no capability nor 
possibility of empathy. Apartheid and the conflict it provoked externalized the human 
experience entirely. For the supporter of harsh security measures the reality appeared as 
virtual and external, not as actually experienced. The structure of political system prevented 
obtaining facts in coherent way that regarded security measure and becoming consciousness 
and contemplating the fragmented facts and experiences was rejected by the mental attitude. 
When these two phenomena were combined they brought about a cultural no-go area (of 
human rights) and security was made a question that was unchallenged and banned from 
public debate and trial.     
 
When this question is taken one step further to regard secret units such as Vlakplas and CCB 
that started dominating the security scenario and the capability of politicians or anybody else 
to comprehend the security scenario became very difficult. Dirk Coetzee has described his 
experience of Vlakplaas operative as sharing many commonalities with a familial gang of 
thugs.234 Coetzee further describes the position of Vlakplas in the security context.  
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“This protection, which enabled us to operate above the laws of the country and above 
the rules and regulations of the police, is not statutory and is of an ambiguous nature. It 
is vested in a culture belonging to a clique that is more like a close-knit family. The 
culture is a syndrome of arrogant exclusiveness, of being above the law, of secrecy, 
necessity, loyalty, mutual trust, mutual understanding, and special relationships 
between superiors and subordinates. Aspects of this culture, such as the exclusivity, 
secrecy and necessity are explicitly and implicitly respected by the rest of the police 
force and by the community beyond it.”235 
 
The way how Coetzee describes this community gives an impression of closed and esoteric 
organization that was law and meaning unto itself and it was an autonomous entity inside of 
State that was beyond the reach of political control.  
 
How should a politician or any other person who has been believing in mutual trust and cause 
have reacted when the bubble of common cause burst? Suddenly the reality appears in the 
new way and denied and unsolved problems cannot be denied and left unsolved any more. 
The natural reaction would be denial as de Klerk reacted to the death squad operations and 
these self-deceptive results were confirmed by Harms commission. My intention is not to 
justify apartheid’s human rights violations but to approach apartheid from general perspective 
is not possible and apartheid should be studied from the viewpoint of apartheid and see what 
inspired and contributed the phenomenon of human rights violations. Besides responsibility it 
appears to be that there was no capability, besides lack of motivation to solve these problems 
and this was not a question that would have fully depended on the will and responsibility.    
 
What kind of repercussion this approach has on comprehending human rights issues? Spiral 
model has approached human rights from perspective of general attitude and generally 
comprehendible norms. As the analysis above points out to comprehend apartheid from 
general attitude is complicated and even impossible and therefore the objective examination 
should be supplied with inter-subjectivity that seeks to trace that what is motivating the source 
of violations and what kind of view on reality the human rights violating State has and on 
what kind of basis it is possible to communicate and agree on reality. The facts that Amnesty 
has produced can be a good starting point because they give a different kind of perspective to 
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the reality and human rights violating States have to explain violations by some 
comprehensible way. However, it has to be kept in mind that there was a also a certain 
problem on resorting Amnesty as source because human rights were partiality portrayed. 
 
 The problem of communication was that by continuous repetition of facts on violations it is 
not possible to construct dialogue because the human rights violating State does not see the 
violations in the same manner as external observer and therefore it is crucial to find out that 
apartheid was in a state a denial. Violation have to be the foremost factual premise but facts 
has to be supplied by constructive discoursive strategies. The most important thing is to 
search for the connection and this connection cannot be found relying normative or self-
evident procedures. A good example of this is EPG mission whereas the foreign relations 
were before based on objective information now EPG started gaining experiences in South 
Africa that gave a completely new perspective to human rights problems. On the contrary 
spiral model and Black has based their interpretation on ‘objective’ and predisposed 
information and communication that is based on predisposed positions. The actual problems 
were beyond predispositions and the causes and origins had to be uncovered and human rights 
violations were merely an embodiment of the underlying and hidden problems.  
 
 
 
4.4 From apartheid to democratic State – violence of the transition period 
 
A number of remarkable changes took place in the end of 1980s and in the beginning of 
1990s and all of these factors affected and contributed to change. As mentioned before the 
unsolved problems began cascading and among other factors this cascade started a process 
that led to dismantling of apartheid. Economical sanctions and general chaos had resulted that 
the economy of the State was crumbling down and this was a factor that contributed to the 
political change.236 Besides economical problems the world context was changing and due to 
collapse of Soviet Union the ideological justifications for all sides started vanishing. 
Apartheid state had sworn its existence as a fortification against revolutionary and disrupting 
communism and when the communist ‘threat’ vanished from the political playground the anti-
communist rhetoric lost its power as well as dreams of communist revolution for the 
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liberation side. Even though the cold war effect has not been properly examined in historical 
scope it should not be underestimated because according to advocators of apartheid resisting 
communist revolution was a major incentive.237 It could be argued as well that the anxiety 
was concentrated on anti-communism and veiled in it whereas it was not fundamental 
precondition for conflict and violence. Communism was a stunt and the actual reasons of 
security effort were beyond the ideological vindication. Local problems were connected to 
global clashing discourses and consequently different sides identified themselves to either of 
these imperative categories. The result was that every time a discoursive symbol was 
pronounced that presented a political standpoint or predisposition that reinforced and renewed 
the identical and analogical connections to the sources of identity. This symbolized battle 
distracted the attention from actual problems and by resorting ideological statements 
adversaries closed the path for reconciliation and opened it for conflict.  
 
I agree with spiral model that successful communication is an indisputable precondition for 
improvement of human rights but this question is not sufficiently underlined either in theory 
nor in practise.238 The problem of inflexible and leashing predisposition of the norms holder is 
a problem that is not recognized at all by spiral model. Amnesty could transcend the 
deconstructive political discourse, but behind the veil of neutrality Amnesty had issues that 
affected the comprehension of human rights. Consequently the liberation violations were 
ranked lower than the violence that originated directly from the apartheid state. This is 
connected to the problem that Baehr has uncovered. Amnesty has entangled to its self-
imposed principles, which are supposed to provide neutrality and guidance for the 
organization. The foremost paradox is that Amnesty claims neutrality whereas human rights 
problems are highly symbolic quality and therefore human rights activities presume fostering 
values that foster human rights. However, this symbolic task and the actual human rights 
interest can divorce when the human rights scenario changes essentially.  
 
The policy of neutrality is feasible in sense that human rights activities have to transcend the 
symbolic political skirmishes before there can be actual human rights discourse. For instance 
the EPG mission was in between of human rights discourse and political discourse and 
besides interest on human rights EPG was interested on such issues as what Nelson Mandela 
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thought about communism.239 For Britain and Commonwealth the human rights discourse 
could not transcend the political discourse before these highly emotional symbolic key issues 
were solved. While Amnesty claims neutrality and researchers have largely swallowed this 
explanation, organization’s neutrality is not embodied before it has been studied case by case. 
The neutrality policy has become an unchallenged mantra whereas human related issues can 
never be entirely neutral. They can be only more and less neutral. There are wider 
perspectives that have more dimensions than traditional interest based political approach, but 
the lack of personal or collective interest will not automatically assign neutrality. The problem 
of this argument from the perspective of this study is that Amnesty’s viewpoint is partially 
‘hidden’ and therefore it is difficult to study it. In other words symbolic desires are not 
something that could directly recognized and therefore the sources of this study are 
inadequate to grasp this problem. Therefore I cannot make a systematic argument on why and 
how Amnesty’s activities where prioritizing some violations over the others. The current 
categorical scale of evaluation partial/neutral is not versatile enough to understand this 
problem. Amnesty is not either partial or neutral. It values certain problems over the others 
but this does not make the organization partial. However, there are certain partial aspects 
concern the shape of human rights activism.      
 
 The appearance of human rights was prevented by political intentions and entanglement to 
them and the actual problems remained uncovered. The impact of ending cold war for ANC 
was that it lost its major financial and political sponsor and also part of its ideological 
platform crumbled down.240 A remarkable step was the change of President and P.W. Botha 
who was a sworn supporter of security State and reaching a settlement under his power would 
have been difficult due to rigid commitment to the principles of apartheid and security. Botha 
had to leave his position after suffering a heart attack. His successor was Frederik de Klerk 
who officially announced the dismantling of apartheid and the first step was allowing the 
banned organizations such as ANC to act again and freeing Nelson Mandela from prison in 
February 1990.241 The remarkable change for human rights issues was the political changes 
created movement in society that was not under reasonable control and the outcome of this 
movement was yet another spiral of violence. The scenario was largely defined between 
Inkatha, ANC and apartheid state and here the role of Inkatha will be especially examined 
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because Amnesty reported on activities that were connected to Inkatha and also in numbers 
most of the violations during the transition era were perpetrated by under the power and 
membership of Inkatha.   
 
 
The issue that affected human rights the most during the last years of apartheid was that the 
culture of secrecy and security that had been created during preceding decades and it was not 
possible to remove it immediately and Amnesty concentrated on its reports to depict the 
consequent complicity of human rights violations and the role of apartheid state had in this 
development. Another factor was that apartheid state was de facto a State without reasonable 
control and it had based its power largely on violence and therefore the counter reaction to it 
had been violence.242 When the State started lifting the violent repression this caused a protest 
in the security forces and also the opposition movements had a possibility to intensify their 
activities.  De Klerk set the new political course: 
 
“Up to now the police have been required to perform two types of functions. The one is 
to handle typical crime situations… But you also had other tasks to fulfil, and that was 
control function connected to a specific political party… You will no longer be required 
to prevent people from gathering to canvass support for their views. This is the political 
arena and we want to take the police out of it. We don’t want to use you any more as 
instruments to reach certain political goals. We as politicians must take full 
responsibility for politics… This is the direction we are taking and I want you to make 
peace with this line.”243    
 
This is a speech that de Klerk gave to 500 police officers at Pretoria Police College on 17 of 
January 1990 and its remarkable because it addresses a complete and utter change of 
mentality what comes to the security issues. First of all this speech openly proclaimed that 
political system used the security system to achieve its political desires. Secondly the speech 
addresses and the police is not anymore expected to conduct deeds for political causes and 
this speech also claimed that political system will not be either be authorizing or tolerating 
these deeds as had happened before. (… take the police out of it. … I want you to make peace 
with this line.) This commanding and demanding style was certainly in need because as what 
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de Klerk announced did not go together with the actual human rights situation and arbitrary 
institutional violence remained as part of the system. This speech is sign of intermediate 
period and we can see that the message is covered in euphemisms and this reflects the culture 
of communication that can be seen in the throughout human rights violations as well as in the 
dismantling of apartheid and certain determination and openness is lacking from this speech. 
As seen before the means to remove the security police from the scenario were inadequate and 
also the understanding what kind of role the secret security organization played in the State 
were faint.   
 
A problem that essentially affected human rights in the 1990s is connected to rise of Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP) and how its mission was tied into the security desires of apartheid state. 
IFP was an organization that fostered Zulu interest in South Africa, but its leader Buthelezi 
claimed that IFP is heir of ANC’s mission and it represents the cause of all the South African 
people.244 IFP claimed that the best method to reach this end is constructive engagement and 
this idea presumed acting within the structures of apartheid state. The approach of ANC was 
‘destructive engagement’ and this strategy was partially based on violent revolution and 
destruction of apartheid state and this was the major difference between IFP and ANC. While 
on the international level the politics were entangled in the trap of cold war on the domestic 
level IFP and ANC were entangled to strategic, symbolic, ethnic and political differences. But 
as with the international entanglement there were issues beyond the surface and there was a 
strife and power struggle between ANC and IFP. ANC blamed IFP for collaborating with 
apartheid state and IFP blamed ANC for destructing preconditions for dialogue and 
constructive engagement. There is probably something right and wrong in both of these 
claims but the scenario was not fertile for constructive encounters. Communication took place 
on highly intensified emotional level and the security desires of apartheid had constructed a 
scenario where all the people were denied their security. This caused that dialogue between 
different settings was virtual impossibility and all the actors were deeply entangled in the 
dogmas and worldviews that were intensified by the violent conflict. Ethnic, political and 
strategic aspects were all confused into one categorical package, which made solving the 
problems impossible. This problem became even more complicated since apartheid state had 
a desire to contradict, destabilize and confuse its opponents and therefore it provided support 
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for IFP that could act as violent counter force to ANC. This conflict was essentially and 
intentionally provoked by apartheid state.  
 
In the historical scope IFP has difficulties to admit that it could not see the forest from the 
trees and recognize the reasons of this conflict and shortcomings that led to it. On the other 
hand the ANC side has over positive picture of the revolution and applying revolutionary 
methods for political change. The last 10 years of apartheid was a no-win situation and even 
the best outcome from human rights perspective is terrifying. Apartheid state had problems to 
reverse from the dead end the opposing forces had similar problems to orientate and set into 
constructive engagement, whereas the preceding strategies had been largely based on 
violence. 245     
 
The amalgamation of strategic interest of apartheid state and IFP on the grass root level was 
embodied on security co-operation and financing IFP that used the funds to increase its 
violent capabilities. Obviously IFP saw this union as justified because it believed that ANC’s 
mission is not only directed against apartheid state but it is a mission that is designed at 
accomplishing ANC orientated supremacy. This sense was intensified by incidents such as 
uncovering ANC arms cache in KwaZulu and IFP claimed that this part of ANC’s violent 
onslaught against IFP.246  The security of homelands was under the control of apartheid state 
and this was a factor that made it easy to use the homeland security structures for purposes of 
State security. The Minister of Law and order appointed the senior police officials to control 
the KwaZulu police and by doing that it was possible combine the interest of the State and 
IFP that controlled KwaZulu. Consequently the KwaZulu police doubled its power under Jac 
Buchner who had also been a Vlakplaas operative had he participated raids that apartheid 
security organizations conducted to Maseru in Lesotho and Matola near Mozambican capital 
Maputo.247 This is how Dirk Coetzee described his colleague to TRC: 
 
"…one of South Africa's top security policemen", who had "established himself as a brilliant 
and ruthless opponent of the ANC - as interrogator, state witness, logistics expert and planner 
of raids on neighbouring states".248  
 
                                                 
245 Barber 1999, 239-241. 
246 Barber 1999, 239-241. 
247 Amnesty International, State of Fear 1992, 64. 
248 TRC 1999. vol. 2. Chapter 5. The Homelands from 1960 to 1990, 471. 
 134
It seems to be that apartheid state unscrupulously used the KwaZulu police to implement its 
security desires and even though nominally homelands were self-determined in the reality this 
was not realised because for example essential security structures were directly in the control 
of apartheid state. Even though it has to be remarked that it would have been difficult to 
create such projects without understanding between IFP and apartheid state. It seems to be 
that in the KwaZulu crises two actors that had dissimilar aims but acted jointly against the 
‘common enemy’. Apartheid state supposedly had only utilitarian interest to support IFP and 
this relation was based on apartheid’s basic strategy of divide and rule. By supporting IFP and 
other anti-ANC forces the security faction sought to suppress ANC that was portrayed during 
the decades of apartheid the prime evil that corrupts South Africa with its communist 
revolution. When all this anxiety was provoked through efficient State propaganda and all the 
angst is projected on one actor, which was ANC, it is not possible to remove such deep-rooted 
prejudice immediately and seek for common grounds. Also ANC had a role and there was 
hostile attitude towards IFP and some people in ANC saw even destruction of IFP as the only 
solution.249  
 
Amnesty’s contribution to South African human rights in the beginning of 1990s was a report 
South Africa, State of Fear, Security Force Complicity in Torture and Political Killings 1990-
1992 (for instance previously presented Mlangeni case is included in this report) and issues 
that are being reviewed in this report regard the violent attacks by IFP that were assisted by 
security police troops. Subjects of these attacks were usually township dwellers who 
supported ANC or Mass Democratic Movement, which had been established after UDF 
(United Democratic Front) a multi organizational association was banned. Other reported 
issues were human rights violations in Bophuthatswana homeland whereas in the Republic the 
torture and killing by security police had reduced in Bophuthatswana a raging conflict 
between officials and people were everyday reality and officials used violence widely to 
suppress the political opposition.250 Amnesty also reported on a conflict between ‘taxi gangs’ 
in Cape Town and how the political violence had escalated to this area and different political 
factions used this arena to solve their differences by attacking minibuses that are used for 
transportation. In that conflict the police favored associations that violently attacked 
associations of ANC supporters and this conflict had similar features to the one in KwaZulu 
even though IFP was not present there but the main purpose was favoring of anti-ANC 
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associations. A new wave of killings in South Africa and abroad had arisen and there were 
well found suspicion that State security organizations were responsible for these deeds and 
Amnesty sought to unravel these cases and to see who is eventually behind them. 
 
 The pattern how these occurrences were reported is following. First there is background and 
context provided in which the particular phenomenon exists, which is followed by the actual 
occasion and who had been the subject of the attack, and who is the conductor of violation. 
This was not easy question because there was a project of intentional misleading on the role 
of security forces and secret missions caused confusion. Barber has used Amnesty’s report as 
example of successful intervention where an independent reporter manages to question the 
official version of reality, when Goldstone commission concluded that there was no proves of 
phenomenon called ‘Third Force’. This term was used for describing the curtailed 
involvement of security forces especially in the ANC/IFP rivalry.251  The descriptions of 
‘facts’ is followed by the reaction of officials and almost categorically the conclusion is the 
new neutral line of police function is not taking place in the reality and justice and political 
systems haven’t been able to act in a manner that would have contributed to halting the spiral 
of violence. Even though the reforms of Botha failed abysmally which led to dismantlement 
of apartheid under power of de Klerk the justice system had difficulties to transcend the 
security trauma and contribute to dismantlement of arbitrary and uncontrolled security 
system. Under the power of apartheid justice system had been integrated as part of oppressive 
security machinery and therefore it could not accomplish assignments that opening society 
required. Amnesty contributed this shortcoming by reporting on cases that justice system 
continued to dismiss regardless of apparent evidences.  
 
Amnesty had changed considerably its methods and whereas before it had trusted on strategy 
of raising consciousness and gathering attention towards human rights problems. Renewed 
situation demanded highly focused and reliable information under conditions where human 
rights were highly politicized and the remnants of apartheid sought to steer the political 
development by manipulation of violent scenario and human rights issues. Power of publicity 
was still strongly present but is difficult to imagine that Amnesty could have brought 
consolation to the victims of human rights violations by mass action that would have been 
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participated by individual members and South Africa had come to a point where it sought to 
cut the spiral of violence and construct a new political system.  
 
Amnesty report was a remarkable because Goldstone commission and Harms commission 
failed to investigate human rights violations properly and expose/admit the link apartheid 
state had to these occurrences. This process was initiated by the information that was 
uncovered by Dirk Coetzee and other Vlakplaas operatives and regardless of the information 
they gave both of these commissions stated that apartheid state does not have connection to 
the “death squad” style killings. Therefore the myth that these deeds are conducted by 
individual rogues was maintained as this was obviously desirable from the perspective of 
security faction. Eugene de Kock has stated of the information that security people gave to 
Harms commission that “We lied”. 252 As the of fallacy apartheid state’s integrity partially 
remained it was important that Amnesty collected a large factual report that sought to distract 
this fraudulent picture.  
 
 
 
4.5 Co-operation of Inkatha and security forces 
 
In the beginning of 1990s in KwaZulu and certain areas in Transvaal conflicts between 
ANC/UDF/MDM supporters and IFP took place. These conflicts and the claims that security 
forces are intermingled with these incidents was one of the interests of Amnesty’s 
investigations. By this far this study has concentrated on violence and violations that were 
mainly committed by security forces and even though the scope of human rights violations 
was broader but Amnesty had not expand its agenda and therefore these violations or abuses 
were not reported The most human rights violations occurred in the conflict between IFP, 
which was backed up by apartheid state and ANC its affiliates. TRC has provided following 
statistical overview on the data that TRC has collected on human rights violations: 
  
“Indeed, IFP violations constituted almost 50 per cent of all violations reported to the 
Commission's Durban office for this period, and over one-third of the total number of 
gross human rights violations committed during the thirty-four-year period of the 
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Commission's mandate. The statistics also indicate that IFP members, supporters and 
office-bearers in KwaZulu and Natal were responsible for more than 55 per cent of all 
violations reported to the Commission's Durban office for the period between July 1993 
and May 1994.” 
 
“Other statistics derived from the Commission's database show that Inkatha/the IFP 
was responsible, in the mandate period, for some 3 800 killings in the Natal and 
KwaZulu area compared with approximately 1 100 attributed to the ANC and some 700 
to the SAP (police). The IFP remains the major perpetrator of killings on a national 
scale, being allegedly responsible for over 4 500 killings compared to 2 700.”253 
 
The reasons for this conflict were before briefly presented, however, the intention here is not 
to analyze profoundly the roots of this conflict, but to portray how this issue was presented as 
human rights question. Liberation violence turned out to be a slippery target for Amnesty and 
therefore Amnesty had to re-orientate its approach to grasp this subject. Whereas apartheid 
state had difficulties to reverse from the dead end, opposition and liberation organizations had 
similar problems and it was impossible to apply ‘old’ schemes and principles to comprehend 
the renewed scenario. Apartheid state over imagined the control over its forces and similar 
phenomenon regards ANC and IFP and their relation was largely defined by spiral of violence 
that was beyond the leadership’s control.254   
  
In the beginning of 1990s there were plenty of incidents that suggested that Inkatha, and 
especially Kwazulu police was backed up and supported by security force machinery. Perhaps 
the most known incident was Boibatong massacre where Inkatha supporters attacked ANC 
supporter with a result of 46 dead. A political result was that CODESA, that functioned as an 
interim institution where the future’s State was negotiated, was temporarily halted due to 
massacre.255 To back up the suspicion of Inkatha’s role Amnesty performed case studies on 
these happenings and here particularly under examination are attacks on Phola Park, 
Swanieville squatter camps and Bruntville township. Phola Park and Swanieville are in 
Transvaal and Bruntville is near Mooi River in Natal midlands (now Kwazulu-Natal) where 
Inkatha vigorously sought to expand its power on this area.  
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Victims of human rights violations had been an important source of information and now 
even more so when some areas of the country had turned into war zones and security forces 
tried to veil their connection to these incidents by covering their faces and removing license 
plates from the cars.256 In the 1960s Amnesty had major problems to connect with the victims 
of human rights violations and the information gathering missions improved gradually and 
also the general interest and therefore information grew continuously and this established a 
network of human rights actors that could produce reliable and sufficient information beyond 
official channels. During this conflict information was collected from people who flee to 
refugee centers (for example churches) and information was collected from people by 200 
hundred volunteers that were briefed by lawyers. There is remarkable change to preceding 
times and whereas the assault against civil society had made very difficult to collect and 
disseminate information on human rights violations. Now there has been a larger network of 
civil society that has provided immediate protection and also this network used consciously 
publicity to advocate human rights. Amnesty does not tell who had organized this mission but 
obviously there was a larger social demand to change and influence human rights. The level 
of repression did not reach all the levels of society and State anymore, and clearly this was a 
step towards establishment of a State that respects human rights.  
 
Interviewing eye witnesses was used as a method to obtain information during the so called 
Seven Days War where IFP launched a series of attacks on ANC-supporting areas and 
generally when attacks on communities occurred and people fled to refuge centers, where 
they could tell what they saw and experienced. According to Amnesty 80 people had been 
killed, 200 homes destroyed 11 500 forced to seek refugee during the Seven Days War 
alone.257 TRC has described and figured Seven Days War in this manner:  
 
“In fact, the violence took place over many more than seven days. Over 100 people were 
killed, some 3 000 houses were destroyed by fire and approximately 30 000 people fled 
their homes as a result of the violence. The vast majority of the people killed and injured 
were from the non-Inkatha areas, and the vast majority of the property damaged, 
burned and looted belonged to non-Inkatha supporters.”258 
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Similar methods were used to publicize other incidents such as attack on Phola Park squatter 
camp. At the time of this incident Phola Park was under threat of removal by the local council 
authorities and a conflict broke between squatter camp and nearby hostel dwellers. This 
conflict erupted in mid-August 1990 and a number of people died immediately and 80 more 
in the consequent skirmishes. According to affidavits taken from more than 100 witnesses 
attacks were led by White men with blackened faces or wearing balaclavas and they were 
followed by armed Inkatha supporters from the nearby hostels. Weaponry used in attack were 
guns, grenades, incendiary devices, and a variety of “traditional weapons”. The pattern of this 
conflict follows more or less the same figure as other Inkatha attacks organized and co-
operated by security forces. Calls for help were neglected and it was not in the in the interest 
of security officials to restrain the conflict. Amnesty reports how a social worker employed by 
Catholic Church tried to call help and when the local police refused to receive her call she 
contacted police headquarters in Pretoria  and a police official assured that riot police had 
gone to the area and everything was under control. However, the only sign of police was an 
unmarked police van and the next the night there was a helicopter searching for the area and 
some police armored vehicles (casspirs) and the only reaction for these police officers was to 
enter the Church and ask if the 1 500 people who had fled there had a permission for such a 
gathering.259 Practically there was either intentional or intuitive agreement between the police 
organization and the ones who supported IFP in the field that police will not intervene these 
scenes. 
 
Rest of the description of Phola Park destructions consists of how White persons, most likely 
security force members, set alight shacks with incendiary devices and Black people 
accompanied by them looted the houses. The overall pictures of happenings is that the police 
took part in destroying the shacks and they guaranteed that the destruction will not be 
interrupted and some people were even denied to leave the area when they fled the 
destruction. Police refused to disarm the IFP supporters and on the contrary police officers 
entered the squatter camp and removed any arms they could find.260  
 
Similar incidents were reported from Seven Days War in Natal and heavily-armed groups 
moved around by buses, lorries, other vehicles and by foot and attacks seemed to be carefully 
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planned. Amnesty presents as an example attack on community of KwaMnyandu that was 
encircled by hundreds of attackers who advanced in vehicles and by foot and the attackers 
were armed with spears, shields, knobkerries (short stick with a knobbed head), handguns, R1 
rifles and shotguns. “During the attack over 120 houses were looted and burned, and at least 
120 people murdered.”261 
 
There are plenty other accounts that support Amnesty’s view on the security forces biased 
approach and security was intentionally denied from certain people and others were 
intentionally assisted in their attacks: 
 
“These indications of bias are strengthened by other reports which describe white 
police moving about in unregistered or private vehicles. They were seen apparently 
consulting with Inkatha leaders while an attack was under way, or, on another 
occasion, joining up with large convoy of trucks ferrying attackers after shooting 
reportedly intensified. Other eye-witnesses describe seeing members of the South 
African Police handing over ammunition and guns from police vehicles to armed 
Inkatha supporters. Many withnesses also describe seeing police vehicles escorting or 
even leading attacking forces moving from one target are to another”262 
 
There are plenty more descriptions how police participated and supported the violence and 
there is no doubts that this information would not be factual even though absolute accuracy 
cannot be guaranteed but the overall picture is clear. The main message of Amnesty in the 
beginning of 1990s was that regardless of new security norms the violence was still strongly 
provoked and incited by the security forces and there had to be strong improvements before 
human rights situation would be sufficient. After the Seven Days War the Government’s and 
Inkatha’s stand on human rights was clear and there were still actors that were not willing to 
improve human rights: 
 
“The government’s response to the crises was to send then Minister of Law and Order, 
Adriaan Vlok, to meet Chief Buthelezi on 31 March 1990. Shortly after, the minister 
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announced that the Defense Force members accused by Chief Buthelezi of taking sides 
against IFP in the conflict would be removed.”263  
 
Besides getting formal and informal assistance from apartheid state Buthelezi as leader of IFP 
vigorously resisted that IFP would have perpetrated human rights violations and this stand 
was expressed also in TRC hearings: 
 
“On no occasion has the IFP's leadership ever made any decision anywhere at any time 
to use violence for political purposes. I have always abhorred violence now and will die 
abhorring violence. I personally have never made any decision to employ violence 
anywhere for any purpose whatsoever.”264 
       
In contrast Inkatha members seemed to have a different view on the reality: 
  
“I will say that it is painful to me that after all these activities that we committed that 
people should deny our existence and call us criminals. When I went for training at 
Caprivi, nobody called me a criminal. When I killed people here, I was not called a 
criminal. Today they do call us criminals and deny knowledge of our activities and 
ourselves. No IFP leader is prepared to stand before this Commission and admit to 
these activities. We decided among ourselves to expose these activities. We in fact were 
not mad persons who just took weapons and started shooting people at random. 
Therefore it hurts me very much for the IFP to desert us and say that they do not know 
anything about us - when they know that they were in fact responsible for all these 
things.”265 
 
How should we interpret this clash or encounter between the IFP leaders and field soldiers? 
Before similar encounter was recognized between Eugene de Cock and de Klerk and 
generally the political leadership deny their responsibility on human rights violations. 
Whereas de Klerk admitted that the actions of State were conducive for human rights 
violations and they recognize these actions as human rights violations IFP or Buthelezi does 
not accept similar view. What comes to credibility of IFP member’s statement here same kind 
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of critique should be applied as on Eugene de Cock writings. Honor turned into shame and 
when it was time to solve what had happened in the past and to react with disappointment to 
the actions of political leadership appears as feasible. However, as argued before these 
statements should be encountered as unique subjective views that provide a valuable inside 
view to the past and they should be encountered in the context that they took place. If these 
experiences are being taken for their face value certain experiences are being simultaneously 
covered. Leaders do exaggerate their role but on the other hand ‘foot soldiers’ tend to attribute 
their behavior solely to the command line and surrounding atmosphere.  
 
The attitude among the security forces towards the conflict between ANC and IFP was 
following: 
 
“…In August 1990, when Thokoza hostel residents attacked Phola Park squatters on the East 
Rand, the police issued a statement declaring that they would "not get involved in a political 
fight" between Zulus and Xhosas.”266 
 
How should we comprehend this view? Why does security forces of a country that is paranoid 
about security and it sacrifices a fair share of its mental and tangible resources to security 
allow violence intentionally to appear? This argument and generally statements of apartheid 
state could be seen as representation or a stage. A play takes place on the stage and certain 
people perform this play for certain people. This was a play of apartheid’s worldview; an 
attest that when true moral boundaries were exceeded and the result was of abandonment of 
morality which lead to violence and chaos. This is how security officials wished to portray the 
consequences of development where apartheid power was fading. The stage reality and 
tangible reality are inevitably connected and there is no one without the other. But did these 
people actually believe what their own plays were presenting? This phenomenon is not 
merely connected to one indecent and it was a strategy developed by apartheid to contradict 
its opponents and also divert attention from human rights violations and other failures of 
apartheid state. This still does not explain why apartheid state wanted to perform this play and 
what it tells about its worldview. This is how Eugene de Kock describes what was called 
black-on- black violence: 
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“The black on black violence … was a handy propaganda tool because the outside 
world could be told … that the barbaric natives … started murdering each other at 
every opportunity. We contributed to this violence for a number of years both passively 
(by failing to take steps) and actively (by sponsoring and protecting violent gangs’).267 
 
The view of de Kock presents that there was certain level of intentionality and deliberation 
but is such a play possible if the audience is not captured in the spirit of the play? As with the 
deaths in detention factually it can be said the evidences that State presented were always 
insufficient but perhaps there were people who were not interested in the accuracy of the play 
as much they were interested on what was played. De Kock claims that this play was directed 
to outside world but it has to originate from the spirit of apartheid even thought this play 
attracted external viewers as well. There must have been a genuine belief that something bad 
happen inevitably if White supremacy will be removed. What else could have inspired 
playing that the Black people inevitably started murdering each others at every opportunity?  
The self-justification of apartheid was that its repression is based on objective hierarchy and 
when the hierarchy where the Whites are on the top is being removed that means that South 
Africa will fall into disruption. From apartheid state’s perspective this strategy was attractive 
from mental as well as practical perspective.  
 
What more, the display of this play was expanded to outside of South Africa and Worden has 
presented that international media swallowed the bite of apartheid state and violence was 
presented as black-on-black conflict – tribal warfare.268 This served the intention of apartheid 
state that wished to present itself as a fortification of progress and morality in dark Africa. It 
is very concerning on how the characterization of apartheid state and the ‘world’ met here and 
the phenomenon lost its proportions and on the contrary this reveals some underlying attitudes 
how Africa or Africans have been portrayed.  
 
The black-on-black violence phenomenon was not only a top level publicity trick and it 
affected actively how security resources were being managed. For instance Amnesty has 
reported on occasions that police has refused to disarm IFP supporters from so called 
‘traditional weapons’ which in practice were spears, and similar non-firearms. The argument 
of the police and military was that it is a violation of cultural rights to disarm ‘tribal’ people 
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of their traditional weapons because is their cultural right to carry these weapons.269 This 
presents how apartheid perverted and rejected the idea of reconciliating different worldviews. 
This represents the utterly analogical way of thinking that apartheid state practiced. In the 
1960s apartheid state established Bantustan project which according to scale and standards 
of apartheid was granting self-determination. By doing this apartheid state justified its own 
standards and there was no encounter between different worldviews. It was decisions made 
purely on irrational analogical basis and it was not based on real (subjective) needs. Apartheid 
state was continuously seeking the categorical ‘objective standards’ and it appears to be that 
there was an overwhelming disappointment when analogical moral certainty could not be 
achieved. This led to  perverting the humanitarian standards and refusing to resort human 
reason at all. Traditional weapons were allowed even after a law that banned carrying these 
weapons was introduced. Amnesty report is vivid description how large crowds caused 
definitive destruction by applying traditional weapons. Whereas the conflict between the State 
and civil society had began from defiance movement now the remnants of apartheid practiced 
defiance and refused to intervene the violent conflict that disrupted South Africa.270  
 
As Barber has interpreted that the intervention of Amnesty changed the picture of human 
rights violations essentially and Amnesty’s report revealed that the reality that apartheid state 
is playing does not correspond to the reality behind the scenes. The drama of apartheid state 
had also managed to attract viewers around the world and therefore it was essential that these 
incidents were investigated and reported and there was counter force for what the 
international media presented on black-on-black violence.      
 
What was Amnesty’s position in this scenario where many different political groups 
perpetrated the human rights violations widely? The foremost message of State of Fear report 
was that apartheid state was still the prime source of human rights violations and instability, 
but how does this question appear in the historical perspective? As argued before Barber has 
presented similar views, though they have been supplied with the participation of IFP and 
ANC that were under feeble political control, which is to certain extent missing from 
Amnesty’s report. However, Amnesty demands that ANC members as well as Inkatha have to 
be made accountable and responsible as security force members and the human rights 
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violations by State cannot diminish violations perpetrated by other groups. Amnesty 
acknowledged human rights violations widely, but the investigations and responsibility were 
concentrated on the State: 
 
“Ultimately, however, it is the government which, through its control of resources and 
the security forces, has the obligation to take all possible steps to ensure that people can 
live within their own communities without fear. If the authorities continue to fail to 
intervene effectively and impartially in the violence and make the security forces 
accountable for their actions, then the prospects for a democratic transition in South 
Africa are seriously threatened.”271 
 
In order to understand this problem it has to be divided into aspects, which are that how this 
issue appears in ‘objective sense’ and how it appears when things are described as they were. 
Amnesty’s simplistic approach through 1960s to 1990s had been based on describing the 
human right violations and demanding responsible behavior from the State and its security 
organizations. It is obvious that the authorities were not acting responsible from perspective 
of human rights but how this self-justifying loop can be challenged and we can ask was there 
any other way to perceive human rights violations in South Africa? The difference between 
the approach of this study and Amnesty fact finding missions is that Amnesty sought to react 
fast to prevailing human rights violations and in this study the scope of examination is 
stretched and therefore each of these approaches reveal and cover differing things. We cannot 
expect that Amnesty would foresee its history, yet we can see that there possibilities to widen 
the perspective.  
 
We have to ask to that what is the function of human rights activities and what are meaningful 
ways to improve human rights violations? In the long range examination we see that the 
question of human rights violations cannot be reduced to a question of responsibility because 
responsibility is a mere objectification that is attached on the top of history. We can uncover 
different discourses of responsibility, but responsibility does not exist as such, at least not in 
retrospective sense. But what about the time when the human rights violations took place, was 
it relevant to demand responsibility primarily and solely from the apartheid state? This answer 
can be yes or no and it is more meaningful to approach this question from perspective how 
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Amnesty knew and acknowledged different kind of matters. Amnesty based its mission on a 
fact finding mission, but to certain extent the result of this encounter was foreseen because it 
found the State as the major force behind the violent upheaval whereas the argument could 
have been based on platform that demands responsibility equally from all the sides. However, 
it is undeniable that it was a key factor that the security machinery of apartheid was 
dismantled and stripped from power before settlement could be reached. 
 
The attitude of Amnesty reflects the methods of improving human rights violations and how 
they still were based on pressuring State apparatus. For example if EGP and Amnesty 
missions are being compared, EPG sough to construct dialogue and foster reaching the 
settlement and EPG mission was tied to the interest of Commonwealth and therefore it was 
also interested to information that was in UK’s interest such as what was ANC’s relation to 
communism.272 Then again Amnesty’s mission created some restriction because it is not a 
political actor and did not have access to similar resources as EPG did and Amnesty had a 
negative attitude towards apartheid state all the way. If it is difficult to say to what extent 
Amnesty can be criticized for presenting one-sided view on the human rights violations or the 
reasons of this development, but it can be said that at least as historical source Amnesty 
material solely is not viable and it creates insufficient picture of past’s human rights 
questions.       
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V. Synthesis 
 
I started this study by formulating a question that threw a doubt on Amnesty neutrality. 
Commonly Amnesty has been labelled as a credible and neutral reporter but the findings of 
this study point out that there are certain limitations that confine the use of Amnesty’s 
material as a historical source. This remark most probably regards the usage of Amnesty 
reports for other purposes as well. However, there seems to be absence of fair critical analysis 
of Amnesty’s activities and therefore it is difficult to construct an argument that would even-
handedly underline the successes and failures of the organization.  
 
The two modes of existing critique are confirmatory and underestimating. The studies of 
normative school (Clark, Klotz, The Power of Human Rights book) fall mainly in the 
confirmatory category. They see experiences and thinking behind the human rights activities 
as self-evident and self-justified and therefore they do not see any need for further analysis of 
experiences that essentially instruct the course of human rights activities. This group leans on 
universalisms and transcendentalisms and generally phenomena that exceed and pass the 
experiences of ‘subjects’ of both for and against side. This will lead to anachronistic 
interpretation, which prevent human rights activist from reflecting and comparing their 
experiences and generally learning from history.  
 
Representatives of underestimating category are in minority and for example Francis Boyle 
represents this overtly disproportionate form of criticism. His foremost argument is that 
Amnesty did not establish a major campaign to disgrace the apartheid regime and it is implied 
in Boyle’s argument that this manoeuvre would have improved human rights. This argument 
appears as irrelevant and there is no evidence that external shaming solely would have 
changed apartheid’s internal desires that inspired the violent project. Secondly Boyle cannot 
see that organizations such as Amnesty are not omnipotent therefore they have to do what 
they can and what Boyle demands (all-out prosecution) is most definitely out of Amnesty’s 
functionary capabilities.  
 
The intention of my argument is not to underestimate or discredit Amnesty’s contribution but 
to show that there are alternative ways of thinking. The lack of reflective capabilities can lead 
to confusion and deviation from loyalty to human rights principles and generally 
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mismanagement of resources. Now I am going to summarize the three varying acts that 
pinpoint the changes in Amnesty activities between 1965 and 1992.  
 
The first remarkable contribution from Amnesty was 1965 Prison Conditions in South Africa. 
As the title of this report reflects this presentation was focused on prison conditions and the 
larger repercussions of human rights violations are not being yet recognized in this report. 
Besides that the lack of resources and experience is apparent in the report and especially the 
introduction of the report that makes disproportionate comparisons between Stalin’s and 
Hitler’s death camps and ‘contemporary’ human rights violations is a failure.  
 
As a source for this report Amnesty applied material that had been published mainly in 
newspapers and this material presented and commented the dialogue of civil society and State 
that considered violations of human and civil rights. This material includes newspaper articles 
and statement that prisoners and warders had given on the prison conditions. It is remarkable 
that the material that Amnesty itself had gathered or produced is few and far between. In this 
sense Amnesty was fully dependent on the activism of South African civil society and it could 
merely put forward the public discussions that were ongoing in South Africa. The significance 
of Amnesty’s report was that it could enlarge the circle of information and ‘internationalize’ 
back then local question of human rights. However, soon enough human rights became a 
banned topic in public discussion and this implied that Amnesty’s contribution as a spectator 
would not be adequate in the future. The 1965 report was a mere beginning but demand to 
publicize and promote human rights was obvious due to lack of lasting interest towards South 
African human rights on the international spheres. 
 
The 1965 report was disintegrated and the intentions why and for what kind of purposes and 
to whom the report was produced were blurred. These shortcomings were effectively revised 
in the 1978 report and Amnesty produced a properly constructed argument on human rights 
violations in South Africa and apartheid state’s role in this development. In 1965 report 
presenting the institutional and legal context is incomplete and fragmentary and it is difficult 
to comprehend on the basis of this presentation the organic intertwining of legal context and 
the actual human rights violations. Whereas the 1978 report The Political Imprisonment in 
South Africa portray in detailed manner what kind of legal arsenal apartheid state was 
applying and how it formed the legal platform and access to usage of violence for State 
representatives. This development reflects also that Amnesty has contemplated more carefully 
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the possible receptors and targets of its report. While the 1965 report was a fragmented 
collection of information now Amnesty desired to convince institutional actors beside human 
rights activists. Well constructed background information and information that regards legal 
context is a reflection of process where Amnesty recognized need to analyze and pinpoint 
clearly how human rights violations were ‘legalized’. The reason for this emphasis is that 
institutional field is the area where the power of human rights lies besides the public 
consciousness and promotion. 
 
In addition to more punctual analysis of apartheid’s institutional context Amnesty managed to 
bring together greater amount of experiences and statements that were collected directly from 
the victims of gross human rights violations. This reflects and entails that Amnesty had 
managed to establish its organization as a civil society actor inside of South Africa and it 
managed to gain reliable information in large quantities through this network. To get hold on 
this information was of prime importance because this was the information that was bound to 
cause the strongest sentimental reaction and therefore this was kind of information was most 
harmful for apartheid state’s image. (An evidence of ‘sentimental impact’ is for example the 
overwhelming reaction that Steve Biko’s death caused.) In the 1960s apartheid state was 
searching for methods and lines of its security policies whereas the 1970s was an era of 
certain implementation of security policies. From the perspective of this development 
Amnesty became a potential enemy of the State and apartheid state openly pronounced that all 
the civil society activity and activities alike will be interpreted as part of illicit ‘total 
onslaught’. However, Amnesty managed to operate under these hostile conditions and put 
forward what kind informal violent policies apartheid state was applying for political 
purposes. 
 
The most essential question from the perspective of this study that Amnesty made a decisive 
movement in the 1978 report and it announced that no reforms can provide relief and 
therefore the only conceivable and acceptable development can be the dismantlement of 
apartheid. This is a complicit question to analyze because one of the Amnesty principles is 
that its activities do not have direct political intentions. This seems to be feasible, at least on 
the level of theory and it is a principle that Amnesty should cherish. On the other hand it 
seems to as feasible that Amnesty’s intention was to discredit apartheid state by putting 
forward shocking information on torture and other human rights violations that took place 
continuously in South Africa. I see that the problem was not the decision in itself but its 
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mental implications. It is inevitable that Amnesty’s activities entail consequences that could 
be labelled as political and therefore Amnesty can never be fully (at least in indirect sense) 
non-political actor. Nevertheless, principles and guidelines have to be evaluated in each case 
and Amnesty has to find out the best possible way to realise neutrality. There is no ultimate 
principle that could be applied for this problem.  
 
The actual problem is that the Amnesty’s category of human rights violations remained 
unchanged when the human rights violations escalated from State institutions, basically to all 
the walks of life. Why did Amnesty recognize only fraction of human rights violations as 
actual human rights violation? We can see from the statistics produced by TRC that most of 
human rights violations were committed by non-state actors and especially Inkatha. The 
partial coverage could not be excused that there was no information reasonably available 
because some of the violations took place openly on the streets, such as necklacing incidents. 
This argument could be averted by stating that there was no need to report on necklacing 
because media and organizations reported these incidents or that there could be no 
rationalizable intention why Amnesty should have reported other than State based violations. 
This will lead to question that what is Amnesty intention? Is it to improve human rights or 
improve human rights on certain conditions? It seems to be Amnesty got away from path of 
human rights and the diversification of human rights violations went unnoticed in the 1980s. 
There are almost no cases presented from the 1980s in this study and the reason for that is that 
Amnesty maintained mainly the same style of reporting and therefore there is very little to 
analyze. Although we have to remember that the analysis of this study is based on reports and 
therefore other kind of promotion for human rights is not covered by this study.   
 
One of the reasons why Amnesty did not widen its scope in the 1980s could be the very same 
reason that was formulated as the hypothesis of this study. According to this assumption 
Amnesty’s activities are based on sympathy that volunteers feel towards the victims of human 
rights violations. When this mental power was associated with defence of oppressed people it 
can be extremely difficult to change the orientation and admit the escalation of human rights 
violations. Two issues are here gravely contradictory. On one hand Amnesty campaigned 
against apartheid state particularly because it was obviously the main source of social 
uncertainty. On the other hand South Africa fell into state of uncontrolled chaos and 
opposition took advantage of the chaos and in the quest for political rights, human rights were 
neglected categorically. In this situation the human rights development was not solely in the 
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hands apartheid state and therefore Amnesty’s ‘background intention’ to discredit apartheid 
state cannot be seen in affirmative connection with the improvement of human rights. In this 
situation Amnesty focused its resources on apartheid state whereas it could have started 
earlier to appeal on opposition movements to abstain from ‘excessive’ violence. 
 
The development of Amnesty reports had been progressive from the 1960s until 1980s and 
the 1992 State of Fear report can be seen as exception from this development. Besides torture, 
upheaval in Bantustans, assassinations this report portrayed how State security forces and 
Inkatha jointly terrorized especially ANC orientated communities. The prevalent individual 
shortcoming of this report is that it is almost completely ignoring the role of ANC associated 
SDUs (self-defence units). In the end of the report Amnesty suggests that ANC should work 
for abolishing violence and contribute to finding a peaceful solution for the conflict. This 
argument remains hollow because Inkatha originated violence is being portrayed widely 
whereas the examples of SDU violence are missing.  
 
Generally speaking the 1992 reports can be seen as ‘settlement of accounts’, which means 
that it was an amalgamation of the old attitude and the new attitude. If we see this 
development from the perspective of an individual volunteer Amnesty member what there 
was left? Previously members could easily conceive State against ‘people’ setting and 
sympathize and associate with the victims and involve deeply in this process by sending 
letters to the victims and also to the authorities that were responsible for their treatment. Now 
the complicity of the conflict and lack of unambiguous attributes caused that there was no 
more targets that were easily ‘associable’. Here Amnesty faced a situation where loyalty 
towards the organization’s members and a role as a reliable arbitrator and source of 
information became a contradictory problem. The contents of State of Fear report has to been 
seen in this context and the result was that the contents of report is not consistent with 
Amnesty’s mass movement character and regardless of the new amended orientation the 
report fails to portray an essential dimension of the problem. However, Amnesty managed to 
make a movement towards action that actually improves human rights instead of continuing 
promotion that was not consistent with the actual human rights scenario. Then again a 
problem remains that how Amnesty is going to solve this persistent problem of being 
simultaneously a mass movement and a particular reporter. This dilemma is permanently 
intertwined with the structures of its activity. 
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The overall picture of study is connected to one major development. Human rights activities 
and politics connected to it can be seen as marketing strategies where spectators are being 
persuaded to ‘buy’ meanings. This marketeer characterization goes both with apartheid state 
and Amnesty International. Apartheid state managed very well in its businesses and it 
managed to persuade certain (Western mainly) spectators to confirm that, regardless of denial 
of rights apartheid state is the only legal authority that represents liberalism in Southern 
Africa. (A logic of doing less bad thing.) On the other side Amnesty sought to ‘tarnish’ this 
image by intensely promoting the information regarding human rights. The problem of this 
phenomenon of selling and buying in the historical perspective is that the bargaining is on the 
top (objective) and the ‘real’ history (subjective) is beyond the surface. Of course it is very 
interesting in historical perspective to see that what ‘sells’ and who is ‘buying’ but there is a 
danger that the actual ‘subjects’ are being bypassed. On the level of bargaining, phenomena 
become objects of skirmishes on the significations and reality.  
 
Therefore Amnesty material is great source for history of human rights activities but for other 
historical purposes less so. When I started this study it all appeared as one reality    
(normals<->deviators), but further examination revealed that the very same issue can be 
conceived very differently regarding the context from which it is being conceived. For 
instance a view of an individual human rights activist or apartheid era politician can be very 
far from a historical view. Yet all of them are ‘real’ and problem is to make these realities 
negotiable and agreeable and this can happen on if the multiplicity of realities is being 
revealed (contrary to normative theory). This is not a problem in itself but is a problem how 
human sciences solve this problem, because studies analyzing South African human right past 
seem to attain some sort of final and affirmative answers. It does not matter which is the 
perspective/approach of certain study, whether it is human rights or history but all these 
studies should seek to stress the multiple realities instead of promptly drawing in the line 
between normality and deviation and address how normality can be restored over deviation. 
This is executive action whereas studies of this area should be analytical. The current 
situation is that theorist try to become actors. 
 
The 'fundamental' results of this study are: 
 
The normative approach is challenged in apartheid context. Whereas spiral model claims that 
human rights actors establish the normative spiral in this case apartheid state was self-
 153
sufficient and it began preparing for the fortcoming pressure (as presented in chapter II). 
Whereas the current theory categorically claims that human rights violating States are reactive 
in 'normative' sense apartheid state was proactive. This turns the setting upside down and 
therefore expecting downright results through this logic are not realistic. 
 
Actors that seek to labelize the human rights violating State can only act withing framed area 
of comprehension. The doctrine of normative action is that the act of violation in itself is 
remarkable and the ‘internal mind’ of the vioting State is not being analyzed. This led to some 
sort of stalemate where apartheid state sougt to neutralize the violations and Amnesty on the 
contrary to portray them as malicious.  In this sense Amnesty mission partially divorced 
human rights mission. 
 
The current theories repeat tautological interpretation that human rights actors are neutral. The 
result of this study pinpoint that there are variations between views and equally violating acts 
are being evaluated on different basis. It seems to be that some human rights violating actions 
are more neutral than others. Disclaimer; this not a categorical, affirmative or all-
encompassing interpretation. I have pinpointed some of the restrictions that were imposed by 
Amnesty's approach, but it is a matter of discussion what is Amnesty's task and how far its 
range should reach. However, this is a challenge for all the human rights activity to search 
for solututions to reach the human rights violating State instead of repeting the labelizing 
mission in conditions where it does not function. 
 
As a final conclusion I would like present that envisaging the tenets of the actors should be 
taken more seriously in the research of the human rights. This regards both the perpetrators of 
the human rights violations as well as the proponents of human rights. This power of 
imagination differs essentially from the theoretical and ‘logical’ reality and yet it 
fundamentally affects the development of human rights and human rights activities. 
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